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This week, Venezuela’s president, Delcy Eloína Rodríguez Gómez, removed Álex Saab from his role as minister of Industry and National Production. Saab’s career is a clear example of secretive political dealings. Photo: Nicolás Maduro and Álex Saab Most people know little about Álex Naib Saab Morán, a Colombian-Venezuelan citizen of Lebanese descent. Saab’s involvement in Latin American and global politics began during the last years of President Hugo Chávez . He gained the most influence under Nicolás Maduro, but now the interim president, Rodríguez, has decided to remove him from the government. The way the United States has handled the Saab case shows both public and secret deals among major political players in the region. The fact that his expulsion from Venezuelan politics came in the first days of interim President Rodríguez’s tenure, and immediately after John Ratcliffe, the head of the U.S. CIA, arrived in Caracas, speaks to Saab’s importance for relations between the two states and to his influence—but also to what is expected of Rodríguez after Maduro was kidnapped and transferred to a U.S. prison. Saab’s career—including his arrest in Cape Verde, extradition to the United States, release and return to Venezuela, and now his removal from power—shows how complicated relations are between major powers and countries that try to act independently. Is he a criminal or a hero? To understand why Saab was swiftly removed from the government in Caracas, we need to go back some twenty years and at least partially illuminate the role of a man whom Washington and Interpol pursued around the world, while the authorities in Venezuela simultaneously proclaimed him a “hero.” Put simply, Saab was tasked with evading U.S. sanctions. In short, Saab’s job was to help Venezuela avoid U.S. sanctions and manage its trade. Many people think he was more important to Maduro than any other minister and helped the country survive under sanctions. However, authorities and the media accused Saab of crimes like financial fraud, illegal transactions, drug trafficking, money laundering, oil smuggling, and setting up illegal networks in Europe and Asia. This was evidenced by the 2011 meeting between Chávez and his Colombian counterpart, Juan Manuel Santos. The two states agreed on a $530 million housing construction project, and Saab was the contractor. According to media claims, Santos did not know that Saab—who was part of Chávez’s delegation—was also a citizen of Colombia. During those years, people started paying more attention to Saab, who over the next fifteen years became a central figure in Venezuelan trade, both legal and illegal. After that, U.S. agencies began tracking Saab and tried to arrest him. He managed to avoid capture for years, but in mid-2020, his plane stopped in Cape Verde to refuel on its return from Iran. Saab landed on the island of Sal, and Washington, through Interpol, requested his extradition and even sent a warship to prevent his escape. For someone of his reputation, this was a surprising mistake. In October 2021, Saab was extradited to Washington, which Maduro called a “kidnapping.” In response, Maduro left talks with the Venezuelan opposition in Mexico, where lifting sanctions was on the table, and arrested two U.S. citizens who worked for Citgo. Biden’s prisoner swap and Trump’s hard stance Many in Venezuela feared Saab would, like other fugitive officials, reveal secrets and align himself with Washington’s agenda. But in Maduro’s view, his trusted man did not do so, even though he appeared before a U.S. court under the threat of a long prison sentence. In December 2023, in a prisoner swap with President Joseph Biden’s administration—after Biden pardoned Saab—he was returned to Venezuela, and by October 2024, he became a minister. After Trump removed Maduro from Venezuelan politics on January 3, some of his associates are now leaving as well. Delcy Rodríguez has little room to maneuver if she wants to avoid new U.S. attacks on Venezuela, and she must comply with Washington’s demands—at least the major ones. Last Friday, Ratcliffe visited Caracas and asked for “confidence-building measures,” according to an unnamed Trump administration official. The official also said Ratcliffe and Rodríguez talked about possible economic cooperation and that Venezuela should not be a safe haven for America’s opponents, especially “drug traffickers.” On Sunday, Rodríguez announced on X that Saab had been dismissed and that his ministry would merge with the Ministry of Trade. “I thank colleague Álex Saab for his work in the service of the homeland,” she wrote, adding that he would get “new assignments,” but did not give details. The investment sector has been handed to a former U.S. student. Calixto Ortega Sánchez is a former head of Venezuela’s central bank and a diplomat in Venezuela’s mission in Houston, the American hub of oil refining. Can Venezuela’s left survive under Trump? By removing Saab and appointing someone familiar to Americans, Caracas is clearly signaling a desire for better relations with Washington. For example, yesterday Rodríguez made 28 changes in top military positions, and she has been restructuring the government and state agencies for several days. relations with Washington and business with U.S. oil companies. That does not necessarily mean betraying the interests of Maduro’s policy, which offered cooperation to the American side in exchange for Venezuela’s political independence. The question of how much freedom Latin American leftists truly have in practice, therefore, remains open. This dilemma also shapes Saab’s story. He did both legal and illegal work for the government. Over about fifteen years, he managed deals worth billions, was arrested and sent to the United States, and later returned to Venezuela to become a minister. He is not the only one with such a background. Recently, Trump released Juan Orlando Hernández, the former president of Honduras, who was convicted in the U.S. for drug trafficking. That move helped the opposition defeat the left in Honduras’s presidential elections. That is why it is hardly surprising. This is why some people believe that Maduro and his wife, Cilia, could one day return to Venezuela if Rodríguez and others meet Washington’s expectations. Anything is possible in politics, and secret channels of communication often decisively shape outcomes. Saab did what his government demanded, and now he has been removed from the top of Venezuelan power as a gesture of rapprochement with a former enemy. Is this just another political move by Venezuela’s left to save what they can from a stronger Trump, or is Rodríguez switching sides? We will find out soon. Saab’s career, and many other cases in Latin American history, show that both options are possible. This article was published earlier on nap.ba .

Protests have continued in Iran for more than two weeks. They began with calls about the state of the economy, but soon shifted from demonstrations to violent calls to overthrow the existing system. U.S. President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu support these protests. Photo: Illustration The pace and number of major events, especially those related to U.S. politics and economics, often leave the media little time for in-depth coverage. For example, at the end of last year and the start of this one, public attention quickly shifted from the Jeffrey Epstein case to the U.S. operation in Venezuela and Trump’s announcement that he might take similar actions toward Mexico, Colombia, Cuba, and Denmark (Greenland). This is not the full list of important events involving Trump. Protests have continued across Iran for two weeks, and many advocates of U.S.-Israeli policy in the Middle East see them as “the end of the regime” in Tehran. Besides Iran, Trump has dealt in the Middle East with Lebanon, specifically the disarmament of the Shiite, pro-Iranian Hezbollah, and talks involving Turkey and Syria. He also asked Israeli President Isaac Herzog to pardon Netanyahu in connection with his corruption trial. Iran Protests The peaceful protests in Iran, which began in late December, were sparked by economic conditions. Iran’s currency, the rial, is estimated to have lost about sixty percent of its value over the past year. Merchants in major cities led the protests. The authorities said the protests were legitimate. Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian said the government would listen to the demonstrators’ demands and tasked ministers with negotiating to resolve the issues. Pezeshkian said the government intends to take “fundamental measures” in “monetary reform.” It is still too early to predict the results of the announced reforms, because the main cause of Iran’s economic problems remains decades of sanctions and Western economic pressure meant to force Tehran to comply with Washington's and Tel Aviv's demands. The Israeli-American military attack on Iran in the middle of last year again shows the aim of that policy. This economic pressure has slowed Iran’s growth for decades. A weakening currency fuels constant inflation, and some experts say these Western measures were designed to impoverish the middle class and turn it against the authorities. But that is only part of the problem for Iran’s leadership. In recent weeks, Trump and Netanyahu have threatened Iran with new military strikes and have acknowledged interfering in Iran’s internal affairs. Netanyahu called on the Iranian people to rise up and told them Israel stands with them. The Mossad secret service wrote in Persian on its profile on the social network X: “Come out together into the streets. The time has come. We are with you. Not only from afar or with words. We are with you on the ground as well.” A few days after the peaceful demonstrations began, the situation changed. Videos on social media show some protesters becoming violent and chanting “death” to Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Some claim these are the biggest protests in Iran since the death of Mahsa Amini in 2022. Iran’s authorities responded with arrests. Media reports showed weapons and military equipment that they claim were found with some participants in the unrest. The authorities say some security personnel have been killed and are announcing more arrests. Supporters of the authorities also took to the streets in greater numbers than those demanding the end of the Islamic Republic. The government is trying to portray the protests as the work of Israel and the United States, who want to subdue Iran or push it into a long war like those in Syria or Iraq. Netanyahu and Trump Don’t Want to Miss the Opportunity Most Western media frame the Iranian protests as a struggle by Iranians for democracy and freedom, something that would finally bring peace to the Middle East. From Iran’s leadership’s perspective, the protests are an attempt by Washington and Tel Aviv to carry out a coup in the country, as has been done in other states, to break Iran as a power with influence beyond its borders and one that seeks an independent policy. Netanyahu does not hide that this is his goal. He has repeatedly said he wants to bring down Iran’s current leadership as part of his plans for Israel to dominate the Middle East. Netanyahu believes this is the right time to break Iran, especially after Bashar al-Assad was toppled in Syria, Lebanon’s Hezbollah was cut off from Tehran, Palestinian Hamas was almost destroyed, and Trump is providing him unconditional support from the White House. A change of power in Tehran also fits official Washington’s plans. Securing an obedient government in Iran would, as in Venezuela, give Washington an opportunity to access Iranian oil and other resources. In the bigger picture, it would be a strong blow to China’s ambitions to withstand American pressure. At this moment, there are no indications that Trump and Netanyahu are close to achieving that goal. Iran’s authorities are keeping things under control for now, and most Iranians are not with the demonstrators despite many problems. The main question is who will make the next move, whether the United States and Israel will attack Iran again, and what Tehran’s response would be. The article was previously published on nap.ba .

While Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić advocates for the European Union and better regional relations, the omnipresent Aleksandar Vulin, closely aligned with Vučić, calls openly for a “Serbian World” and the end of the European path. All of it unfolds in full view of the West. Photo: Aleksandar Vučić and Aleksandar Vulin During the breakup of Yugoslavia, while wars engineered in Belgrade were raging across the region, Slobodan Milošević — as the president of Serbia and the undisputed leader across the territories he sought to keep under control — used a simple tactic in dealing with Western diplomats. Counting on the superficiality of the West and its fear of Belgrade’s supposed power, Milošević frightened his interlocutors with Vojislav Šešelj. In one intercepted telephone conversation between Milošević and war criminal Radovan Karadžić, Milošević described the leader of the Serbian Radical Party with a single word: “crazy.” Milošević’s message to the West was clear: if you push me, “the crazy one” Šešelj will come to power. From NIS to the European Union Vučić has recycled that pattern many times in dealings with the West. Having served as Milošević’s propaganda minister and Šešelj’s party secretary, Vučić had the opportunity to learn from both men. Time and again, he has sold Brussels a polished narrative of Serbia as a guarantor of regional stability and a leader in European integration — all while setting fires across the Balkans. The latest example arrived this week. Announcing that he would attend a working dinner in Brussels with European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and European Council President António Costa, he proclaimed that he would ask EU leaders to admit all Balkan states to full membership simultaneously. “If someone is left out, what will you do with those countries? And I know everyone talks about alignment, but this is not only about the future of the region, but it is also about the future of Europe. Admit us all together, without exception — everyone will feel better, Albanians and Bosnians included… I hear only good reactions to this idea,” Vučić said. To reinforce his “proposal,” which the EU is not about to accept, Vučić walked into a joint press briefing with von der Leyen and Costa and declared loudly that he had “just received a message from Moscow.” Von der Leyen cut him off with: “Let’s wait,” most likely meaning that neither the time nor the place called for such theatrics. Serbian commentators called Vučić’s remark a diplomatic gaffe, but far more likely it was a calculated move — something offered to Brussels, something hinted to Moscow, and a message sent to the Serbian public that Belgrade always has an alternative. Meanwhile, Vučić’s heartfelt concern for Albanians and Bosnians rings hollow. Serbia under his rule cannot organize free and fair elections at home, while Albanians and Bosnians continue to face pressure from Belgrade’s political apparatus. Separatism in Bosnia and Herzegovina has been coordinated from Belgrade for decades, while Kosovo Albanians have repeatedly been targets of Serbian paramilitary violence. The timing of the Brussels performance is notable: Vučić is facing U.S. sanctions against NIS — the Serbian oil company majority-owned by Russia — now under direct American pressure. For months, Vučić has refused to remove Russian ownership from NIS, despite multiple technical solutions proposed by experts. Moscow will not easily surrender such a strategic tool in the Balkans, and Vučić will not seize it from Moscow’s hands — while likely asking Brussels for favors in exchange. Vulin as keeper of the flame Vučić’s claim that he hears “only good reactions to this idea” must, by the logic of Serbian politics, be paired with a radically different counter-voice. Enter his close ally Aleksandar Vulin — former minister in multiple portfolios, former head of Serbia’s intelligence service, and a man under U.S. sanctions. In an opinion piece for Večernje novosti — a newspaper widely viewed as among the most pro-Russian in Serbia — Vulin wrote that Serbia’s European integration is “in direct conflict with the idea of uniting Serbs.” Vulin says that Serbian citizens must decide in a referendum whether they want the European Union or the “Serbian World.” Translated bluntly, Vulin wants Serbs to choose between peace and cooperation with neighbors, or conflict over their neighbors’ territory. In normal circumstances, the government would welcome such a referendum, because rational societies choose peace. But under Vučić, that referendum will not happen — because Vulin’s option would likely win. That fact itself is one of the key “achievements” of Belgrade’s leadership from Milošević to today. Vulin has been expressing versions of this idea for years. Throughout that time, his objective has remained the same: to manufacture instability in the region, obstruct Serbia’s and its neighbors’ European paths, and remain firmly within Moscow’s sphere of influence. A new Belgrade bait-and-switch for the West Vučić’s supposed concern for the feelings of Bosnians and Albanians is deceptive. The number of war criminals Serbia refuses to extradite to Bosnia and Herzegovina speaks loudly enough about what Vučić thinks of reconciliation. Vulin’s proposals speak clearly enough about what may happen if the region fails to resist. The most intriguing aspect of this week’s dual messaging from Vučić and Vulin lies in Vulin’s framing: he calls for a change in Serbia’s national policy — implying that Vučić’s current policy is pro-European, distinct from his own pro-Russian orientation. The fact that Vučić has managed to sell that illusion to Brussels is a tragedy that has cost the region more than a decade of European and NATO integration, deepened divisions, and dug new political trenches. Now, as mass student and civic protests continue at home, Vučić once again tries to present himself in Brussels as a peacemaker who wants the region to join the EU and NATO. The question is whether Brussels will once again believe that it is possible to move westward in cooperation with a pro-Russian policy and pro-Russian ministers — and to erase the consequences of a political legacy that has claimed over a hundred thousand lives, displaced millions, shattered societies, de-industrialized the region, and turned it into Europe’s periphery, forced to bow whenever Washington, Moscow, Berlin, or Brussels threaten hard enough. The article was published earlier on nap.ba .

On a hazy weekday morning on the Athens Riviera, the old airport is almost unrecognizable. The runways are still slightly noticeable from above, two pale scars running parallel to the sea, but at ground level, cranes, pylons, and incomplete concrete frames dominate the horizon. Security fences block off much of the site. Billboards promise “a new green, smart city” where families cycle past glass towers and a vast park rolls down to the water. Photo: Olympic Airways Boeing 747-200 SX-OAB, retired in 1999. November 2025. © Leon Dimitrios/Corella Publishing Welcome to Ellinikon – or rather, The Ellinikon, as the branding now insists. For more than 60 years, this was Athens’ main international airport, handling up to 13.5 million passengers a year before it closed in 2001 . A few years later, its grounds hosted Olympic baseball and hockey, and then – in one of the most jarring turns in its history – a makeshift refugee camp. Today, it is marketed as Europe’s largest urban regeneration project, a €7–8 billion bet on luxury real estate and a coastal lifestyle. How one piece of land could absorb so many roles, in so little time, says a lot about modern Greece – and about the kind of future European cities are building. From glamour gateway to Olympic stage Ellinikon opened in 1938 and, for decades, was Greece’s front door to the world. The airport became synonymous with Olympic Airways, Aristotle Onassis’s national carrier, and with the promise of jet-age modernity. Part of the site also hosted a US air base during the Cold War, underscoring its strategic importance. By the 1980s and 1990s, however, Ellinikon was bursting at the seams. Squeezed between the sea and fast-growing southern suburbs, the airport was handling more passengers than its official capacity, while nearby residents complained about noise and traffic. A decision was made to build a new hub at Spata, 20 kilometres east. When Athens International Airport “Eleftherios Venizelos ” opened on 28 March 2001, Ellinikon ceased commercial operations. Photo: Olympic Airlines fleet parked at the former Ellinikon Airport during its heydays, Athens, October 1985. © Leon Dimitrios/Corella Publishing The last Olympic Airways Boeing 737 departed for Thessaloniki; the lights went off in the terminals. Early on, politicians floated grand ideas for what would follow: above all, a huge metropolitan park that would give congested Athens the green lungs it never had. Instead, in the early 2000s, the site was pressed back into service for another spectacle: the 2004 Olympic Games. Runways and apron areas were repurposed into the Hellinikon Olympic Complex , hosting sports such as baseball, softball, hockey, and fencing. For a few weeks, Ellinikon was again at the centre of global attention, symbolising a confident, modernised Greece. Then the flame went out. Ruins and refuge In the years after the Olympics, Ellinikon slipped into limbo. The grand metropolitan park never materialised; instead, the former terminals and venues decayed behind fences, their seats bleaching in the sun and their walls filling with graffiti. Occasional trade fairs, concerts, and sports events could not disguise the sense of abandonment. When Greece’s debt crisis hit, the 6-million-square-metre plot functioned as both a symbol of waste and a tempting asset. Successive governments tried to privatise it as a condition of the bailout, while local municipalities and citizen groups argued for a largely public park. Planning disputes, court challenges, and political hesitation dragged on for years. Then, in 2015, the site took on a very different role. As wars in Syria, Afghanistan, and elsewhere pushed hundreds of thousands of people towards Europe, Greece found itself on the front line of the refugee crisis . With existing facilities overwhelmed, authorities used parts of the former airport terminal and Olympic venues at Hellinikon to house asylum seekers. Photo: Refugee children from Afghanistan at play near the West Terminal building, Summer 2016. © Leon Dimitrios/Corella Publishing The camp hosted up to 3,000 people , with estimates reaching 6,000 at its peak, many of them families, mostly from Afghanistan. Tents were pitched on former baseball fields and inside the old arrivals hall, scattered around on the parking lots and entrance facilities. Human rights organisations repeatedly criticised conditions as “deplorable” – overcrowded, poorly heated, with limited sanitation and no privacy. In June 2017 , police cleared the camp, busing the remaining residents to other sites across the country. Within a few days, the makeshift shelters were gone, leaving just rubbish, damaged fittings, and contested memories. For those who had once passed through Ellinikon as tourists or workers, the sight of people stranded there in tents was an unpleasant reminder of how uneven the freedom to move can be. Europe’s “largest urban-regeneration project” The next act in Ellinikon’s story is now rising quickly from the rubble. Following a lengthy tender process, the site was leased to Lamda Development, a Greek company backed by international investors, which is spearheading a vast mixed-use scheme branded “The Ellinikon”. The project’s own materials describe it as “Europe’s largest urban-regeneration endeavour” and “a smart and sustainable new city within Athens.” On roughly 6.2 million square metres of land, the developers plan luxury residences, office districts, hotels, marinas, Greece’s largest shopping mall, a Hard Rock hotel and casino resort, and the Riviera Tower. This 200-metre residential high-rise is set to become the country’s tallest building . A central promise is the creation of a vast coastal park, around 2 million square metres in size, with restored streams, sports areas , and restored dunes – marketed as doubling Athens’ accessible green space. Construction is well underway . Recent progress updates show major groundwork, soil and groundwater remediation (billed as the largest such project in Greece), and early structural work on key buildings and infrastructure. Much of the old Olympic infrastructure has already been demolished. Some heritage elements, including parts of Eero Saarinen’s 1960s East Terminal , are meant to be preserved and adapted into cultural spaces. Economically, the stakes are high. The total investment is estimated at around €8–10 billion over the coming decades. The government touts The Ellinikon as a flagship of the post-crisis recovery, capable of creating tens of thousands of jobs and attracting tourists and investors year-round. Whose future city? The Ellinikon’s official narrative leans heavily on expressions like “sustainability”, “innovation,” and “public space”. Plans promise bicycle lanes, electric-vehicle infrastructure, energy-efficient buildings, and, crucially, public access to parts of the seafront and the metropolitan park. Yet the project also speaks to a wider European tension. Large regeneration schemes often arise on former industrial or infrastructural land, sold as chances to heal urban scars. In a few years’ time, visitors may arrive at The Ellinikon, stroll through the park, shop at the mall, and watch the sunset from the marina without realising what stood here before. For the developers and politicians, that will be a sign of success: an “empty” site transformed into a glossy new city-within-a-city — for many others, it may feel more like a beautifully managed act of forgetting.

Last Friday, the Nobel Committee awarded the Peace Prize to María Corina Machado, an opposition leader from Venezuela and a favorite of official Washington. The award comes at an important moment for Venezuela — and some earlier Nobel Peace Prizes in Latin America were precursors to major political processes. Foto: María Corina Machado Parisca The importance of the Nobel Prize varies across different parts of the world, especially when it comes to the Peace Prize. Laureates are often perceived as champions of “the right causes” — those whose politics have prevailed or ought to prevail. Thus, it would be difficult for anyone to argue that figures like Nelson Mandela or Willy Brandt were undeserving of such recognition. But other recipients have provoked sharply divided opinions. The award to Henry Kissinger is one such case, as is that of Aung San Suu Kyi. Critics argue that both Kissinger and the Burmese politician did so much harm that a brief flash of humanity in their long political careers could not possibly justify a Nobel Peace Prize. There are also examples that border on the tragicomic. In 2009, the Peace Prize was given — as people would say — “for his good looks” to newly elected U.S. President Barack Obama. During his two terms, Obama was involved in military operations in Afghanistan, Libya, Yemen, Iraq, Syria, Pakistan, Somalia, Uganda, and the Central African Republic, among others. In the end, in Kunduz, he bombed Doctors Without Borders — themselves recipients of the same prize — and never faced accountability for it. Given these and other examples, it is hardly surprising that U.S. President Donald Trump demanded a Nobel Prize for himself after declaring that he was a peacemaker even in wars that were never fought. Latin America and the Nobel Prize: From Literature to Politics In Latin America, the selection of Nobel laureates sometimes resonates almost like a message from Europe — a reminder of what is expected from its long-departed relatives on the distant continent. While the Nobel Prizes for Literature — several of them since 1945 — were largely received as recognition of the region’s literary excellence, in a part of the world moving away from Spain even as the Spanish language remained and flourished, giving rise to what Nobel laureate Mario Vargas Llosa called the “richness of Latin American and Spanish culture,” the Nobel Peace Prizes — in effect, awards for political action — often poured fuel into the engines of ongoing political processes. Thus, in 1980, the Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to Argentine human rights activist Adolfo Pérez Esquivel for his fight against the country’s military and civilian dictatorship — a victory celebrated as a defeat for the right-wing regimes strongly supported, among others, by Kissinger himself. The 1987 Nobel Peace Prize, awarded to Costa Rican President Óscar Arias Sánchez, helped foster a series of peace agreements in Central America, supported by Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua — arrangements that would later shape key political, economic, and regional relations. In 2016, Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos received the Peace Prize with the explanation that he was the key figure who could end the decades-long war in his country. As in Obama’s case, the Nobel Committee sought to encourage Santos to deliver peace — though the results of the two men’s presidencies were quite different. Santos spent years negotiating with armed guerrillas and reached a peace agreement with them, only for Colombians to reject the deal in a referendum just five days before the Nobel announcement. Although weary of war, they did not want peace “at any price.” In the following years, guerrillas and the government reached various agreements, paving the way for Gustavo Petro’s 2022 election as Colombia’s first leftist president — a development that brought significant political change to the country. Peace for Oil-Rich Venezuela Petro became the first Colombian president sympathetic to the “revolution” in neighboring Venezuela, adding his name to the list of Latin American leaders who support the legacy of Hugo Chávez and his far less successful successor, Nicolás Maduro. This year’s Nobel Peace Prize laureate, María Corina Machado Parisca, has opposed both Chávez and Maduro for two decades. Her selection as this year’s laureate surprised few. On the night before the announcement, betting agencies recorded a massive surge of wagers predicting her win. Kristian Berg Harpviken, director of the Norwegian Nobel Institute, confirmed the reports and told the media there were suspicions of espionage — announcing an investigation, without specifying who was under scrutiny. Some might say that Trump did not place any bets but could still consider the prize his own — something the laureate herself confirmed in her conversation with him. She dedicated the award “to the people suffering in Venezuela and to President Trump for his determined support of our cause.” That “shared cause” is nothing less than the overthrow of Maduro and the establishment of a pro-American government in the country with the largest oil reserves in the world — a goal both Trump and Machado have repeatedly proclaimed. her own country, calling on the United States, Argentina, and Israel to take action. She also demanded sanctions on Venezuela — even though existing sanctions have already forced millions to flee the nation to which she now promises to restore “freedom” and “peace.” In its justification, the Nobel Committee described Machado as “one of the most extraordinary examples of civil courage in recent Latin American history,” portraying her as a “champion of peace” and a “key unifying figure within a once-divided opposition.” Committee chair Jørgen Watne Frydnes said she had “kept the flame of democracy alive in Venezuela during a period of growing darkness” and praised her for “remaining in the country despite serious threats to her life.” A Battle of Life and Death Machado is now wanted by authorities following yet another failed election for the opposition. The courts and electoral bodies — under Maduro’s control — barred her from running in last year’s presidential elections, citing her calls for foreign military intervention and sanctions. Her political program has also been targeted by the government because it proposes that foreign corporations privatize Venezuela’s oil and other resources, and that the country pivot toward Washington. Her goal is to defeat “Chavismo” — the political legacy of Chávez and Maduro — which emphasizes state ownership of national wealth. Machado comes from a very wealthy family, while Maduro rose to power through his ties to Chávez, having started out as a bus driver and union organizer. In essence, this is a clash between two opposing political visions and two political figures. Both sides have used various legitimate and illegitimate means to fight their battles — as shown by the Nobel laureate’s current status in Venezuela and her support for Trump after he placed a $50 million bounty on Maduro’s head, labeling him a member of a criminal organization and a threat to U.S. national security — thus making him a potential target for American attacks of all kinds. For Maduro, Machado is a “demonic witch,” and his government fears that the Norwegian prize may be a prelude to a U.S. military assault. The Peace Prize awarded to Obama at the start of his first term was, after all, used to lend legitimacy to wars he later waged. In recent days, a pro-Maduro newspaper published a caricature showing Machado in military uniform adorned with U.S. and Israeli flags, holding a scythe labeled “sanctions.” Different Sides of the Same War In foreign policy terms, the Venezuelan government and Machado stand on opposite sides. For more than two decades, Caracas has supported Palestine, while Machado backs Israel and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu — even as international courts hear genocide cases. She has equated the struggles of Venezuela and Israel, calling the Middle Eastern state “a true ally of freedom.” Machado has long been prepared for a potential scenario of Maduro’s downfall. Among those who signed the letter nominating her for the Nobel Peace Prize last year was then–Senator Marco Rubio, now the U.S. Secretary of State. Rubio has been a long-time advocate of confronting left-wing governments in Latin America. But that’s nothing new in the region. For decades, Latin America has been divided between pro-American and anti-American forces — and no one hides it. Venezuela’s misfortune lies in the fact that it is governed by an exceptionally inept president, Maduro, whose administration often struggles with even the simplest tasks. Machado’s and Washington’s problem, however, is that millions of Venezuelans continue to defend even such a government by any means necessary — fearing that what might come after could be far worse. And for the credibility of the Nobel Prize itself, it’s both fortunate and unfortunate that its long history has included laureates far better — and far worse — than this year’s winner. This article was originally published on the nap.ba.

