Leaked ‘Trump Bridge’ Plan Stirs Caucasus Tensions as Armenia Denies Secret Corridor Deal

The wider public had hardly heard of a little-known Spanish media outlet, yet this week it shook the Caucasus. Armenia's decision could alter the balance in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Middle East.

Photo: The map of the Lachin corridor

For many, the Spanish portal Periodista Digital was virtually unknown. Its small following on social media, despite Spanish being the mother tongue of half a billion people, suggests it isn’t particularly influential. Yet, this week, it showed it could have a massive impact even on the other side of Europe—in the Caucasus.

The outlet claims that, through the Armenian diaspora in France, it obtained a "secret memorandum" signed by Armenia, Azerbaijan, and the United States. According to this document, the three countries would build a "Trump Bridge" corridor through Armenia's Syunik province. The 42-kilometer corridor would connect Azerbaijan's Nakhchivan exclave with the rest of its territory and would be managed by an unnamed American company for 99 years, although Yerevan would formally retain sovereignty.

The article might have gone largely unnoticed had it not been massively shared and cited on social media by (pro-)Russian accounts, portraying it as a betrayal of the Armenian people by pro-Western Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan.

That the Spanish outlet touched upon a sensitive and important issue was confirmed by Yerevan’s swift reaction. "This fake news was published by a suspicious website called Periodista Digital, which has repeatedly been criticized for serving as a platform for fake personas and distributing manipulative and baseless content. The article in question has nothing to do with reality," the Armenian government stated. Officials added that their own project, called the "Crossroads of Peace," remains on the table, with Pashinyan last publicly discussing it on July 16.

A Corridor That Changes Everything

Russia's preoccupation with its aggression against Ukraine has left room for other powers to gain a foothold in the Caucasus. Other media outlets have written about this part of the world and debated what the so-called "Zangezur Corridor," as officially named by Baku, would mean for the region. Developments on the ground are evident, as shown by Moscow's growing nervousness and intensified media attacks on Pashinyan. Meanwhile, tensions between Russia and Azerbaijan have escalated in recent weeks, with arrests and canceled meetings fueling the standoff.

The issue has gained further importance amid the Israeli-Iranian war, following accusations that Israel used Azerbaijani territory to launch strikes on Iran—allegations Tehran itself has not confirmed. Excellent ties between Baku and Tel Aviv have only fueled speculation, as well as fears that third parties might wedge themselves between Armenia and Iran—or, viewed broadly, between Russia and the Persian Gulf.

How Azerbaijan links its territories is of critical importance for the Caucasus and the powers with stakes there. If Armenia allowed a corridor through its land that it does not control, the regional dynamics would shift significantly. Currently, Azerbaijanis reach the rest of their country via Iran, a route through which Turkey sends over forty thousand trucks annually to access Central Asia.

A corridor through Armenia could also reshape Europe’s energy map, allowing Azerbaijani gas, as well as Kazakh and other Central Asian supplies, to flow through Turkey into Europe. This could cut Russia’s share of the European market by some fifteen percent in a short time. The corridor could facilitate trade worth between fifty and a hundred billion dollars annually by 2027, shortening transport routes between Europe and parts of Asia by twelve to fifteen days.

Regional Relations

These points are well known to anyone following Caucasus affairs. But the story was revived in April this year, when the Armenian parliament passed a package of measures pushing the country toward European Union membership. Earlier, in January, Donald Trump appointed Louis L. Bono as acting director of the State Department's Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs. Bono, a former senior adviser on Caucasus negotiations, suggested placing an international monitoring system over the Armenian corridor, modeled after the Panama Canal or the Berlin access routes during the Cold War.

The West—especially Washington—has clearly seen that part of the Caucasus has grown weary of Vladimir Putin's Russia and that now is the right time to push for change. Following the Nagorno-Karabakh war and Pashinyan's rise to power, Russia has lost leverage to keep former Soviet republics aligned. Armenia has had enough of poverty, while resource-rich Azerbaijan seeks further development.

Connecting Nakhchivan with mainland Azerbaijan is also in Turkey’s interest, as it would insert Ankara into yet another Europe-to-Asia route. Turkey has pursued influence in Central Asia for centuries. Its deeper penetration into that region would be bad news for Moscow, which has long relied on Iran to curb Turkish influence since the Soviet collapse.

Iran, meanwhile, seeks to maintain its border with Armenia and enjoys strong ties with Yerevan. This was evident last week in comments by Iran’s ambassador to Armenia, Mehdi Sobhani. He stated that Tehran does not object to Azerbaijan drawing closer to the West, particularly the EU, and that Iran respects the decisions of an "independent state" with the right to conduct an "independent foreign policy."

Sobhani added that Iran has helped Armenia diversify its foreign policy, citing two examples: an Armenian waste treatment plant built by an Iranian company with World Bank and EU funds, and the modernization of the Meghri customs office, financed by European institutions but carried out by Iran.

The Iranian diplomat stressed that Armenia’s rapprochement with the EU also opens opportunities for broader regional cooperation involving Tehran, adding: "We trust our Armenian friends. The Armenian government is very sensitive in supporting and protecting its relations with Iran, because it is in the interest of both countries and both peoples."

The West or China?

Such a stance from Iran may come as a surprise or signal a subtle shift in its approach. Russia, since the Syrian war, has repeatedly made concessions to third parties at Iran's expense. One need only recall Moscow’s long-standing tolerance of Israeli airstrikes on (pro-)Iranian positions in Syria. Similarly, during Israel’s recent attacks on Iran, Moscow sought not to upset Tel Aviv despite its supposed "strategic partnership" with Tehran.

Nevertheless, things are far from finalized. Azerbaijan and Armenia are still negotiating a peace treaty, which would be the first step in resolving the corridor issue and positioning major powers in the Caucasus. Before such a treaty is signed, a constitutional referendum may be required in Armenia—providing the opposition with an opportunity to challenge Pashinyan's government.

Armenia and Azerbaijan increasingly see a chance to position themselves as a bridge linking the West and China, Europe and Asia, potentially reaping huge financial rewards. Within China’s "Belt and Road" initiative, Iran and the Caucasus hold special importance.

Such a project could benefit nearly every state in the region—except Russia, which risks losing two more countries where it has wielded dominance for decades. Moscow’s nervousness over current developments between Armenia and Azerbaijan shows its displeasure. On the ground, Russia is largely isolated, but not yet defeated.

The article was previously published on nap.ba.

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