Armenia and Azerbaijan Edge Toward Peace, But the Caucasus Remains on Edge

Just under two weeks ago, Armenia and Azerbaijan triumphantly announced to the world that they were on the verge of signing a peace agreement. Nearly all countries with interests in the Caucasus welcomed the agreement, yet open questions remain.

Photo: Illustration

On March 13, Armenia and Azerbaijan announced that they had agreed on the text of a peace deal, with only two points left to finalize.

Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev are most responsible for this convergence of positions between the two countries—not just due to the act of agreeing on a text to sign and ratify. Through their actions (or inaction), these two politicians have brought their countries to a point that would have been unthinkable a decade ago.

Pashinyan and Aliyev

Pashinyan came to power in 2018 in what his critics call a sort of "color revolution" and attempted to pivot Armenia toward the West. He soon damaged relations with Russia, which maintains military bases in Armenia, and consequently alarmed neighboring Iran, which opposes the growth of Turkish influence in the Caucasus and Central Asia through Azerbaijan’s strengthening. Tehran assessed that a significant weakening of Armenia would lead to a decline in Iranian and Russian influence in the region.

Aliyev, upon assuming power in 2003, continued the policies of his father Heydar, from whom he inherited power—at least in terms of realpolitik behavior, a strategy the USSR relied on for decades and in which the elder Aliyev was a key figure. The younger Aliyev formed alliances with anyone who could help him bring Nagorno-Karabakh back under Baku’s control. This brought Israel, among others, into the Caucasus, a move that certainly damaged Aliyev’s reputation in much of the Muslim world.

Over the past decade, Ilham Aliyev has achieved major successes for Azerbaijan after a series of military defeats at the hands of Armenian rebels in Nagorno-Karabakh and neighboring Armenia, which has a fraction of Azerbaijan’s population and a far smaller economy.

Thanks to the geography of that part of the Caucasus, entrenched rebels inflicted heavy losses on the Azerbaijani army, which relied largely on Soviet-era weapons while trying to break through their defensive lines. Baku’s tactical shift came with Turkey’s growing influence and Israel’s entry into Caucasian geopolitics. The massive use of drones and other modern weaponry brought a decisive victory to Baku in 2023, in a war that lasted only a few days and marked the end of the breakaway entity on Azerbaijani territory.

Armenia still feels the consequences of the Nagorno-Karabakh war. According to the opposition, Pashinyan is to blame for the national catastrophe. Alongside efforts to come to terms with the defeat, Yerevan must also care for hundreds of thousands who fled Azerbaijan after the fall of Nagorno-Karabakh. Since then, Pashinyan has sought to secure lasting peace with Baku and resolve key outstanding issues for both sides.

The Peace Agreement

Since the end of the Nagorno-Karabakh war, Azerbaijani and Armenian representatives have met numerous times—sometimes one-on-one, sometimes mediated by a third power, and sometimes on the sidelines of forums both countries attended. The topic was always the same: how to permanently reconcile the two neighbors.

The draft agreement reportedly includes 15 agreed-upon clauses, with two remaining unresolved. The first concerns mutual lawsuits between the two countries in international courts (the International Court of Justice, the International Criminal Court, and the European Court of Human Rights). The second pertains to the presence of foreign troops near their shared border.

Though these two issues may seem minor, they are fundamentally important for the past and future of both states. The lawsuits aim to establish historical responsibility for the war, while the question of foreign military presence is one of the most critical geopolitical issues in the Caucasus.

Before examining these geopolitical shifts, it should be noted that Armenia’s opposition is furious over Pashinyan’s concessions in the draft agreement.

"These authorities have agreed to everything Azerbaijan demanded," said Artur Khachatryan from the opposition Hayastan alliance, adding that Baku is blackmailing Yerevan into accepting its terms or else face war.

Armenia’s Republican Party called the agreement a "one-sided anti-state concession" and a "double capitulation." They asked Pashinyan whether he would win an election if he told the public he was ready to surrender Artsakh (the Armenian name for Nagorno-Karabakh) and later legitimize "ethnic cleansing and genocide."