The presidential elections held in October 2025 in the internationally unrecognized Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) mark a turning point in the political landscape of the island’s northern part. Photo: Illustration, S.Mirvic/Corella The victory of Tufan Erhürman, leader of the Republican Turkish Party (CTP), over incumbent president Ersin Tatar marked the end of an era and opened the door to a new political course—one capable of redefining relations with Ankara and reviving prospects for reunification. In his victory speech, Erhürman declared that it was “time for the TRNC to open a new phase of dialogue — with Ankara, but also with the rest of the world.” His conciliatory tone and emphasis on dialogue suggest a possible departure from his predecessor’s hardline rhetoric and a move toward a model of political cooperation that could ease Northern Cyprus’s long-standing isolation. 40 Years of Division That Still Endures Cyprus has been divided since 1974, when Turkey launched a military intervention in response to a coup supported by the military junta in Athens, which aimed to unite the island with Greece. Turkish forces then took control of about 40 percent of the island’s northern territory, creating a de facto dividing line that still exists today. Since then, Cyprus has remained divided between the internationally recognized southern part under the Republic of Cyprus and the northern part, which functions as the self-proclaimed Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus—an entity recognized only by Turkey. Along the “Green Line,” a buffer zone stretching roughly 180 kilometers, UN peacekeeping forces continue to monitor the unstable peace and the status quo that has lasted for more than half a century. One of the key attempts to overcome the island’s decades-long division was the 2004 Annan Plan, a United Nations proposal named after then–UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan. The plan envisioned the creation of a federation called the “United Republic of Cyprus,” consisting of two constituent states — Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot — with a rotating presidency, mechanisms for the return of refugees and compensation for lost property, and the gradual withdrawal of Turkish troops. The idea was to reunify the island under a shared political framework and EU membership, with international guarantees safeguarding equality between the two communities. At the referendum held on April 24, 2004, 64.9 percent of Turkish Cypriots voted in favor of the Annan Plan, while 75.8 percent of Greek Cypriots decisively rejected it. Since the plan required approval from both communities, it automatically became legally void. The consequences were far-reaching: only the internationally recognized Republic of Cyprus joined the European Union on May 1 of that year, while the northern part of the island remained politically and economically isolated. Among Turkish Cypriots, a sense took hold that they had “voted for peace but did not get it,” and the failure of the Annan Plan was regarded as a symbol of a missed historic opportunity and lasting political and social frustration. Political Context and Internal Tensions Within the TRNC Prior to these elections, the TRNC had been led by Ersin Tatar, a politician known for his strong ties with Ankara and his advocacy of the “two-state solution.” His political agenda was almost entirely aligned with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's positions, who openly supports the “sovereignty of the North” and rejects any form of federal arrangement with the Republic of Cyprus. In contrast, Tufan Erhürman, leader of the Republican Turkish Party (CTP), ran as a candidate for change, calling for a return to negotiations on a federal solution and the normalization of relations with the international community. During the campaign, he stressed the need for “less confrontation and more dialogue,” and promised greater transparency in relations with Turkey. Erhürman’s victory appears to result from strong mobilization among younger voters, growing discontent with the economic situation, and political fatigue with what one of his associates described as the “politics of subordination to Ankara.” The campaign largely served as a referendum on the orientation toward Turkey and the opening toward the European Union. However, this could prove to be a near-impossible mission, as the TRNC remains deeply economically and institutionally tied to Turkey—through currency, loans, infrastructure, energy, and the public sector. The economy has been severely affected by the depreciation of the Turkish lira, high inflation, and rising living costs, which have further widened social inequalities. It is estimated that roughly a quarter of the TRNC’s total expenditures are directly covered by Ankara’s financial aid, leaving local authorities with very limited room for independent decision-making. The Role of Turkey, the EU, and the International Context Judging by official Ankara’s reactions, Turkey’s fundamental policy on Cyprus remains unchanged. Ahead of the TRNC presidential elections, Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan declared that “Turkey firmly stands behind the legitimate cause of the Turkish Cypriots,” emphasizing that “the only viable path for resolving the island’s issue is the recognition of two separate states.” Although Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan congratulated Tufan Erhürman on his victory, calling it “proof of the TRNC’s democratic maturity,” he simultaneously reiterated Ankara’s promise of continued support. Such statements suggest that, despite the leadership change, Turkey’s position on the two-state solution will remain a central factor in future negotiations. While the European Union nominally supports the idea of Cyprus reunification, its actual influence in the North remains limited. Brussels is caught between two conflicting priorities: on one hand, maintaining strategic and energy relations with Turkey — a NATO member and key partner — and on the other, protecting the interests of the internationally recognized Republic of Cyprus, an EU member and the Union’s easternmost frontier. This dual position narrows Europe’s room for maneuver: without a clear and consistent offer of economic and political engagement, Northern Cyprus risks sinking even deeper into Ankara’s orbit. For Turkey, however, the TRNC is more than a symbol—it is also a tool of power: proof of its enduring influence in the Eastern Mediterranean and a strategic lever in relations with the EU and NATO, which Ankara skillfully uses to balance between pressure and negotiation. This article was originally published on odgovor.ba .

Last week, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan signed a mutual defense agreement, which Pakistani Defense Minister Khawaja Asif described as a framework similar to NATO, intended to connect predominantly Muslim countries. Photo: Shehbaz Sharif and Mohammed bin Salman Hamas’s attack on Israel on October 7, 2023, triggered a wave of changes across the Middle East. Israel has used the war to try to pursue its regional ambitions, looking far beyond the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. The latest proof of this is the attack on Hamas members in Qatar, a country that for years served as a mediator in negotiations between the Palestinian organization, Israel, and the United States. The attack did not sit well with the Arab states of the Persian Gulf. After Israel bombed, in addition to Doha, Gaza, Tehran, Damascus, Beirut, Sana’a, and other locations, it is not hard to conclude that other Arab cities are within range—and that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu does not shy away from the use of force, fully backed by the United States. U.S. Ambassador to Israel Mike Huckabee reminded the Arabs last week where things stand: “Israel is our only true partner.” Riyadh’s Response Since Hamas’s attack on Israel, Saudi Arabia, led by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS), has been under dual pressure. Arabs and Muslims worldwide expected Riyadh to help civilians in Gaza and the West Bank, while the West pressed it to recognize Israel. Essentially, this disrupted MBS’s plans to reform the kingdom. Part of those reforms included reconciliation across the region, which meant ending the war in Yemen and mending relations with Iran. This was a major victory for Chinese diplomacy at the time—one that threatened to upset the established balance of power in the Middle East, much to the displeasure of Israel and the United States. Yet, after the events of the past twenty months, MBS now understands that his plan could be thwarted by a military strike—or even an assassination. Israel has carried out assassinations of Arab and Iranian leaders, and Lebanon’s Hezbollah reportedly struck Netanyahu’s home with a drone. The United States’ unconditional support for Israel should serve as a wake-up call for the Arab world. Professions of friendship, lucrative business ties, and a network of U.S. military bases across Arab countries have not been enough for Donald Trump’s administration to take a neutral position in any confrontation involving Israel—no matter the reason or the opponent. It was therefore natural for Saudi Arabia to turn toward Pakistan—a country with which it enjoys exceptional relations. Deepening ties with a nuclear power was merely a question of will, as the two states already maintain strong cooperation in almost every field. Mutual Defense According to a senior Saudi official who spoke to Reuters, the agreement is “the culmination of years of discussion. It is not a response to any particular country or specific event, but rather the institutionalization of a long-standing and deep cooperation between our two nations.” This institutionalization means that the two countries have pledged to defend each other in case of an attack by a third party. The agreement was signed in Saudi Arabia by MBS and Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif. Officials stated that this means Pakistan would defend Saudi Arabia even with nuclear weapons. The agreement was not well received in Washington, as both signatories are U.S. allies. Their alliance sends a direct message to Washington—that some now doubt its guarantees. Even worse for the United States, within both countries there are voices calling for further distancing from Washington. Opposition leader Imran Khan, arguably Pakistan’s most popular politician, advocates for aligning his country more closely with Russia and China. Pakistan’s concern over a Middle East dominated by Israel and the United States was also evident during the Israeli-American strikes on Iran. Islamabad did not hide its support for neighboring Iran, and media reports speculated that Pakistan provided Tehran with concrete assistance. This complex geopolitical maneuvering by Pakistan is closely linked to its border situation and domestic stability. Pakistan’s rivalry with nuclear-armed India, its porous border with Afghanistan, and its hard-to-control frontier with Iran all compel Islamabad to cultivate friends and foster stability wherever possible. The U.S.-Saudi involvement in the region—aimed at defeating the Soviet Union in Afghanistan and undermining Tehran’s government after 1979—has resulted in some of those armed groups now posing a threat to Islamabad itself. A Muslim NATO? Pakistan’s vision for solving regional problems was laid out last week by Defense Minister Khawaja Asif in an interview, where he called for the creation of a defensive alliance of Muslim countries, modeled after NATO. Asif also described neighboring Afghanistan as a “hostile state,” accusing the Taliban government of arming militant groups operating in Pakistan. In an earlier statement, Asif admitted that Pakistan is still paying the price for its 1980s involvement in toppling the USSR in Afghanistan and for supporting the U.S.-led invasion in 2001. In a long-ago interview, MBS himself—while consolidating power and defending his position before allies in Washington—remarked that the West had encouraged radical Islam during the Cold War, particularly in Afghanistan, and that he wanted to change that. Conflicts Are Far From Over The Saudi-Pakistani defense agreement has encouraged many in the region, and some have already proposed that other states join. Support is coming from various quarters. It is worth recalling that in June this year, the Muslim Brotherhood sent a letter of support to Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in the midst of Iran’s conflict with Israel. Not long ago, that same organization and Iran were on opposing sides in the Syrian war. Both cases show that in the Middle East—beneath the surface of seemingly stable, long-standing regimes—movements are stirring and new plans are being forged. Washington, too, is aware that the Middle East is always on the brink of transformation. The U.S. ambassador to Turkey, Trump’s close ally and special presidential envoy for Syria, Tom Barrack, said this week that he does not believe in peace in the Middle East: “When we say peace, that’s an illusion. There has never been peace in the Middle East. There probably never will be, because everyone is fighting for legitimacy.” Barrack’s words have been echoed by many before him. Yet they come at a time when new alliances are forming and wars continue to rage. Syria, under Ahmad al-Sharaa, a former member of al-Qaeda and ISIS, is preparing to normalize relations with Israel after decades of hostility. Pakistan has pledged to defend Saudi Arabia with nuclear weapons. Iran and its allied forces in Lebanon and Yemen are preparing for another round of clashes with the United States and Israel. Even Qatar, Jordan, and Iraq are not spared from instability, while Trump threatens the Taliban and calls for the U.S. military to return to Afghanistan. Palestinians continue to suffer. All of this gives the Saudi-Pakistani agreement additional weight, as it could soon be put to the test. Nearly everyone in the Middle East expects new wars; most simply hope they won’t be the next ones forced to fight. In Barrack’s words, the region remains suspended between the illusion of peace and the struggle for survival and power—and the events of the past twenty months show that no one is untouchable. The article was published earlier on nap.ba

Firefighting helicopter collects seawater in southeastern Attica, July 2025. © Sanin Mirvic/Corella Greece is once again facing the harsh reality of summer wildfires. By mid-August 2025, more than 45,000 hectares have already burned across the country, making this one of the five most destructive seasons of the past two decades. On the island of Chios alone, over 10,000 hectares have gone up in flames this year, adding to an alarming statistic: nearly a quarter of the island’s landmass has burned in the last decade. The blazes have been fed by conditions set in motion long before summer. A severe drought in 2024 brought rainfall levels down by about 40 percent from the seasonal average, with reduced snowfall and drier soils creating an ideal setting for fire. This water shortage has become a silent accelerant, priming forests and shrubland for destruction. Photo: Burned hillside in southeastern Attica after the July 2025 wildfires. © Sanin Mirvic/Corella Yet Greece’s fires, destructive as they are, form just one part of a much larger Mediterranean emergency. Across the European Union, 2025 has already become the worst wildfire season since records began in 2006. More than one million hectares of land have been scorched, surpassing even the catastrophic season of 2017. Spain and Portugal alone account for the bulk of the devastation, with massive blazes consuming rural landscapes and threatening towns, olive groves, and vineyards. The environmental toll has been staggering: greenhouse gas emissions from this year’s EU fires are estimated at nearly 38 million tonnes of carbon dioxide—comparable to the annual emissions of entire countries like Portugal or Sweden. The broader picture reveals a troubling pattern. Southern Europe’s ecosystems are highly adapted to fire, yet climate change has altered the rhythm and intensity of these natural cycles. Prolonged droughts, hotter summers, and erratic rainfall are transforming the Mediterranean into a region where megafires are no longer exceptional, but expected. Studies have shown that extreme weather conditions in Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus are now ten times more likely than in the past and about 22 percent more intense due to global warming. This means that every year, local firefighting forces are asked to confront scenarios that once would have been considered rare events. The response, too, has been unprecedented. The EU Civil Protection Mechanism has been activated on a record scale, sending planes, helicopters, and ground crews to help overwhelmed national services. Greece has relied on this support repeatedly in recent years, as local firefighting units find themselves stretched thin during peak fire season. Meanwhile, policymakers are beginning to confront an uncomfortable truth: no amount of firepower will suffice if prevention, forest management, and water security remain neglected. Comparing Greece with its Mediterranean neighbors offers both perspective and warning. While the fires in Spain and Portugal have been larger in sheer scale, the Greek case underscores how climate vulnerability is compounded by geography. Islands like Chios, where large swathes of land can be lost in a matter of days, and regions already weakened by drought, cannot afford to absorb repeated shocks. What is unfolding is not only a test of firefighting resilience but also of long-term adaptation. The Mediterranean has always lived with fire. But as summers grow hotter, drier, and longer, what was once seasonal risk is fast becoming a chronic condition. Greece’s 2025 wildfires, alongside the record-setting blazes across the EU, serve as a reminder that the climate crisis is not a distant abstraction but a lived reality—one measured in hectares lost, livelihoods threatened, and skies darkened by smoke.

Photo: A narrow alpine path leads into the heart of Prenj, one of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s most iconic mountain ranges along the Via Dinarica trail. © Sanin Mirvic / Corella 2025 Walking the Via Dinarica in Bosnia and Herzegovina is like. stepping into a landscape in slow motion: dramatic peaks rise from emerald valleys, ancient villages cling to limestone ridges, and rivers carve canyons that whisper centuries of history. Bosnia and Herzegovina lies at the heart of the Via Dinarica, carrying more than 300 km of the White Trail—the route’s longest stretch—and offering journeys that fuse wild beauty with cultural depth, making it the trail’s most soulful chapter. The trail infrastructure has grown impressively under the stewardship of UNDP, USAID, and the national tourism ministries, receiving a €2 million investment in its latest phase . This has translated into upgraded trail access, eco‑friendly info centres, and accommodations that now include over 600 beds in rural households and mountain huts—all supportive of local livelihoods. The Bosnian segment of the Via Dinarica gleams with its dramatic variety. A journey might begin with an ascent of Mt. Visočica, where wild horses graze on its slopes and vultures circle high on thermal currents, offering hikers a sense of fresh solitude and open skies. From there, trekkers enter the karst plateaus of Prenj—often referred to as the “ Bosnian Himalayas ”—where rugged limestone peaks and dramatic ridgelines stretch into the horizon, revealing sweeping panoramas across the Dinaric Alps. Beyond Prenj, the trail leads to the soaring heights of Čvrsnica, crowned by the legendary Hajdučka Vrata arch and sheer cliffs that plunge into the emerald Neretva Valley, a place where myth and raw nature converge. With each ascending step, the terrain transforms—from dense pine forests to open alpine pastures, through glacial lakes—inviting solitude, quiet beauty, and a profound connection with nature. For travelers based in Sarajevo, the Bjelašnica and Igman mountain ranges provide easily accessible day hikes, yet they feel worlds apart from the bustle of the capital. Trails leading to Crepoljsko and Bukovik peaks reward even casual walkers with sweeping panoramas, culminating at the majestic Skakavac Waterfall, the country's tallest. These paths also embody a deeper transformation. In the 1990s these same mountains were scarred by conflict and frontlines; today they are places of peace, where hikers meet shepherds, fellow adventurers, or locals who offer simple, heartfelt gestures like sharing homemade bread in remote highland homes. Walking here is not only an encounter with nature but also a quiet reminder of resilience, healing, and how landscapes once marked by war can now welcome the world with openness and hospitality. Outdoor enthusiasts will find Bosnia an abundant playground. The Neretva and Rama rivers invite kayaking and rafting, while deep canyons and caves beckon explorers. Endless valleys lend themselves to wild camping or rural farm-stays, and national parks such as Sutjeska and Blidinje—together with hidden gems like Prokoško Lake, Una National Park, and Cincar Mountain—highlight the country’s potential as a quieter, more authentic alternative to Europe’s crowded trails. Via Dinarica’s sustainable tourism model is driving economic benefits in remote communities. Over the past decade, trail mapping, better signage, and global media exposure—featuring outlets like National Geographic , The Guardian , Lonely Planet , Vogue , and Outside —have transformed Bosnia from a war-torn memory to a nature-based tourism destination with growing global reputation. he initiative nurtures local entrepreneurship, supports eco‑accommodation providers, and integrates traditional products like cheeses, herbal teas, and crafts into trekking experiences. Via Dinarica in Bosnia and Herzegovina is more than a hiking trail: it is a sustainable movement that blends natural splendor with living tradition. Stretching across dramatic peaks, deep canyons, and timeless villages, it offers both wild solitude and cultural immersion while fueling local economies in remote regions. Much like the Appalachian Trail in the United States or the Camino de Santiago in Spain, it is not only a route but a journey of connection—between people and landscapes, past and present, challenge and renewal. For adventurers seeking meaning alongside beauty, Bosnia’s section of the Via Dinarica is a path that calls far beyond its rugged switchbacks, offering an experience as enduring as the mountains themselves.

India occupies a key place in the plans of major powers. It is now under particular scrutiny from the United States and Russia, with a possible strategic pivot of the world’s most populous nation at stake. Photo: Narendra Modi and Donald Trump For Donald Trump, it’s rarely enough that a country leans one way in a geopolitical dispute—he seeks complete victory, willing to risk everything to get it. The latest case is India, a country former U.S. president Joseph Biden courted to distance it from Russia and strengthen it as a rival to China. Biden scored notable wins: India often took positions that displeased Moscow and Beijing. Prime Minister Narendra Modi, a nationalist, refused to support Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and ensured that BRICS took no moves seriously harming the West. In return, Modi freely bought Russian and Iranian oil, attracted Western investment, and positioned India as a bridge between Washington and BRICS/SCO members—aligning with the image Modi wants for himself. Trump’s Return With Trump, things are different. In just half a year, he repeatedly criticized India, claimed credit for ending its last clash with Pakistan, and imposed 25% tariffs on Indian imports to the U.S.—soon raised to 50% because of India’s Russian oil purchases. Yesterday, India announced a pause in buying Russian oil. Modi knows Trump acts without restraint when he senses advantage, using every available tool. In his first term, Trump withdrew from the Iran nuclear deal and even exchanged fire with Iran; he also quit the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to hurt Russia. Washington now demands India stop buying Russian oil and weapons. For a nation hungry for development (cheap Russian oil) and foreign investment (mostly Western), this is a call to choose between the U.S. and Russia. Trump frames the oil demand as a way to pressure Putin to end the war in Ukraine. On arms, he offers India F-35 Lightning fighters—considered by many the best in the world—as a continuation of Biden’s deals. Price and Quality India wants U.S. fighters, but money is an issue. F-35s cost around $110 million each, plus weapons, with flight hours costing $36k–$56k. Even the cheapest variants are about $80 million. Meanwhile, Russia’s Su-57 fifth-generation fighters cost about $50 million, and Moscow has offered joint production—technically appealing given India’s existing Russian fleet and Su-30 production in Nashik. India needs a strong air force to counter Pakistan and especially China. Experts say it requires 30–40 fighters a year, yet China has acquired 435 in the past decade while India lost 151. Choosing Russian fighters ties to oil and broader economic projects like the North-South corridor linking St. Petersburg to Mumbai via Iran. India Chooses Trump wants India to take sides against Washington’s BRICS rivals, calling the bloc a threat to U.S. dominance and the dollar. He also offers oil from the U.S. and non-sanctioned states. Biden pitched India the IMEC corridor (India-Middle East-Europe), with hopes of building a “new China” in India using Western firms. So far, Modi’s policy has followed Indian interests, championed by FM S. Jaishankar’s “The India Way” doctrine: engage the U.S., manage China, reassure Russia, woo Europe and Japan, and expand regional influence. This has been India’s recipe for strength—great powers know it’s easier to win if India is on their side. But Trump is demanding India abandon its balancing act. Russia has courted India for decades, even during the Ukraine war, saving it $10.5B on cheap oil since April 2022 and helping modernize its military and technology. Now, Modi must choose. Trump will not wait—he sees the moment, knowing India can’t shield itself entirely from the fallout of alienating Washington or Moscow. For Trump, India could be a major win or loss; for Modi, the ideal outcome would be to keep his current position. The article was previously published on nap.ba .

The wider public had hardly heard of a little-known Spanish media outlet, yet this week it shook the Caucasus. Armenia's decision could alter the balance in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Middle East. Photo: The map of the Lachin corridor For many, the Spanish portal Periodista Digital was virtually unknown. Its small following on social media, despite Spanish being the mother tongue of half a billion people, suggests it isn’t particularly influential. Yet, this week, it showed it could have a massive impact even on the other side of Europe—in the Caucasus. The outlet claims that, through the Armenian diaspora in France, it obtained a "secret memorandum" signed by Armenia, Azerbaijan, and the United States. According to this document, the three countries would build a " Trump Bridge " corridor through Armenia's Syunik province. The 42-kilometer corridor would connect Azerbaijan's Nakhchivan exclave with the rest of its territory and would be managed by an unnamed American company for 99 years, although Yerevan would formally retain sovereignty. The article might have gone largely unnoticed had it not been massively shared and cited on social media by (pro-)Russian accounts, portraying it as a betrayal of the Armenian people by pro-Western Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan. That the Spanish outlet touched upon a sensitive and important issue was confirmed by Yerevan’s swift reaction. " This fake news was published by a suspicious website called Periodista Digital, which has repeatedly been criticized for serving as a platform for fake personas and distributing manipulative and baseless content. The article in question has nothing to do with reality ," the Armenian government stated. Officials added that their own project, called the " Crossroads of Peace ," remains on the table, with Pashinyan last publicly discussing it on July 16. A Corridor That Changes Everything Russia's preoccupation with its aggression against Ukraine has left room for other powers to gain a foothold in the Caucasus. Other media outlets have written about this part of the world and debated what the so-called " Zangezur Corridor ," as officially named by Baku, would mean for the region. Developments on the ground are evident, as shown by Moscow's growing nervousness and intensified media attacks on Pashinyan. Meanwhile, tensions between Russia and Azerbaijan have escalated in recent weeks, with arrests and canceled meetings fueling the standoff. The issue has gained further importance amid the Israeli-Iranian war, following accusations that Israel used Azerbaijani territory to launch strikes on Iran—allegations Tehran itself has not confirmed. Excellent ties between Baku and Tel Aviv have only fueled speculation, as well as fears that third parties might wedge themselves between Armenia and Iran—or, viewed broadly, between Russia and the Persian Gulf. How Azerbaijan links its territories is of critical importance for the Caucasus and the powers with stakes there. If Armenia allowed a corridor through its land that it does not control, the regional dynamics would shift significantly. Currently, Azerbaijanis reach the rest of their country via Iran, a route through which Turkey sends over forty thousand trucks annually to access Central Asia. A corridor through Armenia could also reshape Europe’s energy map, allowing Azerbaijani gas, as well as Kazakh and other Central Asian supplies, to flow through Turkey into Europe. This could cut Russia’s share of the European market by some fifteen percent in a short time. The corridor could facilitate trade worth between fifty and a hundred billion dollars annually by 2027, shortening transport routes between Europe and parts of Asia by twelve to fifteen days. Regional Relations These points are well known to anyone following Caucasus affairs. But the story was revived in April this year, when the Armenian parliament passed a package of measures pushing the country toward European Union membership. Earlier, in January, Donald Trump appointed Louis L. Bono as acting director of the State Department's Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs. Bono, a former senior adviser on Caucasus negotiations, suggested placing an international monitoring system over the Armenian corridor, modeled after the Panama Canal or the Berlin access routes during the Cold War. The West—especially Washington—has clearly seen that part of the Caucasus has grown weary of Vladimir Putin's Russia and that now is the right time to push for change. Following the Nagorno-Karabakh war and Pashinyan's rise to power, Russia has lost leverage to keep former Soviet republics aligned. Armenia has had enough of poverty, while resource-rich Azerbaijan seeks further development. Connecting Nakhchivan with mainland Azerbaijan is also in Turkey’s interest, as it would insert Ankara into yet another Europe-to-Asia route. Turkey has pursued influence in Central Asia for centuries. Its deeper penetration into that region would be bad news for Moscow, which has long relied on Iran to curb Turkish influence since the Soviet collapse. Iran, meanwhile, seeks to maintain its border with Armenia and enjoys strong ties with Yerevan. This was evident last week in comments by Iran’s ambassador to Armenia, Mehdi Sobhani. He stated that Tehran does not object to Azerbaijan drawing closer to the West, particularly the EU, and that Iran respects the decisions of an " independent state " with the right to conduct an " independent foreign policy ." Sobhani added that Iran has helped Armenia diversify its foreign policy, citing two examples: an Armenian waste treatment plant built by an Iranian company with World Bank and EU funds, and the modernization of the Meghri customs office, financed by European institutions but carried out by Iran. The Iranian diplomat stressed that Armenia’s rapprochement with the EU also opens opportunities for broader regional cooperation involving Tehran, adding: " We trust our Armenian friends. The Armenian government is very sensitive in supporting and protecting its relations with Iran, because it is in the interest of both countries and both peoples ." The West or China? Such a stance from Iran may come as a surprise or signal a subtle shift in its approach. Russia, since the Syrian war, has repeatedly made concessions to third parties at Iran's expense. One need only recall Moscow’s long-standing tolerance of Israeli airstrikes on (pro-)Iranian positions in Syria. Similarly, during Israel’s recent attacks on Iran, Moscow sought not to upset Tel Aviv despite its supposed " strategic partnership " with Tehran. Nevertheless, things are far from finalized. Azerbaijan and Armenia are still negotiating a peace treaty, which would be the first step in resolving the corridor issue and positioning major powers in the Caucasus. Before such a treaty is signed, a constitutional referendum may be required in Armenia—providing the opposition with an opportunity to challenge Pashinyan's government. Armenia and Azerbaijan increasingly see a chance to position themselves as a bridge linking the West and China, Europe and Asia, potentially reaping huge financial rewards. Within China’s " Belt and Road " initiative, Iran and the Caucasus hold special importance. Such a project could benefit nearly every state in the region—except Russia, which risks losing two more countries where it has wielded dominance for decades. Moscow’s nervousness over current developments between Armenia and Azerbaijan shows its displeasure. On the ground, Russia is largely isolated, but not yet defeated. The article was previously published on nap.ba .

