Northern Cyprus at a Crossroads: Can Erhürman Redefine the Island’s Future?
- Sanin Mirvić

- Oct 23, 2025
- 4 min read
Updated: Jan 7
The presidential elections held in October 2025 in the internationally unrecognized Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) mark a turning point in the political landscape of the island’s northern part.

The victory of Tufan Erhürman, leader of the Republican Turkish Party (CTP), over incumbent president Ersin Tatar marked the end of an era and opened the door to a new political course—one capable of redefining relations with Ankara and reviving prospects for reunification.
In his victory speech, Erhürman declared that it was “time for the TRNC to open a new phase of dialogue — with Ankara, but also with the rest of the world.” His conciliatory tone and emphasis on dialogue suggest a possible departure from his predecessor’s hardline rhetoric and a move toward a model of political cooperation that could ease Northern Cyprus’s long-standing isolation.
40 Years of Division That Still Endures
Cyprus has been divided since 1974, when Turkey launched a military intervention in response to a coup supported by the military junta in Athens, which aimed to unite the island with Greece. Turkish forces then took control of about 40 percent of the island’s northern territory, creating a de facto dividing line that still exists today. Since then, Cyprus has remained divided between the internationally recognized southern part under the Republic of Cyprus and the northern part, which functions as the self-proclaimed Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus—an entity recognized only by Turkey.
Along the “Green Line,” a buffer zone stretching roughly 180 kilometers, UN peacekeeping forces continue to monitor the unstable peace and the status quo that has lasted for more than half a century.
One of the key attempts to overcome the island’s decades-long division was the 2004 Annan Plan, a United Nations proposal named after then–UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan. The plan envisioned the creation of a federation called the “United Republic of Cyprus,” consisting of two constituent states — Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot — with a rotating presidency, mechanisms for the return of refugees and compensation for lost property, and the gradual withdrawal of Turkish troops. The idea was to reunify the island under a shared political framework and EU membership, with international guarantees safeguarding equality between the two communities.
At the referendum held on April 24, 2004, 64.9 percent of Turkish Cypriots voted in favor of the Annan Plan, while 75.8 percent of Greek Cypriots decisively rejected it. Since the plan required approval from both communities, it automatically became legally void. The consequences were far-reaching: only the internationally recognized Republic of Cyprus joined the European Union on May 1 of that year, while the northern part of the island remained politically and economically isolated.
Among Turkish Cypriots, a sense took hold that they had “voted for peace but did not get it,” and the failure of the Annan Plan was regarded as a symbol of a missed historic opportunity and lasting political and social frustration.
Political Context and Internal Tensions Within the TRNC
Prior to these elections, the TRNC had been led by Ersin Tatar, a politician known for his strong ties with Ankara and his advocacy of the “two-state solution.” His political agenda was almost entirely aligned with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's positions, who openly supports the “sovereignty of the North” and rejects any form of federal arrangement with the Republic of Cyprus.
In contrast, Tufan Erhürman, leader of the Republican Turkish Party (CTP), ran as a candidate for change, calling for a return to negotiations on a federal solution and the normalization of relations with the international community. During the campaign, he stressed the need for “less confrontation and more dialogue,” and promised greater transparency in relations with Turkey.
Erhürman’s victory appears to result from strong mobilization among younger voters, growing discontent with the economic situation, and political fatigue with what one of his associates described as the “politics of subordination to Ankara.” The campaign largely served as a referendum on the orientation toward Turkey and the opening toward the European Union.
However, this could prove to be a near-impossible mission, as the TRNC remains deeply economically and institutionally tied to Turkey—through currency, loans, infrastructure, energy, and the public sector. The economy has been severely affected by the depreciation of the Turkish lira, high inflation, and rising living costs, which have further widened social inequalities. It is estimated that roughly a quarter of the TRNC’s total expenditures are directly covered by Ankara’s financial aid, leaving local authorities with very limited room for independent decision-making.
The Role of Turkey, the EU, and the International Context
Judging by official Ankara’s reactions, Turkey’s fundamental policy on Cyprus remains unchanged. Ahead of the TRNC presidential elections, Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan declared that “Turkey firmly stands behind the legitimate cause of the Turkish Cypriots,” emphasizing that “the only viable path for resolving the island’s issue is the recognition of two separate states.”
Although Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan congratulated Tufan Erhürman on his victory, calling it “proof of the TRNC’s democratic maturity,” he simultaneously reiterated Ankara’s promise of continued support. Such statements suggest that, despite the leadership change, Turkey’s position on the two-state solution will remain a central factor in future negotiations.
While the European Union nominally supports the idea of Cyprus reunification, its actual influence in the North remains limited. Brussels is caught between two conflicting priorities: on one hand, maintaining strategic and energy relations with Turkey — a NATO member and key partner — and on the other, protecting the interests of the internationally recognized Republic of Cyprus, an EU member and the Union’s easternmost frontier.
This dual position narrows Europe’s room for maneuver: without a clear and consistent offer of economic and political engagement, Northern Cyprus risks sinking even deeper into Ankara’s orbit. For Turkey, however, the TRNC is more than a symbol—it is also a tool of power: proof of its enduring influence in the Eastern Mediterranean and a strategic lever in relations with the EU and NATO, which Ankara skillfully uses to balance between pressure and negotiation.
This article was originally published on odgovor.ba.














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