The Geopolitics of the Caucasus

For the international community, more important than these legal disputes and Armenian political debates is the geopolitical context surrounding the (non-)acceptance of this agreement. The presence of international forces along the two countries’ borders is a crucial issue—not just for monitoring the ceasefire but because it could lead to a land connection between Turkey and Azerbaijan, which Iran sees as a threat to its interests.

Azerbaijan’s Nakhchivan exclave, bordering Turkey, is separated from the rest of the country by sovereign Armenian territory. For decades, Azerbaijan’s land traffic has depended on transit through Iran. To change this and connect the two parts of Azerbaijani territory, the so-called "Zangezur Corridor" would need to be opened.

Since the start of hostilities, Baku has demanded this corridor through Armenian territory, proposing various modalities. Azerbaijan now cites the 2020 ceasefire agreement, which stipulated that the corridor would be under Russian supervision and that Armenia would "guarantee the security of transport links" between Nakhchivan and the rest of Azerbaijan. That agreement was backed by Russia and Turkey.

The new draft agreement, yet to be finalized, must address this issue. There is no doubt that Turkey supports Baku’s stance, while Iran has clearly stated its opposition to any corridor that would alter the region’s geopolitical landscape. Tehran has urged Moscow to reconsider its 2020 position and reminded its ally of Iran’s strategic interests.

One such interest is preventing the severing of Iran’s land connection to Russia and Europe via Armenia. The "Zangezur Corridor" would reduce the number of Iran’s neighboring countries by one, leaving Armenia and Iran without a shared border. This idea is also opposed by Armenia’s opposition, but Pashinyan has made unpredictable moves in the past that are sometimes hard to explain. Recently, an Armenian activist wrote on social media that the Armenian PM’s positions "align with official Azerbaijan’s," calling it "unprecedented."

Numerous Obstacles

Pashinyan’s policies, thus far supported by the West, have left many bewildered. The only explanation for his moves may be his desire to shed the burdens of the past and turn toward the future as if nothing happened. If true, this stance likely has some public support among those weary of war and poverty.

But politics is not always as idealists imagine. For instance, Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov recently stated that "as a next step, Azerbaijan expects Armenia to amend its Constitution… and eliminate claims against the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Republic of Azerbaijan." He also demanded Armenia dissolve the OSCE Minsk Group, a 1992 format backed by the U.S., Russia, and France to resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

To meet Bayramov’s first demand, Armenia would have to change its Constitution, which references the unification of Armenia and Artsakh (Nagorno-Karabakh) in its preamble. Pashinyan has said he will attempt to pass a new constitution via referendum. Experts believe this could not happen before mid-next year, and opposition resistance suggests the outcome is uncertain.

The biggest obstacle to Pashinyan’s plans, however, maybe Russia and Iran—especially if Tehran convinces Moscow of its position. Russia may reject Azerbaijan’s insistence on the 2020 agreement, given the changed circumstances in Nagorno-Karabakh and, more importantly, in Russia’s relations with Armenia after Turkey-backed forces ousted Syria’s Bashar al-Assad. Additionally, Armenia suspended its participation in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO, often called "Russia’s NATO") last year.

Iran has repeatedly—sometimes sharply—warned Russia through official statements and pro-government media to respect Tehran’s interests as a strategic partner. It has also cautioned Armenia against relinquishing its border with Iran and weakening its position.

Tehran insists it opposes any geopolitical changes in the region while acknowledging Azerbaijan’s right to connect its territories via Armenia or Iran. Iran fears the corridor, which would separate it from Armenia, could further entrench Turkey and potentially Israel in the region, beyond existing oil arrangements. Tehran’s seriousness was demonstrated years ago by military drills along the Azerbaijani border and warnings to Baku against bringing Syrian fighters (backed by Turkey) into the Caucasus. Earlier reports suggested mercenaries from Idlib had fought in Nagorno-Karabakh during Syria’s ceasefire.

Likely to calm domestic and regional concerns, Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan stated that this month’s agreement does not include "any extraterritorial transport links for Nakhchivan," later adding that he "will not answer all possible questions" about the near-finalized deal.

Like Pashinyan, Mirzoyan wants peace with Azerbaijan and a new chapter in regional relations. However, this policy worries both Armenia’s opposition and some neighboring states. Pashinyan’s unconventional approach suggests anything is possible—and expected.

The article was previously published on PISJournal.net.

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