In August 2021, the U.S. military withdrew from Afghanistan, and the Taliban entered Kabul. A new war in that part of the world seemed imminent. But instead of weapons, Russia and China chose diplomacy. Photo: Illustration The news that Moscow officially recognized the Taliban government—a movement it once fought and designated a terrorist organization—might have been headline news globally, had the West not, shortly before, helped bring Ahmed al-Sharaa, a former member of ISIS and al-Qaeda, to power in Syria and later lifted sanctions against him. That’s why there was no outrage over Russian President Vladimir Putin rehabilitating a terrorist movement, but rather a simple acknowledgment that Russia became the first country to officially recognize the Taliban government, now called the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. The Americans Exit, the Russians and Chinese Step In Russia’s rapprochement with the Taliban began earlier, while the Americans were still withdrawing and Bashar al-Assad—Moscow's client—was ruling in Damascus. The chaotic-looking U.S. withdrawal was calculated, not just because the military was exhausted from a war it couldn’t win. The Afghan people paid the price. The Taliban didn’t interfere as transport planes hauled away whatever the Americans wanted. Then-presidential candidate Donald Trump called the exit a disaster, claiming billions of dollars worth of equipment were left behind. President Joe Biden, continuing a policy also pursued by Trump, knew what he was doing and what the consequences might be. For decades, U.S. troops fought wars in Russia and China’s backyard, bearing the burden of suppressing various armed groups. Washington decided it was time others—especially adversaries—took on that role, hoping they might fall into the same trap. Stability in the region is of vital interest to Russia, China, Iran, India, Pakistan, and Central Asian states. However, peace is essential to tap into the region’s vast resources. Yet the Taliban, who fought both American and Soviet troops, have not been passive. The wealth of Afghanistan is detailed in a 2010 U.S. diplomatic cable published by The New York Times, describing it as the "Saudi Arabia of lithium." The country holds reserves of oil, natural gas, minerals, gemstones, gold, marble... By 2010, U.S. researchers had found mineral deposits worth $1 trillion; some believe reserves are up to three times greater. Many regions remain unexplored. Afghanistan borders Iran, China, and Central Asia via Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan—Russia’s sphere of influence. It also borders Pakistan and the disputed region of Kashmir. Had U.S. plans succeeded, it would have been a geopolitical disaster for Russia and China—not only because of the resources. Central Asia is strategically vital to Russia for its security and influence in Asia. Ethnic conflict could easily ignite the region. For China, Afghanistan borders Xinjiang province via the Wakhan Corridor—the gateway to the Belt and Road Initiative. Thus, it was in Russia and China’s interest that the U.S. maintained control but not dominance over the region. Both powers feared that conflict might spill over from Afghanistan. China was particularly concerned about the Uyghurs, a Muslim minority in Xinjiang, if the Taliban chose to support their brethren. Diplomacy Instead of Brute Force To avoid regional unrest post-U.S. withdrawal, Russia chose to reset its relationship with the Taliban, despite the USSR's past defeat at their hands—a defeat that hastened the Soviet collapse. Russia extended a hand, and the Taliban welcomed it. Russia was one of the few countries that kept its embassy open in Kabul in 2021, and the following year signed deals with the Taliban to supply oil, gas, and wheat—even though the group had been designated a terrorist organization in Russia since 2003. To elevate the relationship, Putin appointed Zamir Kabulov as special envoy for Afghanistan. Kabulov had served in Kabul 40 years earlier and was Russia’s ambassador there from 2005–2009. Long an advocate for engagement with the Taliban—even during their banned status in Russia—Kabulov's appointment signals the mission’s significance. In the West, Russia’s move was seen as Putin’s attempt to reduce Moscow’s isolation after the invasion of Ukraine. In June 2023, Russia invited the Taliban to its economic forum in St. Petersburg. But back in 2022, Russia was the first country to sign an international economic agreement with the Taliban—sending oil, gas, and wheat. In April, Sergei Naryshkin, head of Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), accused Western agencies of plotting rebellion against the Taliban to destabilize Afghanistan. He praised the Taliban’s state-building efforts and foresaw inevitable international recognition. He claimed the West sought to maintain instability in Afghanistan to pursue its own geopolitical interests—as it had done in Syria, Iraq, and Africa. Soon after, Russia removed the Taliban from its list of terrorist organizations, and three months later became the first country to officially recognize their government—despite countries like China, Iran, India, Qatar, and Pakistan already maintaining informal relations. From 1996 to 2001, only Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Pakistan recognized the first Taliban government. Anti-Washington, With Chinese Backing Russia has thus come full circle in its relationship with the Taliban. Once enemies in war, the Taliban even recognized Chechnya’s independence—the only regime to do so. Now, in 2025, Moscow recognizes them as partners. Some Russian goals are strategic: Expel U.S. influence from Afghanistan and Central Asia, support the Taliban against ISIS and other groups, curb outside interference, suppress arms and drug trafficking, launch economic projects and most notably, a planned gas pipeline from Russia to Southeast Asia—long discussed—has been greenlit by the Taliban, which promises them much-needed income. China also supports integrating the Taliban into regional frameworks. It began projects in Afghanistan, including oil extraction in the Amu Darya Basin in 2023. For China, Afghanistan is not just about resources; it's a land link to Pakistan and Iran, enabling trade routes that bypass seas controlled by the U.S. and counter encirclement by rival India. Russia’s plan is simple: placate and integrate the Taliban into regional structures—formally or informally—to block influence from hostile powers. Other nations, as well as the Taliban themselves, also seek to end the war. Today’s Taliban leadership has fought for decades. Their messages upon entering Kabul were conciliatory—willing to cooperate as long as others don’t interfere in their politics. Russia sees this as a window of opportunity. It knows who the Taliban are, what values they uphold, and why the West won’t engage. After all, when Moscow once tried to conquer them by force, it was soundly defeated. The article was previously published on nap.ba .

On Thursday, Ukraine appointed a new prime minister. Economist Yulia Svyrydenko faces a daunting task—she must accomplish two strategically vital goals: retain the trust of U.S. President Donald Trump’s administration and align Ukraine’s economy with the demands of the war effort. Photo: Yulia Svyrydenko Since the onset of Russian aggression, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has been fighting a key battle at home. He aims to demonstrate to the public that changes at the top of the government can happen even during wartime—thus challenging narratives questioning his legitimacy after his mandate expired and while free elections cannot be held nationwide. For these reasons—and others—Zelenskyy has in recent years reshuffled leadership in both the government and the military. In this latest shake-up, Zelenskyy dismissed Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal and replaced him with Yulia Svyrydenko (39), previously Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Economy since 2021. Her appointment was supported by 262 of 450 members of the Ukrainian parliament, which is dominated by Zelenskyy’s party, Servant of the People. Shmyhal, who served five years as prime minister—a record in Ukraine—will now head the Ministry of Defense, while outgoing defense minister Rustem Umerov will become Ukraine’s ambassador to Washington. Retaining Trump and the West Svyrydenko’s appointment came as no surprise. She was involved in EU accession negotiations and played a key role in a mineral agreement between Zelenskyy and Trump, which would give American companies post-war access to Ukrainian natural resources in exchange for Washington’s continued support. This deal could become a cornerstone of Ukraine’s economic and geopolitical future. That deal reportedly helped keep Trump engaged with Ukraine—even after his infamous spat with Zelenskyy during the latter’s visit to the White House, a moment still fresh in many minds. Svyrydenko is no newcomer to Ukraine’s top political circles. She previously served as Deputy Chief of Staff to the President, effectively the right hand of Andriy Yermak, one of the most powerful figures in Zelenskyy’s government. Yermak, along with intelligence chief Kyrylo Budanov, represents the younger generation of officials on whom Zelenskyy relies most heavily. Well-known in the West, Svyrydenko’s experience and closeness to Zelenskyy’s inner circle were likely key factors in her appointment—already a challenging role under peacetime conditions, let alone during a full-scale war. Her name had already been floated as a potential future prime minister last year. Western media commentators have praised her quiet and persistent work style and her ability to build bridges wherever possible—earning her wide respect across Western capitals. War Economy In a devastated Ukraine, the ability to forge connections is a prerequisite for nearly everything else. Russia has long shifted its war goals from “denazification” to deindustrialization—systematically targeting Ukraine’s infrastructure: energy facilities, factories, mines, ports, railways, and roads. Svyrydenko must now not only rebuild but restructure the economy to serve wartime needs. Zelenskyy recently said the new government’s goal is to reduce Ukraine’s dependence on foreign weapons. “Weapons made in Ukraine now account for about 40% of what’s used on the front lines,” Zelenskyy stated. “That’s already more than at any time in our independence. Our production volume is significant, but we need more. Our goal is to reach 50% domestically produced weapons within the first six months of the new government by expanding domestic manufacturing.” This is no accident. Western countries are co-funding joint arms factories in Ukraine—a development Zelenskyy has praised as a step in the right direction. Svyrydenko will receive important support from Shmyhal in his new role as defense minister. As an economist, he will be tasked with increasing efficiency in military spending. For comparison, recall that Vladimir Putin appointed economist Andrei Belousov as Russia’s defense minister in May 2023, giving him similar responsibilities. This is an enormous challenge. In 2024, Ukraine allocated $53.2 billion—around 26% of its GDP—to defense. Experts estimate the country will need another $40 billion in international aid next year. Zelenskyy is betting that the Svyrydenko–Shmyhal duo will help secure it. Ready for War, Preparing for Peace War fatigue is setting in—not just in Kyiv and Moscow, but especially in Washington. Trump has been voicing this for months. Yet it remains unclear how to end the war, as neither side is willing to make concessions, especially regarding territory. Putin is trying to lure Trump into a trap—hoping to impose long-term conditional stalemates on Ukraine through negotiations. The situation on the battlefield reflects this tension. There have been no major offensives from either side in some time. The war has shifted into a phase of resource attrition. Ongoing battles across Ukraine—and occasionally inside Russian territory—suggest both sides are anxiously awaiting Trump’s mediation proposals. However, there is no guarantee Trump—or anyone else—can deliver peace. Trump has repeatedly said he dislikes Putin’s actions and has hinted at a new approach. This could either escalate tensions between Washington and Moscow or lead Trump to pull back, leaving Europe to manage the crisis alone. That’s why Zelenskyy wants his new government to boost arms production, develop new weapons systems, mass-produce drones, and build defensive systems—while also reforming the economy to suit wartime conditions and lay the groundwork for post-war recovery. The success of Svyrydenko’s government will be measured by its effectiveness on these fronts. The article was previously published on nap.ba .

In today’s globalized food economy, authenticity, quality, and ethical production are increasingly inseparable from commercial success. Greek agrifood producers, celebrated for their olive oil, honey, dairy, seafood, and wine, are discovering that securing Halal and Kosher certifications offers more than spiritual compliance—it provides them with a powerful strategic asset. These religious credentials, once considered niche, have now become mainstream indicators of safety, traceability, and cross-cultural appeal. Photo: © by Sanin Mirvic/Corella The significance of Halal and Kosher certification extends well beyond religious communities. Halal, governed by Islamic dietary law, and Kosher, rooted in Jewish tradition, denote rigorous standards at every stage of production standards that resonate strongly with today’s consumers who demand transparency and ethical sourcing. As such, Greek producers aiming to compete in markets across the Middle East, Southeast Asia, North America, and Europe must consider these certifications as essential marks of trust. Recent figures underscore the scale of this shift. The global Halal food market was valued at over $600 billion just a few years ago, and by mid-2025, its scope had expanded further. Deputy Minister Christos Kellas, addressing the National Association of Agricultural Cooperatives, highlighted that the combined global Halal products market now exceeds $2.5 trillion, growing at an annual rate of more than 6 percent—an unmistakable signal of sustained and accelerating demand . Meanwhile, the Kosher food sector remains highly dynamic, with over 3,000 new certified products launched annually and some 400,000 Kosher-labeled items in circulation worldwide. Greek companies are already responding. Thessaloniki-based Greekexports SMPC has positioned itself as a key facilitator, helping producers align with international standards. Its Halal division, Halal Assurance & Quality Greece, offers assessment and certification for compliance with Islamic law, while its partnership with Balkan Kosher enables access to markets requiring Jewish dietary compliance . CEO Thomas Vassaras notes that demand comes not only from countries with Muslim or Jewish majorities, but also from European multicultural communities and hospitality sectors within Greece—especially in regions like Thessaloniki, Xanthi, and Crete, where religious tourism is on the rise. Yet individual certifications, while beneficial, are not enough to fully harness potential. Greece currently relies on private certifiers, and the absence of a centralized government-supported system can lead to inconsistent standards and limited recognition abroad. Taking note, Deputy Minister Kellas has called for a unified national Halal strategy, supported by public‑private partnerships, to create transparent and credible certification pathways. A recent collaboration between Mirtec Cyprus—a wing of HellasCert, the national association of accredited certification bodies—and the Saudi Halal Products Development Company, funded by Saudi Arabia’s Public Investment Fund, marks a significant step in that direction. Such a national framework could consolidate Greece’s reputation for high-quality food production with robust export ambitions. Standardized certification would reduce producer confusion, simplify international compliance, and enhance branding in major Muslim markets like Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Malaysia, Indonesia, Türkiye, and beyond. In addition to food, the halal-certified tourism market presents a compelling opportunity. Greece could emulate the example of Muslim-friendly destinations that offer certified cuisine and prayer facilities, tapping into affluent travel segments. Government support is essential. Subsidies for certification, export-focused grants, educational programs for small and medium-sized enterprises, and participation in international halal trade fairs such as Dubai’s Gulfood or Malaysia’s MIHAS would signal Greece’s commitment. Malaysia’s Halal Development Corporation and Thailand’s Halal Science Center offer models worth studying, having successfully integrated government policy, research, certification, and export promotion into cohesive national strategies. Without coordinated action, Greece risks ceding ground to neighbors who have embraced this reality. Spain and Turkey are already notable competitors, aggressively marketing olive oil, meat, and dairy in Gulf and Southeast Asian markets. Greece, with its comparable agrifood potential, could elevate its offerings by combining national strategy with targeted trade missions and marketing efforts. Ultimately, the economic upside could be transformative. Analysts estimate that a well-executed Halal strategy may spur annual export growth of 15–20 percent, injecting hundreds of millions into agricultural GDP over a decade. Olive oil, cheese, seafood, herbs, wine (where permissible), cosmetics, and pharmaceuticals all represent sectors that stand to benefit from certified access to the Muslim global consumer base . Perhaps most significant is the shift in perception. Religious certi­fication is no longer just about spiritual oversight. Halal and Kosher standards now symbolize excellence in hygiene, traceability, and compliance—values that appeal to food regulators, retailers, and conscious consumers alike. For Greek producers, certification is a statement: “ We meet the highest standards, in every sense .” As global food culture evolves toward inclusivity, transparency, and sustainability, Greece’s future success may depend on embracing these certifications as passports to new markets—and new understandings. In the end, Halal and Kosher credentials are not exotic extras but fundamental tools for Greece’s agrifood sector to thrive in the twenty-first century’s diverse and discerning marketplace.

For several weeks now, public attention across the former Yugoslav states has focused on Marko Perković Thompson’s concert in Zagreb and student protests in Belgrade. Some in Croatia and Serbia view these events positively, while others across borders see them as a new threat. Photo: Detail from Marko Perković’s concert in Zagreb Marko Perković Thompson long ago ceased being just a musician who endures despite bans and criticism. For hundreds of thousands in Croatia and among the Croatian diaspora, he is the voice of a romanticised version of Croatia’s past and the unmet expectations of the Croatian state after the breakup of Yugoslavia. In other words, he speaks for those deeply disappointed by Croatian politics. Thus, the focus shouldn’t be on the quality of his music, but on the resonance of what he's doing—and what he himself could not produce. Attracting half a million people to a concert in a country of fewer than four million requires more than just a performer—it requires someone channeling political demands no one else in Croatia represents. The concert was a demonstration of his audience’s political aspirations, not merely a musical event. Through the combined efforts of a segment of the political elite, the Church, media, and citizens, the line between fascism and “patriotism” has been smoothed. Those behind Thompson see nothing wrong in pairing patriotic expressions with fascist salutes and labeling it “Christian values.” In Whose Name? That raises the question: how did this happen? Did Franjo Tuđman or his successors in the HDZ betray the vision of Croatia that Thompson’s fans hold? How come Croatian officials—from both government and opposition—who criticize Thompson still attend his concerts? Does Thompson have a political agenda, or is he merely seizing an opportunity? Is he aware that he has stepped beyond music’s boundaries? Who exactly attends his concerts? Croatian public discourse is still searching for answers, though voices from the Croatian right—largely outside parliament and mainstream media—claim that today’s HDZ bears no resemblance to Tuđman’s; that the EU and NATO are not as once imagined; that current PM Andrej Plenković resembles a Brussels-appointed “leftist commissar”; and that Zagreb now has less sovereignty than it did under Belgrade’s rule after WWII. These demands mirror those of Serbia’s protesters, who argue that Serbia—and indeed all former Yugoslav nations—grow weaker daily, and that political and economic currents flowing from the West to the Balkans are reshaping everyday life beyond comprehension. A recent symbol of this shift is American influencer IShowSpeed, who strolls Belgrade sporting a local football kit, flanked by bodyguards, chatting and drawing crowds—even while eating. Some media suggest his presence inadvertently promotes the countries he visits. In Serbia, where conditions are worse than in Croatia across most domains, the issue is even more acute. Authorities—surrounded by EU and NATO states—are allegedly seeking closer ties with Russia and China, making Serbia a frontline in that East–West power struggle. Pro-Russian sentiments swell, and expressions of “fraternal love” for distant China are rising, while Western cooperation is portrayed by the authorities as merely pragmatic. Student protests sparked by the collapse of a station canopy in Novi Sad eight months ago demonstrated the absurdity of Belgrade’s policies. Each defeat for official Belgrade—from Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, to Kosovo and Montenegro—pushes society even further right, setting the stage for similar outcomes and policies. Turning Against Themselves Under these conditions, it was inevitable that student protests would shift rightward—prompting widespread condemnation. Many noted little difference between Serbia’s governing class—many of whom were part of the 1990s aggression and genocide—and post-war students, born after Belgrade’s major political and military losses. Some were especially offended by speeches at the recent Vidovdan student gathering, which organizers used to court the hard right in a nation where most political forces struggle to cross the 3% parliamentary threshold. Earlier, students had marched to Strasbourg by bicycle to appeal for Brussels’ support—but instead, EU endorsement went to Aleksandar Vučić, reportedly promising lithium mining in Serbia and a settlement of Kosovo in favor of the Albanian side. Choosing extremist right-wing figures—at concerts or protests—is no coincidence. The region’s post-Yugoslav condition suits those who shaped it. Croats at Thompson’s concert sang about fighting Serbs, “chetniks,” and Yugoslavs, while Serbian students were depicted by state-friendly media as “Ustaše” trying to recreate Yugoslavia under Western influence. Many within both groups view Bosnia and Herzegovina as the ultimate battleground. Serbian nationalists also claim Kosovo, Montenegro, Albania, and North Macedonia, while Serbia increasingly sells off its resources. Within the massive mental cage crafted across the Balkans post-Yugoslavia, some people see their closest neighbors as enemies—even as they vanish from lands they inhabited for centuries. In import-dependent economies dominated by foreign banks, the narrative of “labor shortages” has been embraced—along with calls for migrant labor. Some leaders even offer their countries as detention zones or camps for Europeans they claim “no longer want.” This new stage in Balkan politics is often explained to the public as a mirror of Western trends: the rise of the right, a Trump-led shift in U.S. policy, perceived threats from Russia, China’s influence, Middle Eastern unrest... Each local conflict reinforces this narrative, allowing factions to seek support from geopolitical powers. The consequences are evident. The periphery remains dependent on the center, while nationalist leaders across nations heed the same foreign addresses. Balkan youth reflect the societies they grew up in, until they emigrate West, where rules exist that are absent in their homelands. The rise of right-wing movements in Eastern Europe confirms that poverty and hopelessness breed rebellion—yet these movements rarely critique the economic system. Even hardcore Thompson supporters in politics don’t mind that Croatia imports food, has lost its factories (like its globally famous shipyards), and is dominated by foreign banks. Their only difference lies in backing a different figure—a messiah—from beyond Croatia. And so, twelve years into EU membership, supposedly welcoming Vučić and other Balkan leaders, these countries have turned into quasi-colonies, aiming to become a regional Belarus under a figure like Alexander Lukashenko. The article was published earlier on nap.ba .

The war in Ukraine has long been in a phase without a major offensive, but both sides continue to face heavy blows. While U.S. President Donald Trump and his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin negotiate, significant military maneuvers are ongoing on parts of the front within Ukraine. Photo: Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin Had someone offered the official Kyiv the current balance of forces on the battlefield in July 2025—since February 24, 2022—it would surely have been welcomed. The Russian army, once attributed near-mythical power, is stalemated in eastern Ukraine and unable to crush one of Europe’s poorest nations, now hoping that Trump makes a mistake at the negotiating table. In reality, this balance of forces has been long established. Both sides are locked into a war of attrition without a clear pathway to total military victory. One side continues inflicting heavy blows, but it hasn’t shifted the strategic balance. True, Russia is advancing in some eastern regions, but experts say that at the current pace, it could take decades to reach Kyiv. Still, the war leaves lasting consequences for both nations. Is There a Winner? From Moscow’s standpoint, Russia is winning—having seized mineral resources and industrial assets in Donbas and elsewhere, annexed Crimea (saving Kyiv rent payments for military bases), attracted Russian tourism revenue, and severed Ukraine’s access to affordable oil and gas as well as transit fees. Ukraine’s breadbasket in Zaporizhzhia now feeds Russia instead, costing Kyiv millions. From Kyiv’s perspective, Ukraine is winning—they’ve survived, maintained state functions, and preserved their army. In fact, their military is stronger than ever and inflicts major losses on Russia. Proponents of Kyiv’s success argue that Moscow’s territorial gains have been minimal—no greater than those made by Russian-backed rebels before the full-scale invasion. Kyiv also has Western backing, while Russia remains isolated in Europe, and the war has spilled beyond its borders. This dynamic has prompted strategic shifts. Ukraine’s recent successes stem largely from intelligence-driven operations behind enemy lines. Meanwhile, Russia is amassing forces in areas from which Trump plans to extract mineral concessions in exchange for continued U.S. aid to Kyiv. Until a final deal is reached, that territory remains a battlefield. Military strategists agree that frontline lines will likely hold for the coming period. Yet, to improve leverage at the negotiating table with Trump and Kyiv, Russia keeps attacking around Pokrovsk in the east, while grouping forces in Ukraine’s northeast, particularly in Sumy region. Who Can Endure Longer? Earlier this week, Trump shocked allies again by lifting sanctions on multiple Russian companies, banks, and individuals—most notably Rosoboronexport, the state’s official military equipment exporter. He also paused U.S. military aid to Ukraine pending an assessment of U.S. military stockpiles. This was not unexpected. Trump’s talks with Putin have included sanction relief, which Moscow values far more than territorial gains. His move may be seen as a goodwill gesture—similar to his recent relaxation of sanctions on Iranian oil exports to China. U.S. officials defend the decision by arguing that while the EU continues to propose more sanctions, American Secretary of State Marco Rubio said in late April that additional U.S. sanctions would prolong the war by “another two years” and that diplomacy should take priority. Halting military aid to Ukraine was an inevitable step—not merely a tactic to pressure Volodymyr Zelenskyy into concessions toward Trump and Russia. The U.S. has already diverted interceptors and offensive weapons to Israel, confirmed Zelenskyy, forcing Washington to reallocate its limited resources among Ukraine, Israel, and its own forces. Russia welcomed these moves enthusiastically, having long claimed the war would end swiftly if Ukraine stopped receiving arms. But Kyiv is beginning to reduce reliance on U.S. support. European determination to sustain aid despite Trump’s threats has catalyzed the growth of Ukraine’s domestic defense industry. Ukrainian companies now manufacture weaponry that often replaces Western imports. European states and firms assist these efforts. In a short time, Ukraine became a leader in drone production—especially marine drones—and improvised air-defense systems combining Eastern and Western tech. The innovation of the Ukrainian military regularly surprises the world. Frontline Conditions Shaping Negotiations Ukrainian strategists now focus on fights around Pokrovsk and potential Russian offensives near Sumy. Pokrovsk is a vital logistics hub and a defensive barrier protecting Kyiv’s supply lines to Donetsk region. If Russia captures Pokrovsk, it could open a path to Dnipropetrovsk, which would mark the sixth Ukrainian province under Russian military control. Such gains would inflict a blow to Kyiv’s legitimacy and citizen morale. As it stands, Russia seems on track to reach Dnipropetrovsk region. At the same time, reports indicate Russian troop build-up in Sumy region. These forces have previously launched attacks on Kyiv (February 2022) and now threaten the road connecting the capital with Kharkiv, Ukraine’s second-largest city. Allegedly, Russia has concentrated tens of thousands of soldiers near Sumy to stretch Ukrainian defenses, while simultaneously attacking near Pokrovsk. On the other side, Ukrainian forces have pushed Russian troops back in Sumy, mined the area, reinforced positions, and deployed elite units. While sizable Russian breakthroughs haven’t occurred, skirmishes, rocket strikes, drone attacks, and infantry footholds several kilometers inside Ukrainian territory are ongoing. With autumn approaching—and weather soon limiting major maneuvers—it’s assumed Russia has only a few months left for major operations this year. In April, the Ukrainian military launched operations in Sumy region, briefly crossing into Russia’s Kursk Oblast. Ukrainian commander Oleg Sirski said last week the aim was to tie down top Russian units there, preventing redeployment to Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson regions. However, results have been limited—especially for attackers. After three years of war, both armies suffer manpower shortages, and advanced technology use is increasingly critical. Western reports confirm Ukraine relies on drones—some with AI targeting that independently select targets after hours in the air. Drones now even resupply front-line units. These examples illustrate how difficult it is to launch large-scale offensives while protecting frontline troops. All signs suggest breaking enemy lines will be extremely difficult without suffering heavy casualties. In months when whispers of a cease-fire grow louder, both militaries hesitate to launch major operations—fearing catastrophic losses while politicians redraw maps. Yet, both sides aim to strengthen their frontline positions along the 1,200-km line, bolstering negotiating leverage. As Trump told Zelenskyy in their tense White House meeting, the goal is clear: show the opponent they “have no cards to play.” The article was published previously on nap.ba

Last Friday marked the conclusion of the NATO leaders’ summit—a gathering widely seen as a turning point for the West. It signaled the start of a new era in which Europe is expected to take greater responsibility for its own defense, while the United States shifts its strategic focus toward the Pacific and China. Photo: NATO state leaders at the summit in The Hague Last Friday, the NATO leaders’ summit concluded. This historically important summit marks the beginning of a new era in Western politics: Europe must start taking responsibility for its own security, while the United States turns its attention to the Pacific and China. “ It’s been a long journey, but worth it. As you’ve probably noticed, remarkable achievements were made. It was a very productive NATO summit ,” said U.S. President Donald Trump. This recap by Trump of what took place at the Hague summit came on the heels of his brokering a ceasefire between Israel and Iran in their twelve-day conflict—and after he bombed Iranian nuclear facilities. While some view the Israel–Iran war as a defeat for Tel Aviv and Washington, the NATO summit was undoubtedly a success for the world’s leading superpower. Trump showcased his victory to supporters by sharing a message he’d received via Truth Social from NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte: “ Mr. President, dear Donald, congratulations and thank you for your decisive action in Iran, which was truly extraordinary and something no one else dared do. It makes us all safer. Tonight in The Hague, you're heading toward another great success. It wasn't easy, but everyone will sign up for five percent. Donald, you have taken us to a really, really important moment for America and Europe and the world. You will achieve something no U.S. president has for decades. Europe will pay a BIG price, as it should — and that will be your victory. Safe travels, and see you at His Majesty’s dinner! — Mark Rutte. ” Trump used this message to underscore three points for his base: Iran was bombed in “a world‑class move,” European defense contributions will rise, and he’s achieved what no other president has. Defense Comes at a Cost The summit was a major win in NATO terms. For decades, European allies resisted reaching the 2% GDP defense spending target they committed to. Washington called it unfair, warning that U.S. resources aren’t infinite. This resistance backfired when Europe remained mostly passive amid Russian aggression in Ukraine. Some countries couldn’t materially assist Kyiv because their military stockpiles were empty. Following U.S. pressure and the war in the East, defense spending jumped: what was once 2% is now heading toward 5%. This shift began with Trump’s first term and gained steam under President Biden. Eastern European countries—Poland, Romania, the Baltics, and Scandinavian nations—as well as Germany, began rapidly increasing armaments. In a second Trump term, this policy could reach its apex. By last week’s agreement—or as Croatian President Zoran Milanović put it, “ They didn’t even vote on anything. The shortest proposals have been adopted. One page referencing defense spending in a very vague and undefined way ”—member states agreed that by 2035 they’ll dedicate at least 5% of GDP to defense: 3.5% to basic military buildup and 1.5% to crisis-ready infrastructure. For Washington, this is the long-sought result: Europe pays and takes responsibility. European resistance led Trump to threaten withdrawal of U.S. defense guarantees in case of Russian aggression. In the end, Trump’s threats and Biden’s diplomacy worked: Europeans now commit to fulfilling their NATO obligations. Spain resisted strongly, saying it couldn’t afford the increase. Public sentiment wouldn’t support spending on a Russia many saw as distant. Madrid didn’t veto the decision but stated it won’t follow the plan. Trump responded sharply, claiming he will force Spain to pay doubly and labeling them “notorious.” Earlier, he mentioned Spain joining BRICS in a White House press briefing, signaling his dismissive attitude toward European partners, whom he seems to expect to “toe the line.” Some Balkan states outside NATO are already seen as spheres where Brussels, not Washington, calls the shots. Rutte later assured that, while the summit statement didn’t mention the Western Balkans, NATO remains committed and has forces in the region. Trump confirmed that the U.S. will still defend NATO allies if attacked, giving Europe and Canada time to fulfill their pledges. Rutte also assured Ukraine that support continues and NATO accession remains open. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov downplayed the summit’s impact, stating the 5% goal wouldn’t significantly affect Russia’s security. Moscow views NATO as a threat only while fighting in Ukraine, interpreting this summit as yet another yielding to U.S. demands and using Ukraine as a shield. Economy, Military, and the Pivot to China With all members spending 5%, around $1 trillion will be added annually—“ a huge win for Europe and Western civilization ,” Trump said. Rutte praised it as “laying the foundations for a stronger, fairer, and more lethal NATO.” This implies many jobs in defense industries, stockpiles of weaponry, and allied provisions of arms to states seeking to counter Moscow. President Milanović raised economic concerns: small states cannot afford expensive weaponry. He cautioned, “If I spend five percent on GDP but can’t buy real capabilities, due to price surges, then we’re not doing a good job.” He asked, “ If India lost one or two Rafales costing over €200 million each, what sense does that make?” He warned against being “held hostage by private contractors,” which leads to “debt slavery .” Smaller states must adapt and improvise—since the bulk of weapons will be produced by larger NATO members. Croatia and others will have to find ways to manage. For the U.S., it’s clear: American arms and tools will flood allied markets, defense contractors gain lucrative deals, smaller allies depend more on the U.S., and military production rivalry with Russia will intensify under the public belief it's necessary. With this summit, Trump took another step toward a U.S. pivot to the Pacific: by shifting Euro-defense obligations onto Europe, America frees resources to focus on China. A heavily armed NATO deters Russia from attacking allies, while Trump (or his successors) can concentrate on Asia. The next phase might involve a kind of “Asia NATO.” With today’s agreement, the U.S. position is stronger than a week ago—provided allies follow through on their Hague commitments. The article was previously published nap.ba .

Being the top official of the "capital of the world," as New York is sometimes called due to its appeal and diversity, is in itself a major political achievement and inevitably brings the attention of both the American and global public. But Zohran Mamdani has already managed to become widely known across his state and the world, even though he is "only" running for mayor. Photo: Zohran Mamdani Thirty-three-year-old Mamdani shocked the American political and business elite—he won the Democratic Party's primary, supported by its left wing led by young U.S. Congresswoman Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, who might be a future presidential candidate. The fact that Mamdani belongs to the same political circle as Ocasio-Cortez has triggered alarms across the United States. A new generation of American politicians, particularly among the Democrats, is questioning assumptions that have gone unchallenged for decades. These include the distribution of American wealth, strengthening the welfare state, and a different stance toward Israel. In the Right Place at the Wrong Time Mamdani, the son of Ugandan and Indian migrants, a Muslim, married to an artist of Syrian descent, won the primary and attracted the attention of party colleagues, Republican rivals, the wealthiest Americans, and President Donald Trump. Mamdani may have benefited from low turnout among party members. He defeated the favored former governor of New York, Andrew Cuomo, and other candidates. During televised debates, Mamdani voiced views completely opposed to the party mainstream, shocking moderators and provoking vocal opposition from his rivals. In addition to promoting a welfare state, angering the party's business wing and wealthy Americans, Mamdani received extra attention due to events in the Middle East. He stated he does not support Tel Aviv’s current policies. A video circulated online showing that while every other serious candidate, including Cuomo, said their first visit as mayor would be to Israel, Mamdani said he would first visit neighborhoods of New York he intends to govern. He added that he respects Israel and believes it should exist as a "state of equal rights" and that Palestinians have rights that must be respected. Separately, Mamdani said he would arrest Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who is wanted by the International Criminal Court in The Hague, if he came to New York. Such a policy from a Democrat would be a boost for Republicans, as Trump battles illegal immigration across the country. In California—which, according to right-wing author Samuel Huntington, lies on the fault line between Western and Latin American civilizations—the entire political concept and American federalism are being tested in conflicts between Washington and Governor Gavin Newsom. However, a rebellion within Trump’s MAGA movement (Make America Great Again) over U.S. involvement in Israel’s wars and the diversion of attention and resources from domestic issues gives the Mamdani case a new dimension. His potential victory could spark a wave of change and offer new meaning to the Democratic Party, which is still recovering from a devastating defeat in November. Deport Him, Stop Him American politics won’t be the same after the Mamdani case—at least in terms of the sheer volume of insults hurled. A segment of Republicans insulted Barack Obama similarly during his presidential run, but the case of Zohran Mamdani has pushed the boundaries. Shameful insults came from the president, senators, congresspeople, and even fellow Democrats. Trump called Mamdani a “communist lunatic” who “looks terrible” and “isn’t smart.” The Republican National Congressional Committee labeled him an “anti-Semitic socialist radical.” White House Deputy Chief of Staff Stephen Miller said that an “anarcho-socialist radical for mayor of New York was made possible by uncontrolled migration” and that “Democrats are changing politics by changing the electorate.” Republican Congressman Andy Ogles from Tennessee called for Mamdani to be stripped of citizenship and deported, calling him “little Mohammed” and “an anti-Semitic socialist who will destroy New York.” He claimed to have submitted a formal request to the Department of Justice to investigate whether Mamdani gained citizenship through “lies and concealing support for terrorism.” Republican Congresswoman Marjorie Taylor Greene from Georgia posted an image on X showing the Statue of Liberty draped in what appears to be a black burqa. Young Republicans in New York urged the White House to strip Mamdani of citizenship and deport him, citing the “Anti-Communism Act.” During the campaign, Cuomo likely sought to suggest Mamdani didn’t belong in New York by mispronouncing his last name—prompting Mamdani to spell it out repeatedly during debates. It's hard to believe Cuomo couldn’t learn how to pronounce his opponent’s name. The absurdity of these Republican accusations lies in simultaneously labeling Mamdani a communist and an Islamist—terms that, logically, exclude one another. While these insults carry elements of ethnic and religious hatred, they stem mostly from Mamdani’s political agenda, which threatens both Democratic and Republican establishments and the broader economic elite in the U.S. Zohran Kwame Mamdani was born in 1991 in Uganda to a Shiite Muslim father of Indian origin and later a professor at Columbia University, and an American-Indian filmmaker mother. He was named Kwame after former Ghanaian president and anti-colonial leader Kwame Nkrumah. He studied African Studies, made rap music, and currently serves on the New York City Council. Republicans aren’t the only ones seeking to stop Mamdani’s rise. Business elites have also entered the fray. The New York Times reported that financial sector leaders such as Daniel Loeb, Bill Ackman, and Citadel CEO Ken Griffin met with current Democratic Mayor Eric Adams to discuss how to block Mamdani from becoming mayor of America’s largest city. Some of these businessmen are close to the Democratic Party. What unites them is opposition to Mamdani’s economic plan—and, for some, his refusal to unconditionally support Israel and Washington’s current policy toward it, though few admit it openly. Mamdani also faces obstruction from within his own party. Cuomo has stated he may continue his campaign, and CNN reported last week that Cuomo plans to remain on the ballot as an independent, potentially siphoning votes from Mamdani and splitting the Democratic base. Mamdani’s Approach The barrage of insults Mamdani endures and the massive mobilization of political and business elites from both parties show just how crucial the New York mayoral race is for the future of the United States. A wave of change starting in New York could spread to other parts of the country, with a new generation of politicians using Mamdani’s model to win. Like Congresswoman Ocasio-Cortez, Mamdani chose to present his program directly to voters, visiting local communities and avoiding corporate media, which have long favored their candidates. In this way, he "hacked" the system and brought politics closer to the people. Through a kind of door-to-door campaign, Mamdani, despite having far fewer financial resources than his rivals, reached those whose voices are rarely heard and whose problems are often ignored by political elites living physically separated from the population. Over twenty thousand of his fellow citizens donated an average of eighty dollars to his campaign. Furthermore, Mamdani—like many politicians of the newer generation who don't come from established elites or traditional political camps—has nearly perfected the use of social media and the internet to promote his ideas. His audience is young people who will one day take over the country's institutions and remain voters for decades to come. New generations of Americans, like youth around the world, think differently, and corporate media are finding it increasingly difficult to reach them. The fact that Israel and Palestine are being debated within the Democratic Party in New York suggests that Mamdani’s strategy is working. For the average New Yorker, local issues are more pressing than foreign affairs. Mamdani recognized this and clearly stated that his priority is New York and its people. According to U.S. media, New York faces many issues and increasingly lacks services and infrastructure residents have long been accustomed to. For example, school gymnasiums have been turned into shelters for illegal migrants after taxpayer-funded hotels filled up. Mayor Adams, who once welcomed migrants in line with the city’s immigrant-built reputation, traveled to Latin American countries to urge people not to come to New York due to full capacity and ballooning costs. Against Trump’s America Republicans like Texas Governor Greg Abbott have made Adams’ job harder by sending migrants by bus to Democrat-led cities, opposing federal border closures. Some U.S. media speculate that after California, Trump’s next target is New York—a longtime Democratic stronghold used to pilot policies before national elections. If Mamdani takes the helm in New York, this conflict could take on a new dimension, and the young politician may further emerge as a capable leader with a different approach to tough issues. For example, Mamdani supports legislation in New York that would prevent federal immigration officers from arresting migrants, a policy already underway in California. Unlike Trump, who enacted a series of measures against LGBTQ+ individuals, Mamdani wants to expand rights for this community. This confirms his alignment with the so-called "progressive Democrats" who advocate more human rights for all, with no room for privilege or discrimination. Though he’s focused on everyday issues, many of Mamdani’s policies carry national significance. Alongside better public services, he intends to help those in need. He describes himself as a “democratic socialist” critical of the current capitalist system, which lacks fair distribution of wealth. He states he owes nothing to billionaires who supported Cuomo and brought Trump to power. He has promised to freeze rents for two million residents, provide affordable housing, open city-owned grocery stores with lower prices, introduce free health insurance for all children in the city, reform the police to reduce violence, establish a $30 minimum wage by 2030, invest in green energy, improve public transportation and make it free. He plans to fund these initiatives by "taxing the top one percent"—the wealthy supporters of Cuomo. Mamdani says he wants to make New York "accessible" to all its residents. From Promise to Reality Such a political program has long been labeled "radical leftist" or even "communist" in the U.S., with its main proponent, Senator Bernie Sanders, often demonized as someone who would destroy the country and "turn it into Venezuela" or "Cuba." Mamdani openly aligns himself with Sanders and Ocasio-Cortez. He believes, as do millions of young Americans, that a different kind of state is possible—and that a step back on some issues isn't necessarily a step back for the country. Sanders has said that his policies were considered normal in Europe during the 1960s and '70s, championed by social democratic rather than communist parties. But the political pendulum has swung so far to the right in economic matters that every proposal by Sanders or Mamdani is now branded as populism, danger, or communism—and implementing them is viewed as a threat to democracy. "His victory shows that working-class politics can’t be bought," Ocasio-Cortez said after Mamdani’s primary win. The organization Our Revolution backed Mamdani, stating it mobilized over 60,000 supporters to help him. Its director, Joseph Geevarghese, said this is "a referendum on the future of the Democratic Party and a warning to the corporate wing." The New York mayoral election is in November, and Mamdani has a lot of work ahead. If he wins, he would be the first Muslim and the first Indian-American to lead New York. But even more important for U.S. politics is the possibility that his political program could challenge the status quo—provided he delivers on his campaign promises. The article was previously published on PISjournal. net

The path of several states emerging from the dissolution of former Yugoslavia toward European Union membership has persisted almost since their independence. Decades later, some European powers and Brussels are making every effort to ensure these states never become part of the European Union, employing local subcontractors to achieve this aim. Photo: Aleksandar Vučić ‘ Everyone that lives in Kosjerić came out to vote against us, everyone. And still, there were more who voted for us ,’ said Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić a few hours after the polls closed, speaking in a live television broadcast from the premises of the ruling Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) which he leads, and from whose helm he formally stepped down. Vučić then announced the ‘exact’ election results, while the competent bodies for conducting the elections had not yet reported. From such a statement, it is entirely clear what happened in one small Serbian municipality that few could find on a map without difficulty. From there, it is not hard to deduce what was happening in other places where ‘everything that lives’ did not vote for the opposition and where the eyes of the public were not focused. Those in Brussels, whose job it is to draw conclusions about processes in the world based on much less information and indications, simply remain silent about the fact that the Serbian authorities, embodied in the figure of Aleksandar Vučić, are in every way suppressing the student rebellion demanding that their country resemble other European ones. The Count What the election results in Kosjerić and Zaječar really were, there are at least two versions. Both the authorities and the opposition, linked to the rebellious students, declared victory. The CRTA observer mission, long financed from sources on both sides of the Atlantic, said on election night that election day was neither fair nor free and that the election results do not reflect the will of the citizens, because the most serious irregularities were recorded at numerous polling stations. Opposition media, activists, YouTube channels, and social media users published a multitude of video materials showing things that, to say the least, do not befit a country on the path to the European Union. The enormous police presence guarding unknown persons agitating during election day from local people, numerous cars with license plates from other cities, the presence of people dressed and behaving similarly to those in Belgrade who in the tent settlement ‘want to learn’, also did not awaken the proverbially ‘concerned’ West. Serbian media reported on vote buying and voter intimidation, and the public has almost become accustomed to it. But shock ensued when on Tuesday some SNS voters joined people protesting electoral irregularities, demanding payment of the promised 25 to 35 euros. They told television cameras that they received a package with groceries and voted for the ruling party, but afterwards did not receive the money. In the end, one added that he doesn't even believe they will ever get the money. Democracy Balkan-Style There is no doubt that now, while the robbed raise a rebellion, some will ‘wisely’ note that, after all, this is only about two small local communities in Serbia and that ‘Vučić is falling’ in the next general elections, because he won't be able to control so many polling stations. However, things are much more serious and concern all countries where Serbia has influence. In Serbia, it has been visible in recent years that a certain number of people register in a different place from election to election. In the last elections in Belgrade, citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina, citizens of Serbia, were registered at transformer stations, at addresses of people abroad, or dozens were assigned the same residence with the aim of voting in local elections. Some Montenegrin parties have been talking about this phenomenon of ‘mobile voters’ for years, but no one in the West wants to hear them. In Montenegro, with a small number of voters and fierce divisions, a few tens of thousands of votes can change the composition of the national parliament. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, we had similar cases in Srebrenica, a town which, even after the genocide, does not have fair local elections. In the upcoming elections, we can expect similar things throughout the country, unless the competent bodies act differently than before. Kosovo elections showed similar patterns of behavior. People from Serbia were brought in to vote for Vučić's close Serbian List. Democratic elections in this way are and will be compromised throughout the Balkans because the West allows its protégés to commit electoral fraud with impunity. The claim that citizens and institutions will prevent irregularities at elections was disproved in Zaječar and Kosjerić. Citizens and the opposition could only note that irregularities were happening and that the captured state would not side with them. Political Balkan Gymnastics by European Recipe Worldwide, citizens' distrust in elections is growing. The introduction of new technologies has in some places led to even greater suspicion. Some even claim that undesirables will not be allowed to win. If so, then the Balkan peoples have nothing to hope for. The West's attitude towards Vučić proves that it is possible to gain legitimacy in any kind of election, meaning voting that implies some form of ballot stuffing, as long as one commits to obedience. In Serbia, some have long repeated that the West has given Vučić a free hand to do whatever he wants, and in return, he will ensure the mining of lithium despite local opposition, deliver weapons to Ukraine, and treat the Kosovo issue in line with Western interests. Serbia is not an exception. Besides the mentioned examples of electoral fraud, let us recall the general elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina three years ago and the influence of the West via the OHR. Some claimed the elections were rigged (the Jelena Trivić case), a new election law was imposed in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina entity on election night, and then the competence of that same entity's vice president was taken away. A little over two years ago, the OHR imposed technical amendments to the election law that were supposed to improve the integrity of the electoral process, but experts said it did not solve the key problems. Democracy, by its very logic, implies the possibility of a peaceful change of power, with prior participation in political life. The attitude of the West, primarily the European Union, towards Serbia and its neighbors suggests that even this may not hold true within Balkan frameworks. Such an attitude towards this part of the world is a path to rule over the people modeled on Belarus or Russia. The European Union (un)consciously imposes autocracy and an absence of law and order on the Balkan peoples, while periodically calling for respect for European standards and demanding and offering a continuation of the ‘European path’. Students in Serbia, who are the generational chance for the country to free itself from the criminal policy led by Slobodan Milošević in power and Vojislav Šešelj in opposition, no longer carry European Union flags at their gatherings. Perhaps that's why in Brussels they should ask themselves what Serbia will look like after the day when Milošević's propaganda minister and Šešelj's party secretary finally leaves power." This article was previously published on nap.ba .

On Monday, the UK government and European Union leadership, at the first summit post-Brexit, reached significant agreements. But more important than the deals themselves is London’s desire to remain close to Brussels. Phto: Keir Starmer In February, Prime Minister Keir Starmer will declare that the UK “does not choose between the United States and the European Union,” attempting to clarify London’s position after threats by U.S. President Donald Trump to impose tariffs on EU imports. While this statement was aimed at domestic political dynamics—particularly addressing euroskeptic opposition figures like Nigel Farage (“I fear we’re tying ourselves to EU laws”)—it echoes the stance of Winston Churchill, who in his 1946 Zurich speech advocated for a united Europe, strong U.S. ties, and the UK as a bridge between transatlantic allies. Of course, Starmer has not gone as far as Churchill, nor could he for many reasons. He has simply continued the policy he has pursued since becoming prime minister: collaborating with European partners to counter Russian expansionism in Eastern Europe. Last August, Starmer visited Berlin and Paris to discuss issues that ultimately led to concrete outcomes at this week’s summit. The London Summit The announcement of the summit reflected optimism long absent in UK-EU relations. Many recall footage of a solitary Theresa May sitting among her former EU colleagues as the UK finalized its Brexit departure in 2020. Diplomats familiar with this week’s London summit stated beforehand that it marked a “relaunch” of UK-EU ties, with a defense partnership agreement serving as proof. Shortly after, it was announced that London and Brussels had agreed to deals on defense and security, simplified food and agricultural trade, and streamlined border controls. Given Brussels’ prioritization of these issues, the agreements signal a new era. For instance, the Trump administration has been particularly critical of Brussels’ treatment of U.S. food exports. Starmer called the deals a “reset” in UK-EU relations. The UK will join a €150 billion EU program for joint arms production and procurement. This initiative, driven by several European powers, aims to bolster Ukraine’s defense against Russian aggression and prepare for potential cuts in U.S. military aid to Kyiv under Trump. The two sides also agreed to reduce food inspection procedures, allowing British companies to avoid carbon taxes. By 2040, this could generate €10 billion in profits for the UK economy. Brussels secured a 12-year extension for EU fishing vessels in UK waters, while the UK gained simplified entry into the EU via multiple border crossings with reduced checks. A New Chapter Starmer’s outreach to Brussels serves two key goals. First, to strengthen his Labour Party, whose base largely opposed Brexit. Second, to counter threats from Russia and Trump’s policies. The Kremlin and a potential Trump White House have shown disregard for European concerns, particularly regarding Ukraine. The warming of UK-EU relations became evident earlier this year when European Council President Antonio Costa noted a “new positive energy” between the two sides, foreshadowing this week’s summit. This is undeniably a major victory for Starmer. The EU remains the UK’s largest trading partner, with €950 billion in bilateral trade, despite a 21% drop in UK exports since Brexit. Simultaneously, Starmer has cultivated ties with Trump, exemplified by a recent UK-U.S. trade deal. While Trump secured tariff concessions, Starmer has maintained proximity to an administration that snubs many EU leaders. Starmer has capitalized on domestic sentiment to align closer to Brussels and integrate the UK into European initiatives, especially in Eastern Europe. Recent polls show Britons favor closer EU ties and disapprove of Trump’s policies. The EU has also shown subtle shifts in strategy. Beyond the UK, Brussels has hinted at offering Turkey a role in Europe’s new security architecture, leveraging Ankara’s strategic position from the Balkans to the Middle East. Turkey’s growing defense industry and military modernization strengthen its bid for deeper EU engagement. In dealing with both London and Ankara, Brussels has signaled it will not abandon its goals despite Trump’s policies. Moreover, the rallying of European powers against Russia sends a message to Washington—not just Trump—that Europe demands respect. This could influence U.S. policy toward China, as economic sanctions on Beijing would falter without EU cooperation. The UK’s resolve to support Kyiv has galvanized Brussels. Ambitious EU defense and arms production plans, unthinkable a few years ago, are now underway. Recent elections in Romania, where pro-EU forces defeated Moscow-aligned candidates, underscore Europe’s mobilization against Russian influence. Starmer has continued Boris Johnson’s pro-Ukraine stance, reinforcing London’s reputation as a reliable Western ally. Since taking office in July 2023, Starmer has won key battles, but the geopolitical contest persists. This article was originally published on nap.ba

Today’s military parade in Moscow, marking the 80th anniversary of victory in World War II, served Russian President Vladimir Putin as an opportunity to further ease Western pressure and attract more foreign state delegations compared to the previous two years. Photo: Putin during today's address in Moscow Russia's aggression against Ukraine changed Moscow’s position globally. Russia became isolated by the West and much of the world. Since then, Putin has been working to break that blockade and strengthen his position, despite being wanted by the International Criminal Court in The Hague for war crimes in Ukraine. This isolation was vividly illustrated during the 2023 parade, when on one of the most significant days in Russian history, Putin hosted only the leaders of Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan. The parade featured just a single World War II tank. Compared to previous years, this was a major setback for Putin. He had few guests, and modern Russian combat systems were absent from Red Square. It seemed as though all available forces were deployed in Ukraine or stationed across Russia. A year later, Putin saw more success. The list of leaders attending the parade expanded. Although the Armenian leadership did not attend this time, the guest list grew to include the leaders of Turkmenistan, Cuba, Laos, and Guinea-Bissau, in addition to those who returned from the previous year. Still, even then, it was clear that Putin remained internationally isolated. The guest list was unimpressive, and the military parade was far more modest than in the years before the invasion of Ukraine. From BRICS to Trump By the end of 2024, Putin’s position began to shift. The list of his interlocutors grew—though it still lacked many key Western states. In fact, with some of them, diplomatic relations were nearly non-existent. At the end of October, Putin hosted the 16th BRICS summit. On that occasion, he welcomed dozens of leaders from around the world. High-level delegations from China, India, South Africa, Brazil, Iran, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Ethiopia, and Turkey arrived in Kazan. These guests didn’t come to Kazan to defy the West or submit to Putin. Most were driven by economic interest, and some by a determination not to take sides in the conflict between the Kremlin and the West. Putin did not win their approval for a new global financial system to replace the post–World War II order dominated by Washington. Still, since then, the West has not kept Russia and Putin in complete isolation. The war in Ukraine has continued to reshape the world. With Donald Trump’s return to the White House, the West is experiencing a number of reversals. Trump blamed Ukraine for the war, claimed that Kyiv was misusing American funds, and criticized Europe for failing to match Washington’s financial commitment. Trump went further—he began negotiations with the Russians. Talks included the lifting of sanctions and cooperation in various sectors of the economy. Essentially, this meant choosing Putin over many European leaders. A Parade with Guests from Around the World This year’s parade gave Putin another chance to expand his circle of partners. According to Russian media, 29 delegations attended, including Slovakia—a NATO and EU member. Among the 29 were also the internationally unrecognized South Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In addition to regular guests from post-Soviet states, Russian media reported that the leaders of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Burkina Faso, China, the Congo, Cuba, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Laos, Mongolia, Myanmar, Palestine, Serbia, Venezuela, Vietnam, and Zimbabwe were present. Regardless of Putin's talk about fighting Nazism, the primary goal of the parade was to bring together those willing to choose Moscow over the West. A striking example is Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić—a long-time Western favorite and alleged guarantor of stability in the former Yugoslavia. Vučić traveled to Moscow to gain support for his policies, strengthen ties with Russia, and defy the West—right after meeting with European Enlargement Commissioner Maroš Šefčovič and attempting to connect with Trump in still-unexplained events in Florida. Vučić’s presence at the commemoration of the victory over Nazism would be commendable if it were sincere and if he truly believed in who stood on the right side in World War II. In Serbia, Chetniks—who fled alongside Ustaše from the Red Army and Yugoslav partisans in 1945—are being rehabilitated and glorified. Vučić’s presence in Moscow may inspire regime-aligned historians in Serbia to explain why the so-called “anti-fascist” Chetniks were fleeing from Soviet and Yugoslav anti-fascists. Vučić isn’t the only one among Putin’s guests who could face uncomfortable questions. For example, Putin could ask the guests from Myanmar about their treatment of Rohingya Muslims. Or Ethiopia's leaders about their role in partitioning neighboring Somalia. He could ask his frequent guest Milorad Dodik about his stance on Muslims, Bosniaks, war criminals, and respect for the law. And then ask them all whether any of that reflects the spirit of the fight against Nazism. This year’s parade was significantly larger than in previous years. Media reports say about 11,000 Russian soldiers took part. Alongside them were troops from 13 other countries, including Chinese soldiers—their first appearance since 2015. Russian media noted that there were three times as many vehicles on Red Square this year compared to last, with the inclusion of drones used in the war against Ukraine. Russian ballistic missiles, artillery, and tanks were also once again on display. Today, Putin once again sent a message to the West and the world—especially about Ukraine. In his speech, he justified the aggression against Ukraine by trying to draw a connection to Moscow’s World War II policies. It was a message that Russia believes it has the right to invade neighboring countries. Tragically and grotesquely, Putin also claimed yesterday that the role of the United Nations and international law would increase in the coming era. The article was previously published on nap.ba

Friedrich Merz has been elected chancellor. Germany thus has a new government at a time when change is necessary, and many in Europe expect a more active German role. Photo: Friedrich Merz Despite unexpected drama in the Bundestag, Germany received the expected new government yesterday. Friedrich Merz, leader of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), in alliance with the CSU, will become the tenth Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, in coalition with the Social Democrats (SPD). Merz's cabinet will have eighteen members. The CDU and SPD will each hold seven ministries, and the CSU three. Behind the coalition, according to February's election results, stand 328 members of the Bundestag, although this number proved fluid. Merz received the required support only in the second round, having won just 310 of the needed 316 votes in the first round—a historical precedent. Some members of the coalition abstained from supporting the new government. German media differ in reporting: some claim all 18 dissenters were from the CDU, others from the SPD. In the second round, Merz's government received 325 votes. Against AfD Yesterday’s secret vote in the Bundestag brought an unpleasant surprise and a heavy blow to Merz. Headlines in German media read “ Eighteen Rebels ,” “Pure Embarrassment,” “ Shaken Merz ,” and “ Brought Down by His Own Ranks .” However, the vote demonstrated that Germany’s political elite remains compact and unwilling to allow change, even under pressure from U.S. President Donald Trump's administration. The second-round vote reaffirmed a standing consensus to keep Alternative for Germany (AfD) out of power. Merz and others' refusal to bring AfD into government marks the first major defeat for Trump’s administration in its effort to reshape the West. AfD had the backing of U.S. Vice President JD Vance, Secretary of State Marco Rubio, and the world’s richest man, Elon Musk. This trio didn’t hold back on criticism of Germany, especially after Berlin designated AfD as a far-right extremist entity. Last week, Rubio called the decision a “veiled tyranny” on social media platform X, stating that “Germany just gave a spy agency new powers to monitor the opposition” and warning Berlin to “change course.” Vance joined in criticizing Berlin, and Musk has for months used his platform X and other means to support AfD. Germany’s Foreign Ministry responded to Rubio’s critique by saying, “ That’s democracy ,” and emphasized that the decision followed a “ thorough and independent investigation to protect our constitution and the rule of law .” They stated that they had learned from their history “ that far-right extremism must be stopped .” For a Better Germany—with the Same Policies It is rare for the German political elite to resist Washington so openly. But that stance needs continuity—in this case, a political figure capable of shaping German policy both domestically and internationally. Germany is in crisis, and AfD is proof of that. Some voters expressed their frustration with mainstream parties by supporting the far right. Since the start of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Germany has gone from crisis to crisis. In the early days of the invasion, Berlin appeared lost. Some of its moves—such as offering Ukraine everything but weapons—left Kyiv stunned. But once U.S. President Joe Biden rallied dozens of countries to aid Ukraine, Germany emerged as a leader. Eventually, it severed economic ties with Russia, gave up cheap energy, and began strengthening its military. Merz's chancellorship is expected to continue Olaf Scholz’s policies, who was forced into a sharp pivot both at home and abroad. Merz is similarly pressured to take clear stances. Washington has many grievances with him, ties with Moscow are poor, and European allies want Berlin to take the lead in shaping a new European policy. One of the first to congratulate Merz on his appointment was French President Emmanuel Macron: “ It’s up to us to make the Franco-German engine stronger than ever ” and “ accelerate our European agenda for sovereignty, security, and competitiveness ,” he wrote. Merz’s Signature For now, Merz will continue Germany’s policies toward Ukraine and Russia. Like Macron, he is not ready to follow Trump unconditionally and understands this calls for more autonomy in the West. In his earlier political career, Merz was a vocal critic of Vladimir Putin, Trump’s administration, and China. Merz must therefore pursue a more independent foreign policy and stand by his belief that Europe must strengthen its defense to reduce dependency on NATO—i.e., the United States. That will be the task of Defense Minister Boris Pistorius, who held the same post in the previous government and is leading an ambitious project to bolster Germany’s military. Merz’s intention to chart an independent foreign policy is also reflected in his appointment of Johann Wadephul as Foreign Minister and Gunther Krichbaum as Minister for Europe—both CDU members. CDU will, for the first time in many years, control the foreign ministry, suggesting that Berlin may pursue ideas that differed from those of former Green Party minister Annalena Baerbock. Merz has previously shown himself to be a pro-American politician, a proponent of Atlanticism, NATO, the European Union, and a united West. He supports economic liberalism and capitalism more broadly. This means that a clash with the Trump administration and its supporters could unfold precisely along these lines, as Merz believes the West must continue to uphold its core ideals. Lastly, let’s turn to the Balkans, which are not at the top of Merz’s priority list. Still, his Balkan policy may be put to the test. If he is against Putin, he must also oppose his Balkan proxies. If he supports a united Europe and the West, he must show it in the Balkans. Foreign Minister Wadephul has worked with High Representative Christian Schmidt and supported him upon arriving in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Germany’s economic policy will impact the region, which is tightly economically linked to Germany—making Merz an important figure for the Balkans as well. The article was previously published on nap.ba

Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni has met with U.S. President Donald Trump multiple times this year. What is the secret link between Meloni and Trump, and what connects them? Photo: Trump and Meloni Donald Trump’s intent to govern the United States and the world in his own unique way is no secret. He recently stated this himself, adding that he “has a lot of fun” while doing it—a remark that sounded like it came from someone enjoying an easy job. In an earlier statement, Trump claimed his job is not easy and requires significant effort. This stance is unsurprising and would likely be echoed by any shrewd politician, even those leading the smallest administrative units. Thus, Trump’s remarks of this sort should be taken with a grain of irony or as part of his performance, which alternates between compliments and insults depending on his audience. But when a foreign official meets with a U.S. president multiple times in a few months, the matter becomes serious. This holds true even for Trump, who praises Meloni with terms like “ a fantastic woman ” “ who “ has conquered Europe ,” an “ excellent prime minister and true world leader, ” and a “brilliant person with immense talent .” What Trump says about Meloni need not be true or false—it is part of a public performance, giving her political backing in Italy and the EU. Trump leverages his popularity and power as U.S. president to assist a politician who is a key cog in his plans for Europe and the world. Meloni: From Fascism to the Acceptable Right The rise of Giorgia Meloni to power was met with the same hysteria in Western media as that of any politician who slightly deviates from mainstream politics. Her electoral victory in September 2022 was portrayed in parts of the West as an apocalypse—a return of fascists to lead European nations and the end of the EU and NATO. At the time, it was accurately reported that Meloni was a member of the neofascist National Alliance party, that in 1996 she called Benito Mussolini “the best politician of the last fifty years,” blamed Yugoslav President Josip Broz Tito for crimes during and after WWII, claimed parts of modern Croatia, and more. But back then, Meloni was a political marginal. Her party, Brothers of Italy, received 2.2% support in elections eleven years ago, 4.4% seven years ago, and 26% in 2022. This rare phenomenon globally—though common in Italian politics, where rapid party ascents are frequent—was driven by two factors. First, Brothers of Italy absorbed the right wing of former Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi’s party, with whom Meloni was close. Second, Meloni shifted away from radical, Europe-unacceptable far-right positions toward the center-right, at least on economic policy and most of her party’s value judgments. Her 2019 statement, “I am Giorgia. I am a woman. I am a mother. I am a Christian,” later became the foundation of her political brand. Trump’s Perspective What Meloni achieved in Italy, Trump has done differently in the U.S. during recent elections. Unlike his first two campaigns, Trump now heavily involves businessmen, Republican structures, lobbies, media, fringe groups, and minorities. He has moved away from his initial rhetoric of “draining the swamp” in Washington and persecuting U.S. politicians and officials over (un)founded accusations. In his second term, he is copying Meloni’s approach by attracting anyone who can help him maintain popularity and marginalize ideological rivals. Meloni also moderated her foreign policy stances. As her rise to power became certain, she reassured the West by stating she is not against NATO or the EU but believes reforms are needed. Italy’s approach to NATO remains unchanged, and Meloni supports Ukraine against Russian aggression. However, her stance toward the EU has shifted. Official Rome now fights illegal migration and clashes with “woke ideology.” This approach, particularly on migration, is gaining traction even among non-right-wing factions in the EU. Meloni has mirrored Poland’s opposition, which until recently governed Warsaw, by blending Atlanticism, ultraconservatism, sovereignism, economic liberalism, European unity, and ties to Israel and Arab monarchies. She has given new momentum to the right-wing transformation started by Marine Le Pen, who distanced herself from her father Jean-Marie Le Pen’s legacy. Trump’s second-term strategy strikingly resembles this model. His team undoubtedly draws on these experiences to craft policies. The new right, led by Trump, has merged ideologies once deemed incompatible decades ago. Realpolitik and Economics Beyond ideology, Meloni is crucial to Trump’s administration. Vice President JD Vance, Elon Musk, and others in Trump’s circle have harshly criticized the current governments of the UK, Germany, France, and Spain—major European powers except Poland (pro-Brussels and pro-American) and Italy. Meloni has become Trump’s bridge to the EU. Weeks ago, she promised Trump to organize a meeting with EU leaders, advocating for continued free trade without tariffs. Trump had earlier imposed 20% tariffs on all EU goods. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen acknowledges Meloni’s influence, admitting she discussed this with the Italian premier before Meloni’s U.S. trip. Meloni’s clout extends further. Media report her friendship with Musk, who supports Brothers of Italy and participates in their events. Talks of Tesla’s major investment in Italian electric vehicle production coincide with Chinese competitors dominating U.S. and EU markets. Data on Tesla’s European sales validate this narrative: record declines in Spain (75%), France (63%), Germany (62%), and Scandinavia contrast with modest growth in Meloni-led Italy. Trump and Musk value Italy’s friendship, given its status as Europe’s fourth-largest economy and the world’s eighth-largest. Meloni signaled alignment with Washington by withdrawing Italy from China’s Belt and Road Initiative in December 2023—a blow to Beijing and a win for the U.S. However, Italy’s economy is fragile. When Meloni took office, Italy’s debt was 152% of GDP. The COVID crisis triggered inflation and recession, while sanctions on Russia (a key partner) exacerbated energy concerns. Trump’s tariffs hurt Italian exports, which totaled $70 billion to the U.S. in 2024. As an EU member, Italy has limited economic flexibility, relying on loans to service existing debts. An Alliance on the New Right Addressing these economic and social challenges requires more than technocratic solutions. As the West faces upheaval and Washington prepares for a showdown with China, there is a need for an ideological framework resilient to electoral backlash over poor economic results and public discontent. Who can formulate such a policy? What would it look like? In the absence of new grand political and philosophical ideas in the West, the right has resorted to recycling existing ones. Trump is the standard-bearer of this new right-wing politics, distinct from the classical Western right of recent decades. Argentine President Javier Milei, who tested Trump’s ideas domestically by slashing ministries and cutting free cancer drugs, acknowledges this. Earlier this year, Milei declared a global front led by Trump to defeat the left, including Meloni, Israeli PM Benjamin Netanyahu, Hungary’s Viktor Orbán, El Salvador’s Nayib Bukele, and others. This emerging alliance was evident during the U.S. elections, with support from Poland’s Andrzej Duda, Austria’s Freedom Party, France’s National Rally, Spain’s Vox, and others at odds with the supposed “ left ” governing the West. For this group, the “ left ” is no longer the worker-focused movement of decades past but a “ cultural model ” and “ woke ideology .” Workers’ rights and poverty, once the left’s raison d'être, are rarely mentioned today. Trump, who returned to the White House due to Biden’s missteps, needs fresh momentum for his evolving policies. Meloni is invaluable here: she capitalized on public discontent and rebranded far-right politics into something palatable even to Europeans wary of Trump. This experience could benefit Trump, who boasts, “ No one knows the system better than me, ” and “ No one understands politicians better than me. ” The article was published previously on PISjournal.net

European Commissioner for Enlargement Marta Kos visited Serbia this week. The visit was intended to demonstrate Belgrade’s commitment to Brussels. Earlier, Serbian Orthodox Church Patriarch Porfirije (Prvoslav Perić) asked Vladimir Putin for Serbia to remain in Russia’s political orbit. Photo: Marta Kos and Aleksandar Vučić The student protests in Serbia, now in their sixth month, are not just a problem for President Aleksandar Vučić. These protests have shaken Western policy toward Serbia and the Balkans as a whole. The "European path" of several Balkan states has been stripped bare and rendered nonsensical. The students’ simple demands—which do not ask Belgrade to align with Brussels or Moscow—cannot be fulfilled, as they undermine the entire great-power politics toward this part of the world. The collapse of the canopy at Novi Sad’s railway station shattered the narrative that Vučić, or any Balkan leader, guarantees Balkan stability during the EU accession process. Kos’s visit to Serbia and Porfirije’s stance in Moscow reveal how Brussels and Moscow view Balkan citizens and how some Balkan leaders treat the people they rule. Distant Russian and Brussels Worlds In mid-February, former Serbian President Boris Tadić, attending the Munich Security Conference, wrote on social media X that his interlocutors in the German city told him "representatives of the Serbian delegation are feeding Western politicians information that Russian intelligence and interests are behind the student protests in Serbia." He added that it is " absurd to simultaneously claim that a color revolution is underway and that Russia is behind it, especially considering the Progressive-led government signed an agreement granting Serbia observer status in the Russian CSTO defense alliance and formed a joint working group with Russia to combat color revolutions ." Two months later, a complete reversal. Porfirije, whom many in Serbia see as Vučić’s man, told the Russian president that a "color revolution" is unfolding in Serbia and expressed hope that " this trial will be overcome ." He requested Serbia become part of the "Russian world" and thanked Putin for supporting Serbia. He conveyed Vučić’s greetings, adding that the Serbian president will visit Moscow on May 9 to commemorate the victory over Nazism in World War II. This statement by the head of the Serbian Orthodox Church (SPC) angered some in Serbia. Most criticism focuses on his accusation that protesting students and citizens are paid agents of Western intelligence. This alignment with Vučić’s camp and repetition of claims by members of the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) has upset the opposition. Among those accusing the clergy of propagating regime-friendly narratives is MP Radomir Lazović of the Green-Left Front. On Facebook, commenting on the patriarch’s remarks, he wrote that during a Foreign Affairs Committee meeting, he questioned Serbia’s new ambassador to the U.S., Dragan Šutanovac—a former Democratic Party (DS) leader whom Vučić blames for all of Serbia’s ills—about the protests. " To my question about how he will present the students’ fight for justice to U.S. interlocutors, the former DS president and now Progressive ambassador replied with memorized lines from the SNS protocol for slandering student protests. He immediately launched into claims about Russian security service influence and, like a parrot, repeated the prepared talking point that EU flags are absent from the protests—a line all Progressives repeat ," Lazović wrote. The Serbian public missed a key part of Porfirije’s Moscow remarks. Thanking Putin for supporting Belgrade’s policies toward Montenegro, Kosovo, and the smaller Bosnian entity, he said, " Without Kosovo and Republika Srpska, I can say, the Serbian people have no future. " Serbian nationalists, typically close to the Church, took no issue with the claim that Serbs lack prospects without part of Bosnia and Herzegovina—a region never part of Serbia. Porfirije did not stop there. Serbs "sometimes" place more hope in Russia than Serbia, "centers of power in the West want to shatter the Serbian people’s identity and culture," and "the Serbian people see the Russian people as one." He echoed Russian Patriarch Kirill’s words that "love for Russia... may even be embedded in the genes of the Serbian people" and called Western moral decline "demonic." All this followed Putin’s opening remarks endorsing the so-called "Serbian world"—an attack on the sovereignty of multiple states. " We know the Balkan situation is not simple, and we acknowledge your efforts to strengthen Serbia’s position, including the significant All-Serbian Assembly you held, " Putin said. Brussels’ Perspective The Moscow meeting set the stage for Commissioner Kos’s visit. Upon her arrival, official Belgrade shifted tone, expressing a desire to move closer to the West—distancing itself from the " Russian world " and a Kremlin isolated in Europe after its aggression against Ukraine, a majority-Orthodox country unmentioned by Moscow’s "faith brothers." On the day Kos arrived, Foreign Minister Marko Đurić stated Belgrade aims to meet EU membership conditions " by 2026. " After meeting Kos, Vučić wrote on Instagram: " I emphasized our full readiness to accelerate reforms—not due to bureaucratic demands, but because we believe they bring a better life for our citizens. " Parliamentary Speaker Ana Brnabić said, "Serbia’s EU membership remains its foreign policy goal." Kos also met Prime Minister Đuro Mačuta. Kos spent two days in Serbia, meeting various political actors and laying flowers in Novi Sad for the canopy collapse victims. She met with " Students Who Want to Study, " though the meeting was held at the EU Delegation in Belgrade—not at the protest camp outside Serbia’s Parliament and Presidency, as initially announced. Kos also spoke with DS leader Srđan Milivojević. After their meeting, he said EU officials were " stunned " by what they saw outside Parliament. Serbian media have reported for months that the camp has few students and includes alleged criminals and veterans of Serbian military units that fought in Croatia and Bosnia. Ahmedin Škrijelj, an MP from the Sandžak Democratic Action Party, attended the meeting with Milivojević. He told Kos that Bosniaks in Serbia are denied constitutionally guaranteed rights and called for mechanisms to protect them, calling the current government a remnant of Slobodan Milošević’s regime. He urged demilitarizing Sandžak, converting military facilities into educational or recreational spaces—particularly a planned military site in Priboj near the Bosnian border—while supporting Serbia’s EU and NATO membership. Serbia’s European or Russian Path? After meeting Vučić, Kos said the EU’s " momentum " for enlargement is real and Serbia must seize this " once-in-a-generation chance ." She wrote on X: "Timely meeting with Serbia’s president. The EU’s enlargement momentum is real, and we want Serbia to seize this chance to complete our Union." To achieve this, "concrete steps on democratic principles and reforms" are needed, and "the time to act is now." What reforms does Brussels demand? Kos stated Serbia must hold free, democratic elections, improve media freedom, and align with student demands. Otherwise, she warned during a visit to the Zoran Đinđić Foundation, Serbia’s European path will stall. Hosts at the Foundation alerted Kos to " media campaigns in pro-government tabloids that led to six citizens being detained for 50 days, while six others fled to EU countries—the only zone they currently perceive as safe—due to threats. " On Kos’s second day, opposition figure Marinika Tepić was assaulted in public. While some in Serbia found Kos’s messages encouraging, they are insufficient to spur meaningful change. It is clear Vučić will not allow free elections, his allied media will not stop shamelessly attacking critics, and Belgrade will not abandon its "Serbian world" policies toward neighbors—backed by Putin and championed by Porfirije. Why would they? The penalty, per Kos’s words, is merely the end of Serbia’s European path. This article was previously published on nap.ba

About ten days ago, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed the Law on the Ratification of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement with Iran. Tehran announced that it would soon ratify the agreement as well, marking the beginning of a new phase in the relationship between the two countries. Photo: Masoud Pezeshkian and Vladimir Putin When considering future threats to the United States, Zbigniew Brzezinski wrote in his 1997 book The Grand Chessboard: "Potentially, the most dangerous scenario would be a grand coalition of China, Russia, and perhaps Iran, an 'anti-hegemonic' coalition not united by ideology but by shared grievance." This diplomat and political scientist, who influenced U.S. foreign policy for decades, also noted that such a coalition could only materialize if Washington was blind. Whether Washington was blind or intoxicated by its Cold War victory is less important than the fact that this tripartite alliance has been developing in various forms for decades. A new phase in Russia–Iran relations began on January 17 of this year, when Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian signed the agreement with Putin in Moscow. It has been undergoing ratification ever since. An Agreement for a New Era At the end of March, Putin submitted the agreement for ratification in the Duma. Three weeks later, he signed the law finalizing the ratification, and the agreement officially entered into force. The Russia–Iran Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement is a substantial document. It contains 47 articles and covers areas such as defense, energy, counterterrorism, finance, agriculture, industry, science, technology, and culture—for the next twenty years. Russian media described the agreement as consolidating Russia and Iran’s status as strategic partners. On the Iranian side—where the deal was received with greater optimism than in Russia—it was seen as a diplomatic victory for the new Iranian administration that replaced the one led by President Ebrahim Raisi, who, along with Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, died in a helicopter crash on May 19 last year. Still, it would be inaccurate to attribute the agreement solely to the current Iranian administration. As early as 2020, then-President Hassan Rouhani called for a new agreement to replace the existing 2001 Tehran–Moscow deal. Rouhani was strengthening ties with Russia and China as a counterweight to poor relations with the West and had pushed the Kremlin to sign the agreement quickly. This is a success for Iran for at least two reasons. First, the 2025 agreement is more comprehensive and more favorable to Iran than the 2001 version. Second, Putin agreed to the deal amid Western isolation following the invasion of Ukraine and a need to seek support beyond Russia’s borders. One reason Putin had previously hesitated was concern for Israel’s interests and a desire to negotiate with the West. Putin’s delay in signing the agreement led to its ratification just as he was trying to repair broken ties with Washington and secure peace in Ukraine. The ratification also coincides with negotiations between Tehran and Washington on Iran’s nuclear program and Donald Trump’s threats of possible military action. A New Framework for Enhanced Cooperation Critics who downplay the agreement argue that it is full of generalities and offers no firm guarantees—such as a mutual defense clause in the event of an attack. But realists know this was never expected. First, the agreement was signed while Russia was at war with Ukraine. Second, both countries are in regions where political shifts are constant, which could place them on opposing sides at any time. The agreement begins by affirming: "Based on the deep historical ties between the Iranian and Russian peoples, the closeness of their cultures, spiritual and moral values, shared interests, strong neighborly relations, and broad opportunities for cooperation in political, economic, military, cultural, humanitarian, scientific, technical, and other fields." It reaffirms the strategic relationship between the two countries and aims to strengthen cooperation across various domains. It also expresses a joint commitment to shaping “a new just and sustainable multipolar world order based on sovereign equality among states,” in line with UN principles. The agreement outlines specific areas of cooperation. Essentially, it provides a framework for a new level of bilateral relations. For instance, in January, the commander of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, Ali Shadmani, stated that Tehran had purchased Russian Su-35 fighter jets—though he didn’t specify how many or whether they had been delivered. Last week, Moscow and Tehran also agreed on the annual delivery of 55 billion cubic meters of Russian gas, and Russia pledged to finance the construction of a new nuclear power plant in Iran. Trump’s Pressure Had this agreement been signed a few years ago, it might have been compared to Iran’s 2021 agreement with China or similar deals with Venezuela and Syria. In Russia’s case, it might have drawn comparisons with its pact with North Korea. But with Trump returning to the White House, the agreement has taken on new significance. The pressure Trump exerts on Moscow and Tehran to make deals on his terms may be offset by this pact. Continued isolation is inevitably pushing these two states into deeper cooperation—just as Brzezinski had warned. This year’s examples of Russia–Iran collaboration—on gas, weapons, and nuclear technology—make that clear. Trump is demanding peace in Ukraine from Russia in exchange for, among other things, restoring Russian energy exports to Europe. The 55 billion cubic meters of gas Russia is now planning to send to Iran is roughly equivalent to what once flowed through Nord Stream 1 to European consumers. Also notable is the sale of Russia’s top fighter jets to Iran, at a time when Trump and Israel are discussing a potential strike on the country. Threats from the U.S. and Israel to destroy Iranian nuclear facilities are being answered by Moscow and Tehran with plans to build new nuclear plants—following Moscow’s assistance in constructing Iran’s first nuclear reactor in Bushehr in 2007. The agreement gives Tehran and Moscow a foundation for long-term cooperation—and, in the short term, a bargaining chip in negotiations with the West. No doubt, China is also part of this strategic equation. Trump’s pressure on China—from tariffs to sanctions dating back to his first term—speaks to the broad geopolitical front that has been forming over the years. It’s no surprise that Russia and Iran, and especially China, are holding their ground in this contest with Trump, because they know there is an alternative to any deal with Washington. Trump’s desire to pull Russia away from China and Iran requires a serious offer from the Kremlin. Meanwhile, his interest in cutting a deal with both Iran and Russia is pushing them to constantly reevaluate their “strategic partnership” forged in January. Thus, the great game now has even more complex directions to its outcome. The article was previously published on nap.ba

The fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime marked the end of an era for Syria. Just a few months later, Syria once again stands at a crossroads. The leading roles are played by the United States and Turkey. Photo: Illustration Less than six months ago, al-Assad was toppled and the Middle East was reshaped. Russia faces the loss of its only naval base on the Mediterranean, Iran has been pushed out of Syria, Lebanese Hezbollah has lost its land corridor to Tehran through Iraq, and a major victory has been secured by all those who sought Assad’s downfall. This primarily includes most Western states, Israel, and ultimately Turkey, which now stands to gain more than others in the new reordering of the Middle East. The final days of Joseph Biden’s presidency, as he awaited the handover of power to his successor, were marked by Assad’s fall. Biden will be remembered as the president during whose term a major Washington adversary was defeated—something that many previous occupants of the White House, including Trump in his first term, had failed to achieve. Trump and Syria In his first term, Trump ordered strikes against Syria, with U.S. forces initially entering the country under the pretext of fighting ISIS. In reality, Washington used the opportunity to strengthen the Kurds militarily and established the Al-Tanf military base at the tri-border area of Syria, Iraq, and Jordan, preventing Damascus from reaching its state borders. Along Syria’s northern frontier, American bases protected the Kurds from Turkish attacks. Now, in his new term, Trump is once again turning his attention to Syria. Biden has left him with a clean slate. For months before the presidential election, U.S. media reported that Trump, upon returning to the White House, intended to withdraw troops from Syria. Now, he has the opportunity to do so even more easily—and possibly to secure concessions in return. In the complex geopolitical game involving Israel, Iran, Russia, Lebanon, Jordan, and Iraq, Trump is expected to focus special attention on ally Turkey, a NATO member. An agreement with Ankara could bolster some of America’s positions in the Middle East and bring Turkey even closer. Trump is particularly counting on his strong personal ties with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Last week, Washington announced the withdrawal of part of its forces from Syria, after the government in Damascus—now more closely aligned with Turkey—reached an agreement with the Kurds to hand over control of oil fields and the Tishrin Dam on the Euphrates River. The United States will leave about one thousand troops in Syria, withdrawing roughly the same number. The Kurds’ willingness to cede vital facilities to Damascus could not have occurred without American approval. The Kurds know that only the United States can protect them from Turkey, which accuses some Kurdish groups of terrorism. This particularly concerns the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which Washington also designates as a terrorist organization, though elements of it fought as part of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) against ISIS. Turkey’s Presence in Syria and Israel’s Concerns Trump’s decision to gradually integrate the Syrian Kurds into the new Syrian government, and to allow Damascus greater influence over territories it had not controlled for years, signals his trust in relations with Erdoğan—despite Israel’s objections to Turkey’s growing presence in Syria. Last week, Trump told Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu that he "must be reasonable" regarding any disagreements with Turkey over Syria, praising his personal ties with Erdoğan. "Any problem you have with Turkey, I think I can fix it. I mean, as long as you’re reasonable, you have to be reasonable. We all have to be reasonable," Trump said in the Oval Office while hosting Netanyahu. "Bibi, if you have a problem with Turkey, I really believe you’ll be able to solve it. You know, I have very good relations with Turkey and with their leader, and I think we’ll manage to sort it out. So I hope it won’t be a problem. I don’t think it will be a problem," he added, using Netanyahu’s nickname. Netanyahu’s resistance to Turkey’s presence is no coincidence. Turkey is reportedly considering establishing its own air bases near Hama and Palmyra, in central Syria. A few days before Turkish experts were allegedly due to visit these bases, Israel bombed them. Israel is concerned about Turkey’s growing footprint, particularly since greater Turkish control over Syrian airspace could, at some point, hinder Israeli military operations. Nevertheless, Tel Aviv’s official line is that Turkish military presence could lead to incidents between the two armies. Washington has tried to calm its closest ally, suggesting that there must be permanent communication channels with Turkey to avoid such incidents. Middle East Eye reported that Turkey told Washington it already maintains such communication channels in Syria with the United States, Russia, and Iran—and would have no problem establishing another with Israel. The fate of the Syrian Kurds remains unclear. Turkey does not want armed Kurdish groups on its borders, and the new government in Damascus aims to restore control over all Syrian territory. During the Syrian war, the Kurds were a means for the U.S. to enter Syrian territory without Damascus’ official invitation and to protect Kurdish forces from attacks by Turkey, Syria, Russia, or Iran. Tel Aviv opposes any reduction of American military presence in Syria, and some in Israel have long proposed closer ties with the Kurds as potential strategic partners in the Middle East. A New Syria Ahmed al-Sharaa, a former member of al-Qaeda and ISIS, has come to power in Damascus—and is considered more acceptable to the West and almost all Syria’s neighbors than the secular Assad. In recent months, al-Sharaa has both visited and welcomed visits from Western delegations, despite having been long labeled a terrorist. Today, al-Sharaa is a dialogue partner for the West. American, German, French, and numerous other delegations now regularly visit Damascus. The European Union is announcing aid packages for Syria, while the United States and the United Kingdom have begun removing the new Syrian rulers and government from sanctions lists. Al-Sharaa has declared that he wants Syria to be rebuilt and that he seeks no wars with neighbors. He has refrained from commenting on Israel’s occupation of parts of Syrian territory. In his view, the only major regional issue for Syria is Iran’s influence. It appears that al-Sharaa may not stop there. According to U.S. Republican Representative Cory Mills—who recently returned from a meeting with the new Syrian president in Damascus—al-Sharaa expressed a willingness to consider joining the Abraham Accords and recognizing Israel under certain conditions. Mills, along with colleague Marlin Stutzman, reportedly carried a letter from al-Sharaa to Trump outlining this position. The new Syrian leadership’s readiness to engage with all sides, and the openness of others to listen, signals a new dynamic in Middle Eastern relations. This political stance is driven by Syria’s devastation, the need for foreign assistance, and the desire to see sanctions lifted. With Iran and Russia pushed out of Syria, Washington remains the only viable address for engagement. The future of Syria will be determined by the broader relationships across the Middle East. With the defeat of Iran and Russia in Syria, Turkey and Israel now have an opportunity to expand their influence. This is happening at a time when Washington is pressuring Tehran to sign a new nuclear agreement. Washington seeks partners to take over some of its positions in the Middle East, as the world’s largest power refocuses its attention on confronting China. Trump appears to count heavily on Erdoğan. Thus, Syria becomes part of an evolving Middle Eastern mosaic—and at the same time, a testing ground for the personal relationship between two presidents, strengthening the strategic ties between two allied nations. The article was previously published on nap.ba .

European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said last week that the West as we knew it no longer exists, and that Brussels must play a role in shaping a new world order. Photo: EU Flag The announcement of the end of entire eras has usually come from scientists, journalists, and revolutionaries. In recent decades, Francis Fukuyama proclaimed the “end of history,” Immanuel Wallerstein foresaw the end of the capitalist West’s dominance as a consequence of the collapse of the rival communist USSR, and now many are speaking of the “end of globalization” due to the policies of U.S. President Donald Trump. Representatives of the European Union are not known for “strong” statements, aware of the complexity of the system they belong to and the fact that Brussels’ policy is constrained by bureaucracy and divisions among member states. That is why Von der Leyen’s statement comes as a surprise and signals an awakening of Brussels, faced with the fact that the world is changing and that the United States, China, Russia, and other countries in Asia and Latin America will seize every opportunity that presents itself at any given moment. Troubles in the West – Donald Trump “The West as we knew it no longer exists,” Von der Leyen said in an interview with the German newspaper Die Zeit, referring to the policies of U.S. President Trump. Von der Leyen said she had always been a “convinced Atlanticist” and a “great friend of the U.S.,” but that Trump’s policies are creating new circumstances. These are “historic changes” that are forcing the European Union to “play a very active role” in shaping the new world order. Von der Leyen’s statement on the future of the European Union is one of several similar messages coming from the old continent directed at the United States, following Trump’s engagement in the war in Ukraine and his alignment with Kremlin positions. “What we once considered a world order is now turning into world disorder, caused, among other things, by the struggle for dominance between China and the U.S., but also, of course, by Putin’s imperial ambitions,” she said. “That is why we need a new, different European Union, ready to step onto the global stage and actively participate in shaping the new world order to come,” she added. The “world disorder” mentioned by Von der Leyen is an acknowledgment that the West is rapidly changing, and that Washington now views its allies and rivals differently. The new policy from Washington may even target its closest allies. The actions of U.S. Vice President JD Vance and Elon Musk are the best evidence of that. The Trump administration has largely abandoned confronting rogue regimes. Now, Washington is at odds with the governments of the United Kingdom and Germany. Musk’s criticism of British Prime Minister Keir Starmer and his support for the German opposition AfD have shocked Europeans. Real Limitations Von der Leyen’s words reveal that she sees some policies of the United States and China as dangerous for Brussels. “The positive effect of all this is that I’m currently holding countless conversations with heads of state and government leaders around the world who want to cooperate with us on creating a new order,” she said, citing Canada, India, Malaysia, Indonesia, Mexico, and South American countries as examples. Despite Trump’s aggressive trade policies, the European Union, she says, has maintained its strength and has become more attractive to other countries due to its predictability and reliability. In other words, Von der Leyen claims that the European Union has the power and resources to compete with the United States and China, which are engaged in economic warfare and global competition. However, things are not as simple as Von der Leyen suggests. Trump’s policy toward Ukraine and Russian President Vladimir Putin shows the limits of European powers. Trump and Putin excluded Europeans from negotiations about a European war. French President Emmanuel Macron and Starmer are attempting in various ways to position European powers as players in Ukraine, aware that they lack a military force equivalent to that of the U.S. or Russia. At the same time, the European Union struggles with access to various raw materials and depends on other countries. Brussels is now extending a hand of cooperation to regional powers, as Von der Leyen emphasized, likely offering predictability in contrast to Trump and equality in contrast to China. Since the European Union has a strong economy and a large market, Brussels could decide the outcome of the economic war between Washington and Beijing. Macron has hinted at this in various settings—both in Beijing a few years ago and more recently in Washington. During his last visit to the White House, Macron told Trump that he should impose tariffs on China and work jointly with Europeans in Ukraine and elsewhere. On the other hand, China seeks stronger economic ties globally and supports free trade. Such a system suits communist China, as no single country can match it. For comparison, China has nearly 800 million workers, while the EU and the U.S. together have fewer than 800 million people total. Two weeks ago, Von der Leyen had a phone conversation with Chinese Premier Li Qiang, who wants the two sides to “maintain free and open trade.” How to Get Brussels Moving? Brussels can choose which side to align with, although today, almost no one in Europe says it should be China. Frustration with Washington over Trump’s tariffs is understandable, but it should not form the basis for any policy. Ultimately, Trump’s rule will not last forever. However, the European Union needs mechanisms for action and must find ways to increase its influence, first in Europe and then globally. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan recently extended such an offer to Brussels, aware of Europe's limitations, particularly in the field of defense. The EU’s intention to play the younger sibling to great powers has proven misguided. For example, reliance on the U.S. military has led to the stagnation of European armies. If the EU were to choose China’s offer of free trade with reduced U.S. influence, it could quickly find itself in the kind of economic situation the U.S. is currently in. Europe needs different politicians and new ideas. The European Union under Ursula von der Leyen cannot boast that it has shown much of this in recent years, with little success in that area to claim. But for a slow and bureaucratized Brussels, Von der Leyen’s statements last week sound like a giant step in that direction. This article was originally published on nap.ba .

On April 13, the second round of presidential elections was held in Ecuador. The victory went to the incumbent president, Daniel Noboa, in an electoral race that is hard to compare to any other. Photo: Daniel Noboa and Luisa González How security has deteriorated in what was once a peaceful Ecuador was the main topic of this year’s general and presidential elections. Consequently, the poor economic situation also became a central issue, as it is a consequence of the drug cartel war that has devastated the country, something President Daniel Noboa has tried to halt. Voters were primarily concerned with security, the economy, and the rule of law. After the first round in February, Noboa and left-wing candidate Luisa González advanced to the second round. Noboa won by seventeen thousand votes, less than one percent. He received 4,527,606 votes, and González 4,510,860, with a voter turnout of 82 percent. However, polls indicated that Luisa González had better chances in the second round. Nearly all public opinion agencies, including those close to the authorities, gave the opposition candidate the edge and predicted her victory. Supporting the likelihood of her win was the February result of her party, which secured 67 seats in the national parliament out of 151. Noboa’s party won 66 seats. Additionally, it was assumed that Noboa would have a smaller reservoir of votes after candidates from the political center and right were eliminated. In addition to a 2024 murder rate of 38.76 per 100,000 people—a slight decrease from 2023’s rate of 46.18—state data from late last year shows that only 33.87 percent of Ecuador’s working-age population was employed. In January and February of this year alone, over 1,500 murders were recorded—the highest ever in Ecuador. April Elections During the campaign, both Noboa and González publicly exchanged accusations against one another, including admissions from both candidates that individuals close to them were involved in scandals. This was partly due to the agreed format of the televised debate, which allowed participants to ask each other questions that had to be answered with a short “yes” or “no,” followed by an explanation. The public thus heard that one of Noboa’s family companies had been repeatedly involved in cocaine smuggling to Italy and Croatia. It was also heard that González was part of a group caught in criminal activity. Noboa’s camp claimed that González had ties to various criminal clans—claims she denied. The debate between Noboa and González, held just days before the vote, was a major political event. Supporters of the incumbent president claimed that this was the decisive moment for many voters, as the left-wing candidate, in their view, showed her “true face.” However, González did not perform worse than her opponent in the debate. The lawyer often sounded more convincing than the young President Noboa (37). Her selection as the presidential candidate of the Citizen Revolution party likely has much to do with her eloquence and persuasiveness. Luisa Magdalena González Aldiva (47) may have most closely embodied the profile of a person capable of defeating a millionaire incumbent and returning Ecuador to the stability of the era of her mentor, Rafael Correa. Her life was meant to demonstrate that the struggle pays off. She married at 15, became a mother at 16, and was divorced by 22. As a single mother of two, she completed law school in Ecuador and defended two master’s theses, one at the prestigious Complutense University of Madrid. She then became a presidential candidate, a member of a regional parliament, and a state official in Correa’s administration. Her image is also unique. She proudly identifies as a single mother and calls herself a “Manabita” due to her origin in the province of Manabí. She describes herself as an evangelical Christian who reads the Bible and has tattoos, she says reflect her vow to God. On social media, she presents herself as an animal rights activist and a woman who leads a healthy, athletic lifestyle and advocates for the decriminalization of abortion. She even revealed some of her chest tattoos during the televised debate, something she had done before. For this, she was accused by some of trying to sexualize Ecuadorian politics. Nonetheless, González is much more than a social media figure or self-promoter. She is a true “political animal,” as Aristotle might describe. Her political journey began in the right-wing Social Christian Party, before she joined Correa’s camp. During his presidency (2007–2017), she held various state positions, including in diplomacy. Eventually, she became president of the party Correa led, who, after being sentenced to eight years in prison for corruption, fled Ecuador and now lives in Belgium. In the campaign, she accused Noboa of a lack of public safety, corruption, high unemployment, and familial ties to drug cartels. Noboa’s family is involved in banana distribution—shipments that often carry cocaine. Ports in the Mediterranean are particularly noted for this. González claimed that drugs from Ecuador had reached Italy and Croatia via companies linked to the president’s family—a claim Noboa acknowledged but denied personal involvement. Some media outlets have reported on Balkan cartels, with a recent focus on Albanian groups. These reports claim that Balkan cartels are more brutal than Mexican or Colombian ones and more efficient, as they do not operate under a single cartel. They broker deals between Latin American, American, Mexican, and European groups and then manage the logistics of transporting goods and money. The scale of the trade is reflected in the fact that 73 percent of the world’s cocaine, mainly produced in Colombia and Peru, passes through Ecuador. But González’s strongest card in this campaign was Rafael Correa. A vote for González was a vote for Correa’s return to the country. González described him as her mentor and advisor and insisted the charges against him were politically motivated. If she had won, he would have been part of her team. Noboa’s Policy González’s clear alignment with the former president brought her loyal supporters, but also sworn enemies. That’s why Noboa played the anti-“correísmo” card, opposing the policies of the former president. What some called “21st-century socialism,” as Correa’s policies were often dubbed, was portrayed by his opponents as a path that would turn Ecuador into another Venezuela, replacing democracy with dictatorship and isolating the country internationally. This stance by Noboa was a double-edged sword. Correa had leveraged the rise of left-wing governments across Latin America and enabled Ecuador’s economic development. During his tenure, the country was almost a peaceful oasis in Latin America. The murder rate in 2019, two years after Correa left office, was 6.85 per 100,000. In just a few years, Ecuador saw a complete collapse of its security. Powerful cartels flooded into the country, which did not know how to respond. In addition to inter-cartel killings, civilians, soldiers, and police officers were also caught in the violence. Kidnappings are common, and people fear leaving their homes. Corruption has flourished. Ecuadorians, according to polls, do not trust government institutions. The military enjoys the highest level of trust, with 65 percent support. Few people want to invest in such a country. The rise of the young Noboa to power is a result of this situation. He was a member of parliament until May 2023, when the president, Guillermo Lasso dissolved parliament and called for early elections in October. Noboa entered the race to serve the remaining 16 months of Lasso’s term—and won. That was González’s first unsuccessful attempt to become Ecuador’s first female president. Violence was ravaging the country. Noboa assumed office in November 2023 and declared a state of “internal armed conflict” in January 2024. He deployed the army and police to the streets and achieved a modest reduction in murders, from 8,237 in 2023 to 6,964 in 2024. Violence continued. One presidential candidate was killed in the previous elections, and heavily armed military and police guarded all the candidates during the campaign. Noboa saw this as an opportunity to become a new Nayib Bukele, the president of El Salvador, known for his uncompromising war on gangs. Even before gaining admiration from U.S. President Donald Trump and his Republican allies, Bukele had become a star in Latin America, offering other countries a “recipe” for combating crime. Noboa seized the opportunity. Just days before the election, he brought in Erik Prince, founder of the notorious Blackwater. Prince, a Trump ally, announced a crackdown on drug cartels. Noboa called this “strategic alliance” a turning point in the fight against gangs in Ecuador. Earlier, Noboa had advocated for a legal change allowing foreign countries to establish military bases in Ecuador. His obvious target was the U.S. military, which he hoped would help in the fight against the cartels. As a result, American influence in Ecuador would grow, while the left-wing political bloc advocating national sovereignty would weaken. Noboa also promised voters a million new jobs in four years, foreign investment, a fight against Ecuador becoming another Venezuela, an end to corruption, and better schools and universities. He supports market liberalization—contrary to the left—but adapted some policies for the campaign, including offering incentives to start businesses. Polarization and Election Results Not Accepted by González This approach led to clear polarization: for or against the left. To shift focus to Ecuador’s condition, González promised to end violence, create two million jobs in four years, pursue a sovereign foreign policy, and build a welfare state. She accused Noboa of hospitals without medicine, schools in disrepair, and being out of touch as a millionaire. Regarding Prince’s presence, she called it an insult to Ecuador’s army and police. She repeatedly called Noboa a “liar” during the televised debate. However, the situation in Ecuador led to complete militarization. Some see this as the beginning of Noboa’s autocracy—something not unfamiliar in Latin America. Before the election, some cities were isolated, borders were closed, and security forces filled the streets. Noboa’s policies—business incentives and city lockdowns—appear, at least according to González’s post-election claims, to be key to his victory. Few in the opposition saw this coming. The full picture would only become clear after the election. Citizens rushed to the polls. Thirteen million were eligible to vote, and voting is mandatory for those aged 18 to 65. The penalty for not voting is a fine. Turnout in the second round was 87 percent. Noboa received 5,858,472 votes; González, 4,674,616—55.62 percent versus 44.38 percent. Compared to the first round, Noboa gained 1.3 million new votes, while his opponent added just over one hundred thousand. The opposition was in total shock. González claimed there was a “grotesque” theft of the election. Correa, who is very active on social media, posts dozens of messages daily. In one, he stated that the result was “mathematically impossible,” with a probability of less than one percent. Noboa rejected the allegations, saying the overwhelming margin speaks for itself. His supporters told the left they didn’t want Ecuador to become another Venezuela, and that González’s campaign had opened people’s eyes. Observer missions from the Organization of American States (OAS), the United States, and the European Union reported no major irregularities. Even RETO, which supported González, implicitly agreed and congratulated Noboa, leaving the Citizen Revolution without its strongest party ally. González is not giving up and is filing complaints with authorities, which she claims are controlled by Noboa. She called on everyone to reject the results and for the election commission to open all ballot bags and recount the votes. On social media, she posted a few compromised polling station records as evidence of alleged fraud. Her complaints prompt a brief recap of her candidacy process. On June 13, 2023, when she attempted to register her presidential candidacy with supporters, police used pepper spray and tear gas against them, explaining it as a response to aggressive behavior by her followers. On June 16, her candidacy was rejected, only to be accepted four days later after corrections. These months-long obstructions, González claims, were part of a conspiracy against her. In her post-election complaint, she stated that Noboa was not properly registered, that the electoral commission changed polling locations at the last minute due to weather conditions, that her party’s observers reported the use of unsigned and unstamped materials, and that overseas voting was restricted. She also said that Noboa declared a state of emergency in seven historically left-leaning regions just days before the election. She argued that the business incentives were, in fact, vote buying. In other words, González claims the militarization of Ecuador was a prelude to emergency rule in some provinces, which influenced the results, and that cash incentives were nothing but vote buying. These, she believes, were the keys to Noboa’s victory. The Ecuadorian public does not share the leftist politician’s certainty. So far, the response has been weaker than she would like. As it stands, there was either no electoral fraud or it was executed perfectly. That’s why the aftermath will be interesting to follow. González can expect a decision on the annulment of the election by May 24, as that is when Noboa is set to be sworn in and begin his four-year term, and the continuation of his battle against the left in an unstable Ecuador. This article was previously published on PISjournal.net

Student protests in Serbia have lasted for almost six months, toppling the government but not the power of Aleksandar Vučić. In defending his rule, refusing to meet the demands of students and the citizens supporting them, Vučić has decided to form a new Serbian government, to be led by Đuro Macut. Photo: Đuro Macut When citizens and students took to the streets after fourteen people died in the collapse of a canopy at the renovated train station in Novi Sad—a number that later grew—few could have imagined that this would threaten the position of Aleksandar Vučić and his Serbian Progressive Party (SNS). Those hoping for the end of Vučić’s rule believed it would come from his policies on Kosovo, or his ambivalent stance in the West–Russia conflict. The opposition tried unsuccessfully for years to exploit the cracks in these policies. Analysts of the political landscape in Serbia were convinced that external pressure and Kosovo policy would be decisive in Vučić’s fall. None of them considered the students a threat. Within a few months, students disrupted the plans of both the government and the opposition. They toured Serbia, organized rallies, protests, and blockades, awakening their fellow citizens and liberating them from fear of the regime. The government’s disorientation in handling the students is shown by their attempts to mimic student actions—an own goal. If Vučić could openly side with Russia, it wouldn't be surprising if he ordered his supporters to walk to the Kremlin, imitating the students cycling to Strasbourg. An Endocrinologist in Politics The opposition’s confusion—and the claim that parts of it work for the government—gives Vučić room to gain support from both the West and Russia. Sometimes the opposition waves Russian flags, other times they call for help from Brussels. The student rally on March 15 was a message to both the government and the opposition. Thus, the new Serbian government is a forced maneuver by Vučić. Đuro Macut, a little-known figure to the public but a respected expert in endocrinology, was named prime minister. He is also one of the founders of a movement Vučić plans to activate—possibly as a replacement for SNS. During the parliamentary debate on the government’s formation, opposition leader Zdravko Ponoš said Macut, based on his credentials, might be fit to run a hospital or clinical center—but not to be prime minister. Ponoš is likely right. However, that doesn’t mean Macut will focus only on healthcare. In his inaugural address, Macut announced his priority would be restoring normal operations in schools and universities—essentially, signaling a crackdown on students and striking professors. A clear sign he has picked a side was his appearance at the “students who want to study” camp in downtown Belgrade—a camp the opposition claims has few real students. Even that single task is a lot for someone who has devoted his life to medicine, especially given that Serbia is in a state of popular revolt and on the brink of conflict. New and Old Ministers: Stanković, Bratina, and the Students This week, students began blocking Serbia’s public media service, including Serbia and Vojvodina’s television networks. They are demanding either professional media coverage or for the channels to be shut down. Radio Television of Serbia (RTS) is especially under fire, with its headquarters surrounded for days by both police and students. RTS has become a key battleground between the government and the students. It seems students have already won some ground, as Macut (or Vučić) made strange choices for the new ministers of education and information. The new education minister is Dejan Vuk Stanković, a political analyst who stated he would use force against students. Additionally, there are allegations he sexually harassed female students at the Faculty of Education in Belgrade. The new minister of information and telecommunications is Boris Bratina, a professor at the relocated University of Priština in Kosovska Mitrovica. Bratina is known to the public as a member of the organization SNP1389, which recently allied with the Naši movement. SNP1389 advocates for “unification of all Serbian lands,” denies the Srebrenica genocide, seeks an alliance with Russia, and views the West as evil. Videos have circulated online showing Bratina burning the EU flag. Although some believe Bratina is replacing ousted minister Aleksandar Vulin and that this is another Vučić trick to appeal to the far-right, it’s worth noting that Vučić recently said Macut’s government would continue Serbia’s path toward the EU—EU-whatever that means. Several ministers from the previous government remain: Marko Đurić as foreign minister, Ivica Dačić as interior minister, Dubravka Đedović Handanović as minister of mining and energy, Bratislav Gašić as defense minister, Zlatibor Lončar as health minister, and Nikola Selaković as minister of culture. Rallies in Belgrade and Novi Pazar – Two Different Politics The government’s formation had a prelude. Vučić brought people from across the Balkans to Belgrade to demonstrate his popularity. Serbian media reported that some were paid to attend and provided with food, drinks, and concerts. Still, the April 11 rally wasn’t a victory for Vučić—it was much smaller than the March 15 student protest. In this showdown of popularity, the students prevailed, though Vučić again proved he has a team capable of mobilizing diverse groups. Vučić acknowledged growing societal fragmentation and is searching for new voters. The entertainment at the rally, featuring Baja Mali Knindža and a speech by Milorad Dodik, shows he is counting on support from Serbs in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Montenegro. Given that citizenship has recently been granted to many Serbs living outside Serbia, a significant share of future votes could come from abroad. The rally was titled “We Won’t Give Up Serbia.” On the other side, students held another rally, this time in mostly Bosniak-populated Novi Pazar. The local hosts welcomed them warmly, and tens of thousands took to the streets. A new defeat for Vučić and his radical-nationalist politics, which in the '90s brought death and destruction across the region, came in the form of footage from Novi Pazar—youth born just before Vučić left Šešelj’s party making every effort to erase divisions. Proof of the students’ success is the lack of backlash over a banner in Novi Pazar, attributed to Bosniak “nationalists” and “autonomists.” Locals said on social media the banner appeared near a police station. Macut’s Mission and the Students’ Isolation Some see Macut’s government as a continuation of the previous one. His address supports this. However, there are urgent matters he must address. Student protests continue, even though Vučić declared victory over the “color revolution.” Their demands from November remain unmet. The case of the public broadcaster suggests more demands may follow—and if students succeed, other dissatisfied groups could join the strike and rebellion. Vučić is counting on the protests fading and elections being held. Macut’s task is to prepare for those elections and lead the government until then. Under current rules, no one can beat Vučić at the polls, so a key question is whether the opposition will participate. But Vučić has no real plan for ending the rebellion that began in November. Hundreds of thousands at the rallies have rejected both the government and the opposition. The lack of protest leadership allows Vučić to stay in power and gives his party a strong position in any future election. This is why Vučić has returned to an old Belgrade strategy—exporting and internationalizing the crisis. His relationship with Milorad Dodik and the attack on Bosnia and Herzegovina’s constitutional order shows another card in play. Simultaneously, the weak opposition gives him space to once again present himself to foreign powers as the Balkans’ stabilizer. The newly elected EU enlargement commissioner, Marta Kos, has taken the bait. At the end of last month, Kos defended Brussels’ approach to Serbia. “Who else am I supposed to talk to... to keep Serbia on its EU path?” she said in response to a journalist’s question about meeting Vučić just four days after the March 15 protest, where participants and the opposition claimed a type of sonic weapon was used. In that interview, Kos said, “What the demonstrators and students are asking from Serbia is the same as what the European Commission is demanding,”—including urgent media reforms. This means Bratina will be the EU’s interlocutor, just as Chetnik voivode Andrija Mandić was recently accepted on Montenegro’s path to Brussels. The West’s silence on protests in Serbia pleases the Kremlin. Vučić brought in the FSB to investigate the alleged use of the sonic cannon. The Russians concluded that no such device was used on March 15. While not entirely satisfied with Vučić’s policies, Russia is using this opportunity to get even closer to him. Students haven’t convinced Brussels to move closer. It seems Brussels once again prefers backing a leader over the people in the Balkans. The students’ isolation benefits Vučić. The fact that he hasn’t crushed them in almost six months shows the declining popularity of a politician who has ruled Serbia for thirteen years, with support from both the West and Russia. This article was originally published on nap.ba

Once again, Iran’s nuclear program is a top priority for U.S. President Donald Trump. This time, after threatening sanctions, his administration is also warning of military action if Tehran refuses to comply with demands from Washington and Israel. Photo: Illustration The Obama administration reached a nuclear deal with Iran in 2015. Tehran limited its activities in this field and, in return, received sanctions relief. China, Russia, Germany, the United Kingdom, and France were also signatories to the agreement. Two years later, Trump withdrew the US from the deal and imposed sanctions on Iran. This was a major victory for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who opposed the deal with Iran. Since 2015, the Middle East has changed, but some plans remain on the table. One of them is the overthrow of the government in Tehran. Iran remains the only country from the list mentioned in the famous statement by US General Wesley Clark, who allegedly was told in the Pentagon after September 11, 2001, that the United States, after Afghanistan, would overthrow "seven countries in five years." That list, besides Afghanistan, included Iraq, Syria, Libya, Lebanon, Sudan, Somalia, and Iran. Trump's Second Term With the fall of Bashar al-Assad, who was replaced in power in Damascus by former ISIL and al-Qaeda member Ahmed al-Sharaa and who quickly became a partner of Washington and the European Union, the only country remaining from Clark's famous list is Iran. All other countries on the list have experienced wars in this century, and their governments have been changed, in some places multiple times. The Israeli lobby helped Trump return to the White House. His appointments further confirm this. Netanyahu, after pressuring Trump to withdraw the US from the Iran nuclear deal, is now pressuring Trump to take military action against Tehran. But Iran is stronger than all the countries on that list, although significantly weakened after Assad's fall and Hezbollah's losses in Lebanon in the war against Israel. Netanyahu does not want to miss this opportunity, so Trump is once again dealing with Iran, even though the US interest is to urgently address China. Since taking office, Trump has been sending messages to Iran in his style. Other US officials have done the same. Some of the terms mentioned were "hell," "strikes," "sanctions," "maximum pressure," all if Iran does not agree to Washington's demands. And Washington's demand has been for decades that Iran not build nuclear weapons, while Tehran claims that it is not its goal. About ten days ago, Trump surprised the public. He announced that negotiations with Iran would begin during Netanyahu's visit to the White House. The world soon learned that the host of indirect talks between the two countries would be Oman, and just before Trump's announcement, the public learned that the US president had written to Iranian Ayatollah Ali Khamenei requesting talks. Oman Negotiations Since Trump's first term, Iran has not been at peace. In addition to banning international inspections of its facilities for a certain period, it has begun enriching uranium. Many experts claim Iran is on the threshold of building nuclear weapons, if it so decides. For years, Iran has claimed its nuclear program is for civilian use. However, some believe this concept should be abandoned. Some Iranian politicians have called on Ayatollah Khamenei to issue a fatwa calling for the acquisition of nuclear weapons. One of Iran's most important political figures for decades has been Ali Larijani, now Khamenei's advisor. At the end of last month, he said Tehran would develop nuclear weapons if the US or Israel attacked Iranian nuclear facilities. Attacks on Iranian nuclear facilities are precisely the topic, as a threat hanging in the air while the US military has been building up forces in the Middle East for weeks. After the first meeting in Oman, attended by US envoy Steve Witkoff and Iranian Foreign Ministry chief Abbas Araghchi, Tehran announced that a second round of talks would take place in the same country on April 19, just seven days after the first. Araghchi said this meeting would establish the "general framework of a future agreement." News of the negotiations reached the public from various sides. Some media reported, citing their sources, that the Muscat talks took place in a good atmosphere. Then, Iran had requested the re-signing of the deal Trump abandoned in 2017 and proposed the denuclearization of the Middle East, including Israel. The Oman talks surprised many, especially since not long ago, Khamenei said talking with Washington was impossible because they do not honor agreements. Yet talks happened. And Iran's proposals, if the media reports are accurate, undermine the entire US and Israeli policy concept toward Tehran. Indeed, one of Washington's arguments has been that Iran would trigger a nuclear arms race in the Middle East, after previously claiming Iran wants such weapons. If these Iranian demands were accepted, those two claims would be completely discredited. Trump's Plans and the Balance of Power In Paris, too, many believe war is at the door. French Foreign Minister Jean-Noël Barrot said earlier this month that "in case of (negotiation) failure, military confrontation seems almost inevitable" and added that Paris' position is that "Iran must never acquire nuclear weapons." US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth confirmed this a few days ago. "If we can't resolve this at the negotiating table, there are other options to ensure Iran never gets a nuclear bomb," he said. "With what we're doing against the Houthis and in the region, we've shown we can go far, deep, and very hard (...). We don't want to get to that point, but if necessary, we will do so to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear bomb." In May 2023, several months before Hamas's October 7 attack on southern Israel, Israeli military chief Herzi Halevi spoke about Iranian nuclear facilities. "Iran has advanced in uranium enrichment further than ever before... On the horizon are negative developments that could lead to (military) action," he said, without specifying who would act against Iran, when or how. "We have the capabilities, and others also have capabilities," Halevi added. Yesterday, Trump spoke about the Oman talks and concluded that Iran is stalling, even though only a few days have passed since the meeting. "I think they're just leading us on. Iran must give up the idea of nuclear weapons. They can't have nuclear weapons," he said, adding that US options "include" a military strike on Iranian nuclear facilities. The Iranian side doesn't trust the other side either. Yesterday, Ayatollah Khamenei said the Oman talks "implemented their initial steps well" but that Iran is "very skeptical" of the other side. "We are neither overly optimistic nor overly pessimistic about these talks," he added. Yesterday's statements by Trump and Khamenei confirm the poor relations between Washington and Tehran, but also show this is not about trust. Simply, it is about the possibility of using force and calculating the gains and losses if war were to break out. Washington knows Iran's capabilities, just as Tehran knows the capabilities of the United States, Israel, and their allies in the region. Trump must now decide whether he is willing to pay the price of attacking Iran, after not doing so in his first term, or whether he will agree to a deal similar to Obama's and thus admit he made a mistake by abandoning the agreement. Demands that Iran abandon its missile program and behave as Netanyahu wants are also on the table, and it is hard to believe Tehran will accept them. In other words, Trump must decide, while Americans expect him not to start wars as he promised throughout his political career, whether he will once again fulfill Netanyahu's wishes. This article was previously published on nap.ba

Donald Trump’s Return to the White House has made many in Europe ponder what will happen if the U.S. president decides to change his policy toward the old continent and shifts the burden of maintaining the current order onto its allies. Photo: Map of Europe The desire of several European countries to form some kind of "European army" has long existed. France has been at the forefront of this effort, but has been unable to realize it for two key reasons. First, no European country has a military even remotely as strong as America’s. Second, many European nations, especially in the east and north, trust Washington’s power more than the plans of European powers. Yet, the idea of Europeans relying on their strength has never been abandoned and periodically resurfaces in public discourse. Trump’s negotiations with Russia, aimed at securing peace in Ukraine, have brought this idea back into focus. Last month, the United Kingdom gathered countries willing to aid Ukraine if Washington abandons Kyiv. Can Europe Do Without Turkey? Attending the summit was Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, as London recognizes Turkey’s importance. Even setting aside Turkey’s other unique characteristics and looking solely at the map, the country borders all major flashpoints in Europe and beyond—from the Middle East (Iraq, Syria, Iran) to the Caucasus, the Black Sea (where Russia’s war in Ukraine rages), and the Balkans. Its influence extends even further. "It is unthinkable to establish European security without Turkey," Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan declared shortly after the summit. Without Turkey, "Europe cannot sustain its role as a global actor," he added. "Given that security parameters have shifted due to recent events, ensuring European security without Turkey is impossible," Erdogan said, alluding to Washington and Moscow’s dealings over Ukraine. Days later, Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk visited Erdogan, with security dominating their talks. "If the EU wants to prevent or even reverse its loss of power and influence, it can only do so through Turkey’s full membership," Erdogan stated at a joint press conference. "We consistently stress that full EU membership remains our strategic goal. We frequently discuss with our colleagues our desire to enhance cooperation with the EU based on mutual benefit and respect." Tusk’s visit was an ideal opportunity for Erdogan to make this statement, as Brussels has kept Ankara at a distance from EU membership for decades. Poland and Turkey have a tradition of friendly relations, with positive episodes dating back centuries, even when the majority-Muslim Ottoman Empire was an adversary to Christian Europe. These ties continued after modern Turkey’s founding, with Poland being the first European country to recognize its independence in 1923. Relations were further strengthened with Poland’s NATO accession. NATO Proves Cooperation with Turkey Is Possible NATO itself is proof that cooperation with Turkey is feasible on many issues. A recent example is Ukraine. Turkey supports Ukraine’s territorial integrity and sells it weapons while maintaining good relations with the Kremlin, refusing to impose sanctions on Russia. Since the early days of the aggression, Turkey has acted as a mediator and offered its services. For Tusk, given Poland’s view of Russia as the greatest threat, Turkey’s stance on Eastern Europe was likely of interest. Many believe these two European powers could form a key pillar of a new European security architecture, even without the U.S. and Russia. This is no coincidence, as both share a border with Russia and possess strong militaries. Turkey has NATO’s second-largest army in terms of troop numbers and is one of the few with combat experience. What Can Turkey Offer Europe? Europe’s ambition to play a greater global role faces immediate obstacles. The EU’s well-known weaknesses could be mitigated through an agreement with Turkey, particularly in security, where Turkey is a military power with a rapidly growing defense industry. This is especially relevant in discussions on relations with Russia and how to aid Ukraine. Turkey has even stated its readiness to send peacekeeping forces to Ukraine. In other crisis zones along the EU’s and Europe’s borders, Turkey is a key player even without Brussels. With Bashar al-Assad’s weakening in Syria, Turkey has expanded its influence in the Middle East. The Damascus regime is a key card in Ankara’s hands. Through Syria, Turkish influence reaches Lebanon and Israel. Additionally, the Middle East is the source of millions of migrants heading to Europe. Turkey could also assist the EU in the Balkans, where Brussels has struggled for decades to manage crises effectively. The flare-ups, often backed by Belgrade, show Brussels lacks the means to prevent them, acting more as a firefighter. For instance, after the clashes in Banjska, where some European forces performed poorly, Turkey stepped in to stabilize the situation, bolstering Kosovo’s security forces and sending troops to Pristina. Turkey has a military base in Albania, troops in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and strong ties with Serbia, Montenegro, and Croatia. Some European politicians have shown a poor understanding of the Balkans, leaving the heaviest diplomatic lifting to the U.S., Britain, and Turkey. Open Questions in Europe-Turkey Relations However, unresolved issues between European states and Ankara remain problematic. In security terms, Cyprus is a major sticking point, alongside what the West frames as "rule of law" concerns—issues Brussels has criticized Turkey over for decades. Turkey cannot resolve these issues overnight, even if it wanted to meet all of Brussels’ demands. The question is whether Europe is ready for realpolitik, the approach Ankara, Washington, Moscow, and other major players adopt when necessary. If Brussels wants to be a key global player, it must push its idealpolitik to the background. Europe and the Middle East’s Geopolitics The absurdity of this dynamic is that Turkey has the most problems with left-wing leaders in Europe, while those on the right tend to have better relations. Examples include Poland’s or Hungary’s right-wing figures. Despite their rhetoric of a "Christian Europe," they have found common ground with Turkey on many issues—something proponents of open societies have failed to do. While it’s clear that these left and right-wing labels are increasingly superficial, Europe’s left seems to lack realpolitik. The case of Syria illustrates this: Ahmed al-Sharaa, a former ISIL and al-Qaeda member, has become Brussels’ partner, with the EU recently promising to lift sanctions on Syria and provide billions in aid. What’s Next? How the EU positions itself toward Turkey will soon become clear, as major geopolitical shifts unfold before our eyes. Until then, Ankara won’t sit idle. Erdogan could make similar offers to Trump or even Vladimir Putin. Issues that interest Trump—Israel and Iran—are in Turkey’s backyard, while Washington could help Erdogan with Kurdish matters in Syria and Iraq. Moreover, Erdogan and Trump claim to have a good relationship. Trump’s demand that allies increase defense spending is crucial for Europe’s future. Strengthening NATO or relying on European capabilities is a key question for Turkey. In either case, Turkey stands to gain as a military power in a critical region. The EU’s complex decision-making system and member states’ conflicting interests hinder action. But Turkey becomes a vital partner if European powers move to achieve their ambitions. Competing with the U.S., China, and Russia is already a monumental task—adding Turkey or other European powers as adversaries would make it impossible. This article was previously published on nap.ba

The Last Day of the Past Month Remains a Milestone in Modern French History – Marine Le Pen, Opposition Leader, Was Convicted and Banned from Running for Office. Yet, This Is Only Part of a Bigger Story. Photo: Marine Le Pen The West has undergone significant changes since the fall of the Soviet Union. With Donald Trump’s entry into politics, these changes have accelerated, bringing back some episodes from Western history—often in a new form. A good example of these transformations is Marine Le Pen, or her father, Jean-Marie Louis Le Pen, who founded the party his daughter would later transform beyond recognition. Jean-Marie Le Pen, founder of the National Front, was a classic far-right extremist—someone who found Adolf Hitler’s politics acceptable and automatically regarded Jewish and Muslim citizens of France as enemies. Because of this, he was for years considered the most troubling figure in French politics, someone whom the rest of the political establishment consistently prevented from gaining power. France’s major parties successfully united against him and his party whenever needed. Since 2002, when Jean-Marie Le Pen came close to winning the presidential election, the French establishment has relied on what's known as the “Republican Front.” But the National Front began to change. Marine Le Pen took over the party, expelled her father, and eventually renamed the party to the National Rally (Rassemblement National, RN). She reshaped the political strategy of her father and the party’s founder—now, Jews were no longer the enemy. The focus shifted primarily to Muslims and eventually to anyone who didn’t think like her, even if their positions occasionally overlapped with hers. Ultimately, anyone was acceptable if their support could help the RN gain power. In 2022, she appointed young Jordan Bardella—who was then romantically involved with her niece, the granddaughter of Jean-Marie Le Pen—as the head of the rebranded party. Bardella pushed the party further toward the political center in what was yet another rebranding. He claimed that anyone could be French if they embraced French culture and tradition, suggesting that becoming French was a matter of personal choice. He embodied this idea himself—Bardella is the son of a French father and an Italian mother from Turin, the daughter of an Algerian worker. When the Front Became a Rally Though the National Rally remained a family affair, the party was changing internally. Over a decade, Marine Le Pen brought together all those disillusioned with official Parisian politics and the programs of mainstream parties. Le Pen and her party became a movement of the dissatisfied—people who knew what they didn’t want but rarely articulated a clear vision of what they did want. Things became even more absurd when questions arose about how they intended to realize their goals. However, the crises afflicting France gave strength to the RN. The unpopular pension reform carried out by President Emmanuel Macron’s government, illegal immigration and declining street safety, increased military spending and aid to Ukraine, slowing economic growth, rising costs of goods and services, and cuts to health and education—these are just some of the issues the RN capitalized on. While the left fragmented, the right was dominated by the RN. In recent years, the RN has attracted conservatives, traditionalists, Eurosceptics, farmers, believers, old-school republicans, low-paid workers, those who support France remaining in the EU under certain conditions, supporters of Russian President Vladimir Putin, and more recently, those who view Trump as the leader of the future. RN’s allies—at least in rhetoric—are anyone who opposes any government policy at a given moment. Even if this coalition seems contradictory, it’s happening because France and the West are at a crossroads in a time when political ideologies are being redefined and new parties are replacing the traditional ones. In last year’s elections, RN came fourth in power after the second round of parliamentary voting, though it was the strongest individual party in the first round with nearly 30% of the vote. Bardella was described by the media as a “new kind of nationalist.” The party received over ten million votes. Marine Le Pen isn’t sitting idle. She remains the real leader and public face of the party, a shadow figure using Bardella’s media skills to advance. She makes strategic decisions, guiding the party politically and ideologically. Her conviction was the result of this role—she wanted to run in the next presidential elections with an expanded voter base. Conviction for Crime or Political Elimination? France, too, isn’t immune to politicians presenting themselves as victims of the system. Some try to portray their convictions as political conspiracies. While in some global cases, this may be true, Marine Le Pen’s case is not among them. Her supporters cite Romania, where the court removed Călin Georgescu from the ballot after he won the first round of annulled presidential elections. But the verdict against Le Pen is not a conspiracy—it concerns a specific case with clear evidence. According to many neutral observers in France, she broke the law of the country she swears loyalty to. She and 24 other members of the RN were accused of redirecting around €4 million—legally obtained from the European Parliament—to pay party staff in France. According to the verdict, Marine Le Pen personally embezzled €474,000 during her time as an MEP. The law clearly states that funds from the European Parliament must only be used for activities at that level. Otherwise, parties—especially in poorer EU countries—could use EU money to finance national election campaigns, gaining unfair advantages. The court found Le Pen guilty of embezzlement and barred her from running for public office for five years, sentencing her to four years in prison, two of which were suspended. She must also pay a €100,000 fine. Le Pen announced she will appeal the ruling and said she will fight it through legal means. Yesterday, she compared her case to Martin Luther King Jr., who fought racial segregation in the U.S. about 50 years ago. “Our struggle will be peaceful and democratic. We take Martin Luther King as our example, who defended civil rights—because today it is the civil rights of the French that are at stake,” Le Pen said. A few days earlier, her associates had also invoked the legacy of the American Baptist preacher and activist assassinated in Memphis on April 4, 1968. Le Pen and her supporters strongly condemned the verdict, calling it a political attack, a democratic crisis, and an assault on political freedom—refusing even to entertain the idea that laws can constrain political elites or that she committed a crime. What seems to hurt them most is the part of the verdict banning Le Pen from the 2027 presidential race. Polls had shown she was the frontrunner. The Emerging West? Le Pen and her RN supporters weren’t the only ones outraged by the verdict. She received support from both the Kremlin and the White House. Numerous statements of condemnation came from the U.S., particularly from Vice President JD Vance and the world’s richest man, Elon Musk. “When the radical left can’t win democratic elections, they abuse the judicial system to imprison their opponents,” Musk posted on X. “It’s their standard tactic globally.” But Musk isn’t entirely right—at least not regarding whom French courts target. In France, various politicians have been convicted for corruption or embezzlement: Prime Minister Alain Juppé (2004), Budget Minister Jérôme Cahuzac (2016), Presidential Candidate François Fillon (2020), President Nicolas Sarkozy (2021), President Jacques Chirac (2011), Interior Minister Claude Guéant (2015), and many more. Politicians from across the spectrum—including former presidents—have been tried. For years, the current opposition, including RN, has told President Macron that he too will one day face justice for alleged misdeeds. So, the post–WWII Western system still functions. Courts are often stronger than individuals, and laws apply to everyone—despite many flaws. Those very flaws are used as a justification by a group of politicians who argue that the system must be reshaped to match their version of democracy. In the last U.S. election, we often heard that democracy is “whatever the majority votes for.” That mindset includes Trump’s promise to “drain the swamp”—to reform institutions by firing anyone who doesn’t comply with the new leadership. Musk now has a department in the government focusing on this, while workers and unions are suing after being rapidly laid off. The courts appear to be the final barrier to the right’s vision. In Wisconsin, during recent elections for the state’s Supreme Court, Musk promoted Trump’s candidate, even offering voters $1 million prizes to support someone aligned with Washington’s ruling powers. Resistance of the Establishment But the resilience of the current system showed in that same election—the candidate Musk and Trump opposed won. Yet the new right doesn’t stop. After targeting international treaties and law during Trump’s first term, they now go after courts—and potentially the U.S. Constitution itself. Trump recently said he wanted to run for a third term—despite the Constitution forbidding it. “No, I’m not joking. I’m not joking,” Trump said. “But it’s too early to talk about that… There are ways you can do it, as you know.” Senator Bernie Sanders claims that the U.S. is becoming an oligarchy, threatening its democracy. “I’m trying to make it clear to people across the U.S. and the world that Americans will not sit back and let Trump create an oligarchy where Musk and other billionaires run our government,” Sanders said during a tour of the U.S. “We will not sit back and let him form an authoritarian society, undermining the Constitution, freedom of speech, and assembly, and dismantling what the Founding Fathers built in the 1790s: a system of divided power ensuring no one holds too much of it. That’s exactly what Trump wants,” Sanders said. Whether Sanders and his allies succeed remains to be seen—it’s a struggle that will take years. Meanwhile, the same type of politician stands behind Marine Le Pen and other far-right figures across powerful Western nations. Their goal is to defeat what they label as the "left"—even though the left has for decades focused on everything but working-class rights. In France, the next round of the battle is Le Pen’s appeal—and then the 2027 presidential election. Even if her conviction is upheld, that doesn’t mean she can’t support a candidate. Those who believe the trial has made her a martyr say the verdict is the perfect way for someone close to her to win the election and for RN to form the next government. After the trial? Perhaps another rebranding of the party that brings together discontented French people from across the ideological spectrum. If Martin Luther King has become Marine Le Pen’s inspiration, why shouldn’t her party become palatable to those who once rejected it? Donald Trump proved in just eight years that even your greatest enemies can become your allies. That was the price he paid to be accepted by the political establishment—and by American society. The article was previously published on PISjournal.net .

Russian President Vladimir Putin is playing multiple strategies in negotiations with his American counterpart Donald Trump, to secure a victory for the Kremlin in the war in Ukraine. Last week’s proposal indicates that one idea is the balkanization of Ukraine and "conflict management" by Moscow and Washington. Then, yesterday’s news from Moscow—they rejected Trump’s proposal to end the war. Photo: Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump The details of the negotiations between Putin and Trump, or their teams, are not publicly known. It is also unclear whether Kyiv would accept any agreed terms or whether European powers would agree to be mere observers in the division of influence zones in a country where, as Brussels has stated, "Europe and democracy are being defended." The answers to these questions lie in the balance of forces on the battlefield, as well as in precise data on the resources available for this war. Since the beginning of the aggression against Ukraine, there has been talk of Kyiv’s limited resources. However, the public does not know how much of its resources (material and human) Moscow has expended or how much longer it can sustain this destructive and costly war. Putin’s Proposal Trump’s victory in the November elections was good news for Putin, if for no other reason than his promise to end the war in Ukraine before even entering the White House. Moreover, Trump has distanced Washington from its European allies, which is an additional advantage for the Kremlin and Kyiv’s greatest fear. It is no surprise, then, that Putin has multiple proposals on how to handle the war in Ukraine—even if a lasting and mutually acceptable peace is not achieved. In that case, a "frozen conflict" would require "conflict management" by Washington and Moscow in the coming years, forcing the two nations into further contacts, negotiations, concessions, and plans... A key precondition for this scenario is the balkanization of Ukraine—the fragmentation of this vast country’s territory, in line with the term coined about two centuries ago and consistent with the American approach to "conflict management," which Washington has applied, for example, in the former Yugoslavia since its disintegration. "In principle, of course, it would be possible to discuss an interim government in Ukraine under the auspices of the UN, the U.S., with European countries, and, of course, with our partners and friends. To hold democratic elections, to bring to power a capable government that enjoys the people’s trust, and then proceed to negotiate a peace agreement with them," Putin said last Thursday. "I’m not saying there are no other options, but this is one of them, and such practices exist within the UN’s work," he added. To support his proposal, Putin cited East Timor, Papua New Guinea, and parts of the former Yugoslavia (without specifying which) as examples of countries where "there have been instances of what is called an external government, an interim administration" under UN peacekeeping forces. A few days later, yesterday, Moscow announced that it was rejecting Trump’s proposal to end the war in Ukraine—a proposal whose details remain unknown to the public—because it does not meet Russia’s interests. The Kremlin had anticipated this, so Putin had already prepared the international and domestic audience with his earlier proposal. Targeting Zelenskyy, Weakening Ukraine Putin’s proposal to install an interim government in Ukraine goes beyond just a plan to remove President Volodymyr Zelensky, whose term has expired. This time, the removal of Zelensky is not framed as a demand from Washington circles but serves a different purpose. Sowing divisions in Ukraine—given its history and the power dynamics within its political, military, and business elite—could lead to various demands for regional governance across the country, depending on the status of Zelensky or any new president. This statement by Putin is only a few days old, but the idea has been around for a decade. Controlling Kyiv from within was part of the Minsk agreements negotiated between Ukraine and Russia about ten years ago with French and German mediation. The Kremlin interpreted part of the agreement as giving Russian-backed separatists in eastern Ukraine veto power over all of Kyiv’s decisions—a right granted to entities in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1995 and one that has been attempted, with varying success, in Skopje, Pristina, and Podgorica. Accepting such a proposal would tie a country’s hands, forcing it into endless mediated negotiations with those who seek its destruction. In the case of the Minsk agreements, it meant Ukraine remained stuck between the West and Moscow—a battleground for decisions aimed at mere political and economic survival, with a temporary pause before renewed conflict under new geopolitical circumstances. Kyiv reacted harshly to Putin’s new proposal. Alongside Zelensky, other officials spoke out bluntly, with one telling Putin to "take some pills to kickstart his brain activity." Zelenskyy called Putin’s proposal an attempt to find excuses not to end the war. "He is afraid of negotiations with Ukraine. He is afraid of negotiations with me, and by excluding the Ukrainian government, he suggests that Ukraine is not an independent actor for him," Zelensky said. The West’s Response So far, Putin’s proposal has not impressed Washington much. According to Reuters, an unnamed White House National Security Council official, when asked about Putin’s statement, said that Ukraine’s governance is determined by its Constitution and its people. Kyiv’s European allies will reject such a proposal outright—especially the UK and France. Prime Minister Keir Starmer and President Emmanuel Macron have repeatedly accused Russia of not wanting a fair peace in Ukraine. And shortly before Putin’s proposal, Starmer said the Russian leader was "playing games" and "buying time." Whether Putin is buying time, playing games to divide the West, or doing both may be debatable. But there is no doubt that Putin wants to cripple Ukraine. His proposal, supposedly meant to "help" Ukraine, sounds like a mockery of common sense. Among other things, the Russian leader calls for "democratic elections"—something he refuses to hold in Russia. There is also no doubt that Putin feels more complimentary with Trump’s return to the White House and appears, at least publicly, to be leading the game between the two. His demands and proposals seem to come from a position of strength, though it is unclear whether he is bluffing while hoping for a quick peace in Ukraine. Putin has laid out proposals and demands before Trump, calculating that more agreements with the White House will ensure Moscow is not isolated from the West—or from Washington and the countries that follow Trump unconditionally. This would commit the U.S. to constant engagement and joint action with the Kremlin. In practice, this means stripping Ukraine of its right to self-determination and thwarting Ukrainians’ aspirations to move toward the West—a promise made to them before Russia’s aggression began. Yesterday’s rejection of Trump’s peace proposal proves this and puts Trump in a position where he must offer the Kremlin even more, listen to Russia’s proposals, or end the negotiations. This article was previously published on nap.ba .

Istanbul Mayor Ekrem Imamoglu, a prominent opposition figure seen as President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s most formidable challenger, was abruptly barred from Turkey’s presidential race this week in a sweeping legal maneuver. Days before his party was set to nominate its candidate, authorities revoked Imamoglu’s university diploma—a constitutional requirement for presidential bids—citing regulatory violations. He was then arrested on charges of corruption, extortion, and "managing a criminal organization," stripping him of his role as mayor of Istanbul. Erdogan’s timing reflects a confluence of favorable conditions. Internationally, he faces little pushback: the U.S., under a Trump-era foreign policy ethos indifferent to democratic norms, dismissed Imamoglu’s arrest as a “domestic issue.” At the same time, Europe, wary of antagonizing Turkey amid security dependencies and shifting U.S.-Russia dynamics, has muted its criticism. Domestically, Erdogan’s military successes in Syria and a fractured opposition coalition further embolden him. The pro-Kurdish Peoples' Equality and Democracy Party (DEM), once a pillar of Imamoglu’s support, has grown hesitant amid clandestine government-PKK talks, leaving protests fragmented. With three years until elections, Erdogan’s team bets economic recovery will eclipse public outrage, while legal assaults on the CHP—including a case to oust its chairman—weaken rivals long-term. Mass Protests and Government Crackdown The arrest ignited Turkey’s most significant wave of protests since the 2013 Gezi Park uprising , with demonstrations erupting nationwide. Tens of thousands gathered in at least 55 provinces, with crowds in Istanbul chanting slogans and waving Turkish flags outside City Hall. Riot police deployed water cannons, tear gas, and rubber bullets to disperse protesters, leading to over 700 arrests. Imamoglu’s wife, Dilek Kaya Imamoglu, addressed the crowd , calling the charges against her husband an “injustice” that “struck a chord with every conscience.” In a message relayed through his lawyers , Imamoglu urged supporters to “defend democracy” and hailed their defiance as proof that Turkey had “had enough” of Erdogan’s rule. The Republican People’s Party (CHP) organized solidarity votes nationwide, claiming 15 million participants. Yet cracks in the opposition were evident: while Imamoglu’s supporters rallied at City Hall, DEM Party members seemed to prioritize Nowruz celebrations over joining the protests—a sign of Erdogan’s success in exploiting divisions. Erdogan’s Two-Decade Power Consolidation Over 20 years in power, Erdogan has been accused of systematic dismantling of democratic institutions. After surviving a 2016 coup attempt , he purged thousands of judges, replacing them with loyalists, and tightened control over media—90% of which now aligns with his government. While Turkey still holds elections, the system operates as a “ competitive authoritarian ” regime: opposition parties exist, but state mechanisms heavily favor Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP). The latest crackdown highlights Erdogan’s reliance on legal and institutional weaponization. Istanbul University’s revocation of Imamoglu’s diploma—now challenged in Turkey’s Constitutional Court and the European Court of Human Rights—threatens his eligibility for the 2028 presidential race. Prosecutors also sought terrorism charges tied to Imamoglu’s alleged links to the pro-Kurdish DEM party, a ccused of affiliations with the PKK (a designated terrorist group). Erdogan’s strategy mirrors past tactics against figures like Kurdish leader Selahattin Demirtas but benefits now from a fractured geopolitical landscape and an opposition in disarray. Imamoglu emerged as a direct threat after his 2019 victory in Istanbul’s mayoral race ended the AKP’s 25-year hold on the city. Authorities annulled his initial narrow win, prompting a rerun that saw him triumph by a historic margin. His reelection in 2023 further solidified his cross-partisan appeal, positioning him as Erdogan’s likeliest challenger. However, Erdogan’s recent moves—including backchannel negotiations with the PKK—have sowed distrust between Imamoglu and Kurdish voters, undermining the alliance that propelled his rise. Economic Crisis and Public Discontent Turkey’s economic instability—marked by soaring inflation and a currency crisis since 2018—has eroded Erdogan’s popularity, particularly among youth frustrated by unemployment and authoritarian policies. The 2024 municipal elections delivered the AKP its worst defeat, even as Erdogan mobilized state resources to aid his party. Yet with three years until the next national vote, Erdogan’s allies aim to stabilize the economy and outlast public anger over Imamoglu’s arrest. Simultaneously, the CHP faces existential threats: a court case alleging election fraud seeks to remove Chairman Ozgur Ozel , while Istanbul Municipality itself risks a government-appointed trustee if charges against Imamoglu advance. Losing Istanbul in 2019 also severed Erdogan’s access to the city’s vast financial networks, which had funded his patronage system for decades. Retaking control of Istanbul’s resources is now a key priority, with the Interior Ministry appointing a government-aligned governor to replace Imamoglu. Erdogan’s removal of Imamoglu marks a decisive shift toward what many see as autocracy, transforming elections into hollow formalities. By leveraging international complacency, a divided opposition, and time to suppress dissent, he seeks to enter the 2028 election cycle unopposed. Yet Turkey’s economic turmoil and Imamoglu’s relative popularity reveal vulnerabilities in Erdogan’s rule. The upcoming elections—far more than a political contest—will test whether Turkey’s democracy can withstand this authoritarian surge or succumb to one-man dominance.

Just under two weeks ago, Armenia and Azerbaijan triumphantly announced to the world that they were on the verge of signing a peace agreement. Nearly all countries with interests in the Caucasus welcomed the agreement, yet open questions remain. Photo: Illustration On March 13, Armenia and Azerbaijan announced that they had agreed on the text of a peace deal, with only two points left to finalize. Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev are most responsible for this convergence of positions between the two countries—not just due to the act of agreeing on a text to sign and ratify. Through their actions (or inaction), these two politicians have brought their countries to a point that would have been unthinkable a decade ago. Pashinyan and Aliyev Pashinyan came to power in 2018 in what his critics call a sort of "color revolution" and attempted to pivot Armenia toward the West. He soon damaged relations with Russia, which maintains military bases in Armenia, and consequently alarmed neighboring Iran, which opposes the growth of Turkish influence in the Caucasus and Central Asia through Azerbaijan’s strengthening. Tehran assessed that a significant weakening of Armenia would lead to a decline in Iranian and Russian influence in the region. Aliyev, upon assuming power in 2003, continued the policies of his father Heydar, from whom he inherited power—at least in terms of realpolitik behavior, a strategy the USSR relied on for decades and in which the elder Aliyev was a key figure. The younger Aliyev formed alliances with anyone who could help him bring Nagorno-Karabakh back under Baku’s control. This brought Israel, among others, into the Caucasus, a move that certainly damaged Aliyev’s reputation in much of the Muslim world. Over the past decade, Ilham Aliyev has achieved major successes for Azerbaijan after a series of military defeats at the hands of Armenian rebels in Nagorno-Karabakh and neighboring Armenia, which has a fraction of Azerbaijan’s population and a far smaller economy. Thanks to the geography of that part of the Caucasus, entrenched rebels inflicted heavy losses on the Azerbaijani army, which relied largely on Soviet-era weapons while trying to break through their defensive lines. Baku’s tactical shift came with Turkey’s growing influence and Israel’s entry into Caucasian geopolitics. The massive use of drones and other modern weaponry brought a decisive victory to Baku in 2023, in a war that lasted only a few days and marked the end of the breakaway entity on Azerbaijani territory. Armenia still feels the consequences of the Nagorno-Karabakh war. According to the opposition, Pashinyan is to blame for the national catastrophe. Alongside efforts to come to terms with the defeat, Yerevan must also care for hundreds of thousands who fled Azerbaijan after the fall of Nagorno-Karabakh. Since then, Pashinyan has sought to secure lasting peace with Baku and resolve key outstanding issues for both sides. The Peace Agreement Since the end of the Nagorno-Karabakh war, Azerbaijani and Armenian representatives have met numerous times—sometimes one-on-one, sometimes mediated by a third power, and sometimes on the sidelines of forums both countries attended. The topic was always the same: how to permanently reconcile the two neighbors. The draft agreement reportedly includes 15 agreed-upon clauses, with two remaining unresolved. The first concerns mutual lawsuits between the two countries in international courts (the International Court of Justice, the International Criminal Court, and the European Court of Human Rights). The second pertains to the presence of foreign troops near their shared border. Though these two issues may seem minor, they are fundamentally important for the past and future of both states. The lawsuits aim to establish historical responsibility for the war, while the question of foreign military presence is one of the most critical geopolitical issues in the Caucasus. Before examining these geopolitical shifts, it should be noted that Armenia’s opposition is furious over Pashinyan’s concessions in the draft agreement. "These authorities have agreed to everything Azerbaijan demanded," said Artur Khachatryan from the opposition Hayastan alliance, adding that Baku is blackmailing Yerevan into accepting its terms or else face war. Armenia’s Republican Party called the agreement a "one-sided anti-state concession" and a "double capitulation." They asked Pashinyan whether he would win an election if he told the public he was ready to surrender Artsakh (the Armenian name for Nagorno-Karabakh) and later legitimize "ethnic cleansing and genocide." The Geopolitics of the Caucasus For the international community, more important than these legal disputes and Armenian political debates is the geopolitical context surrounding the (non-)acceptance of this agreement. The presence of international forces along the two countries’ borders is a crucial issue—not just for monitoring the ceasefire but because it could lead to a land connection between Turkey and Azerbaijan, which Iran sees as a threat to its interests. Azerbaijan’s Nakhchivan exclave, bordering Turkey, is separated from the rest of the country by sovereign Armenian territory. For decades, Azerbaijan’s land traffic has depended on transit through Iran. To change this and connect the two parts of Azerbaijani territory, the so-called "Zangezur Corridor" would need to be opened. Since the start of hostilities, Baku has demanded this corridor through Armenian territory, proposing various modalities. Azerbaijan now cites the 2020 ceasefire agreement, which stipulated that the corridor would be under Russian supervision and that Armenia would "guarantee the security of transport links" between Nakhchivan and the rest of Azerbaijan. That agreement was backed by Russia and Turkey. The new draft agreement, yet to be finalized, must address this issue. There is no doubt that Turkey supports Baku’s stance, while Iran has clearly stated its opposition to any corridor that would alter the region’s geopolitical landscape. Tehran has urged Moscow to reconsider its 2020 position and reminded its ally of Iran’s strategic interests. One such interest is preventing the severing of Iran’s land connection to Russia and Europe via Armenia. The "Zangezur Corridor" would reduce the number of Iran’s neighboring countries by one, leaving Armenia and Iran without a shared border. This idea is also opposed by Armenia’s opposition, but Pashinyan has made unpredictable moves in the past that are sometimes hard to explain. Recently, an Armenian activist wrote on social media that the Armenian PM’s positions "align with official Azerbaijan’s," calling it "unprecedented." Numerous Obstacles Pashinyan’s policies, thus far supported by the West, have left many bewildered. The only explanation for his moves may be his desire to shed the burdens of the past and turn toward the future as if nothing happened. If true, this stance likely has some public support among those weary of war and poverty. But politics is not always as idealists imagine. For instance, Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov recently stated that "as a next step, Azerbaijan expects Armenia to amend its Constitution… and eliminate claims against the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Republic of Azerbaijan." He also demanded Armenia dissolve the OSCE Minsk Group, a 1992 format backed by the U.S., Russia, and France to resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. To meet Bayramov’s first demand, Armenia would have to change its Constitution, which references the unification of Armenia and Artsakh (Nagorno-Karabakh) in its preamble. Pashinyan has said he will attempt to pass a new constitution via referendum. Experts believe this could not happen before mid-next year, and opposition resistance suggests the outcome is uncertain. The biggest obstacle to Pashinyan’s plans, however, maybe Russia and Iran—especially if Tehran convinces Moscow of its position. Russia may reject Azerbaijan’s insistence on the 2020 agreement, given the changed circumstances in Nagorno-Karabakh and, more importantly, in Russia’s relations with Armenia after Turkey-backed forces ousted Syria’s Bashar al-Assad. Additionally, Armenia suspended its participation in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO, often called "Russia’s NATO") last year. Iran has repeatedly—sometimes sharply—warned Russia through official statements and pro-government media to respect Tehran’s interests as a strategic partner. It has also cautioned Armenia against relinquishing its border with Iran and weakening its position. Tehran insists it opposes any geopolitical changes in the region while acknowledging Azerbaijan’s right to connect its territories via Armenia or Iran. Iran fears the corridor, which would separate it from Armenia, could further entrench Turkey and potentially Israel in the region, beyond existing oil arrangements. Tehran’s seriousness was demonstrated years ago by military drills along the Azerbaijani border and warnings to Baku against bringing Syrian fighters (backed by Turkey) into the Caucasus. Earlier reports suggested mercenaries from Idlib had fought in Nagorno-Karabakh during Syria’s ceasefire. Likely to calm domestic and regional concerns, Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan stated that this month’s agreement does not include "any extraterritorial transport links for Nakhchivan," later adding that he "will not answer all possible questions" about the near-finalized deal. Like Pashinyan, Mirzoyan wants peace with Azerbaijan and a new chapter in regional relations. However, this policy worries both Armenia’s opposition and some neighboring states. Pashinyan’s unconventional approach suggests anything is possible—and expected. The article was previously published on PISJournal.net .

In recent days, U.S. President Donald Trump ordered attacks on Yemen’s Houthis. The targets included military sites, power grids, and various facilities, with dozens of civilian deaths reported. Why is Trump, who has declared himself a peacemaker, attacking the poorest country in the Arab world? Photo: Donald Trump Benjamin Netanyahu’s government enjoys Donald Trump’s support no matter what it does. Recently, the Israeli military broke a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip despite protests from some Israeli citizens. Under various pretexts, Netanyahu continues to wage war with neighboring countries to create a “new Middle East,” having previously violated ceasefires in Lebanon and attacked multiple locations in Syria. In Netanyahu’s vision of a “new Middle East,” Israel is the only regional power with the right to do as it pleases. Among the few who resist this are the Houthis, who have attacked Israel in solidarity with Palestinians in Gaza. The rebel Houthis, who control the capital Sana’a, are part of the so-called “Axis of Resistance,” an Iranian-led coalition fighting against Israel and the West in the Middle East. Israel has carried out attacks on the Houthis, but geographical distance makes these operations inefficient and infrequent. This is why Israel called on Trump for help. Thanks to its network of military bases and aircraft carriers, the United States can operate globally. This is what happened in Yemen, with the justification being that the Houthis were attacking American and other ships in the Red Sea. From Biden to Trump Since October 2023, the Houthis have attacked ships heading to Israeli ports and then others. Exceptions were made for countries the Houthis consider friends, such as Russia and China, although these two countries allowed the United States and the United Kingdom to attack them under the authorization of the UN Security Council. The administration of Joseph Biden thus found itself in a war it did not need, which, with minor interruptions, continues to this day. However, since January of this year, when Hamas and Israel agreed to a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip, the Houthis say they have not attacked any American ships. Their only targets have been ships linked to Israel, and they previously stated they would stop attacking these ships if the blockade of the Gaza Strip were lifted. This is why Trump’s decision to launch attacks on the Houthis surprised many. In several waves of attacks, the U.S. military targeted vital Houthi infrastructure, including power grids, factories, and military sites, with a wedding hall under construction also hit. Dozens of civilians were killed. For those surprised by the move, Trump quickly provided an explanation on social media at the beginning of this week—blaming Iran for all Houthi attacks, claiming that Iran arms and trains them. The Houthis have stated they will not back down, as it is their human and religious duty not to abandon Palestine. In recent days, they have fired rockets and drones at Israel and U.S. warships. On the other hand, Iran has reiterated that it does not control the Houthis and that they decide their actions. That Trump is pulling the strings in this new escalation was shown a few days after his social media post. Midweek, he again took to social media to claim that Iran had reduced the “intensity” of its weapons assistance and “support” to the Houthis, whom he called “barbarians,” and urged Tehran to let the Houthis “fight on their own,” as they would “certainly lose” even with Iranian help. Trump’s assertion that Iran has reduced its support to the Houthis is arbitrary, as this cannot be confirmed in such a short time. If a ship does not sail or a plane does not fly one day, it does not mean it won’t the next. Thus, it is clear that Trump is creating a narrative for the public and targeting Iran, which is Israel’s greatest adversary and has resisted the plans of Washington and Tel Aviv in the Middle East for years. Between Negotiations and War After the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria, the blows suffered by the Shiite Hezbollah in Lebanon, and losing its land connection to Iraq and Iran, Tehran now does not want war. Trump’s return to the White House is an additional problem, as the hawkish Republican does not hesitate to support Israel in every way. On the other hand, Netanyahu has repeatedly said that this is the right time to create a “new Middle East,” meaning a redistribution of power in the region that would strengthen Tel Aviv and allied Arab regimes while weakening Iran and (pro-)Iranian forces across the region. However, Netanyahu knows that Israel alone cannot defeat Iran, as was shown last year when some Arab states and Western allies came to its aid twice to defend against Iranian missile attacks. Additionally, Israeli attacks on Iran are supported by the United States and its allies. For a new, large, and decisive attack, Israel needs Trump’s support. Netanyahu has not hidden for decades that he wants to destroy Iran’s nuclear program and overthrow the Iranian government. Trump, like his predecessors in the White House, has said that Iran obtaining a nuclear bomb is a red line for Washington. Iran has repeatedly stated that it does not want a bomb, as it contradicts its religious beliefs, but it will not abandon its civilian nuclear program. However, Iran’s nuclear program is slowly moving beyond its stated limits, as Tehran does not allow international inspectors to examine all facilities, and some ayatollahs are calling for a fatwa to acquire a nuclear bomb. This means the Middle East is on the brink of a major war, and Trump is to blame not only for the attacks on the Houthis and new threats against Iran. In his first term, Trump withdrew the U.S. from the Iran nuclear deal, which required Tehran to abandon any intentions for atomic weapons in exchange for lifting sanctions. The United Kingdom, Germany, France, Russia, and China supported the agreement. However, if Trump is unclear about what kind of war this would entail, U.S. military experts are not. They have warned for years that Iran is preparing for a confrontation with the United States and has serious capabilities to target U.S. military bases across the Middle East. Such a conflict would result in numerous casualties on both sides, and an environmental disaster cannot be ruled out if Iranian nuclear sites are destroyed. Even before assuming the presidency, Trump reportedly contacted Iran and secretly negotiated. Media outlets have reported on this multiple times, with Trump’s associate Elon Musk mentioned as one of the negotiators on the American side. Both sides have denied some of these reports. Conflict, but of What Kind? Trump will not stop dealing with Iran, as Netanyahu is pushing him to do so. Tehran has recently stated that it does not want to negotiate with Trump because he does not honor agreements. How important it is for Trump’s administration to break Iran is illustrated by an event in Paris this January, organized by the Iranian diaspora sympathetic to Western ideas. The world must return to a policy of “maximum pressure” on Iran to turn it into a more democratic country, said Trump’s envoy for Ukraine, Keith Kellogg, at the time. The retired U.S. general added that “these pressures are not just kinetic, not just military force, but must also be economic and diplomatic.” Trump was more direct. He wants to force Iran to abandon its nuclear program, stop producing ballistic missiles, and change its policy toward the region. In other words, Trump wants Iran to be incapable of independently conducting its policies. The attack on the Houthis is part of a plan testing the limits of Iran’s commitment to its allies, as was the case with the recent formation of the Lebanese government. Iran has not relented so far, despite struggling with economic problems. “Maximum pressure” is having an impact, and some wonder what would happen if Tehran agreed to Washington’s demands. Trump has expressed a desire to negotiate peace with Iran in the Middle East, but his ally in Tel Aviv wants much more than that. Since Trump is the one leading this new round of escalation in the Middle East, it is up to him whether and how he will reconcile all differences. If no agreement is reached and Trump continues to attack Iranian interests in the Middle East, any kind of conflict is possible. This article was previously published on the nap.ba .

Yesterday, the President of the United States, Donald Trump, and his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, held a phone conversation. The main topic was Ukraine, although the two presidents showed little interest in bringing Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy to the negotiating table. Photo: Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin The public is still piecing together fragments of the 90-minute phone call between Trump and Putin, attempting to contextualize it with recent events and connect it to what the U.S. and Russia have been negotiating in recent weeks. Official statements from both sides are being cited, along with remarks from officials close to Trump or Putin, and known positions are being referenced. Previously, the spectacular meetings between U.S. and Russian presidents have moved to phone and video calls, shrouding their negotiations in mystery to the extreme. Even before, it was clear that the public would only receive crumbs from these meetings, sometimes waiting years to create a broader picture. However, this time, the public did not have to guess that Ukraine was the main topic of the Trump-Putin conversation. Yesterday, the unwritten diplomatic rule that those not at the table where decisions are made often end up being the subject of those decisions was applied to Ukraine. About Ukraine Without Zelenskyy It is no secret that Zelenskyy does not stand well with part of the West, particularly in the United States. A recent scandalous conversation between Zelenskyy and his hosts at the White House revealed what has long been in the air—some U.S. officials want Zelenskyy to step down from the presidency, believing it would be easier to achieve peace in Eastern Europe without him. On the other hand, Putin has been repeating for months that Zelenskyy is not a partner for negotiations, as his mandate has expired, and that Ukraine needs new elections or for its parliament to elect his successor. However, the real reason does not lie in Zelenskyy's legitimacy. Washington and Moscow do not pay attention to such "trivialities" when redrawing Ukraine or other states. From the start of the Russian aggression against Ukraine, Zelenskyy has repeatedly stated that he will not agree to cede even the smallest part of the territory to Moscow, and this is the biggest problem that both the White House and the Kremlin have with him. Washington knows that Ukraine does not have the strength to reclaim all lost territories, and the Kremlin knows that Russian resources (economic and human) are not infinite, which is why they want Kyiv to give up the fight as soon as possible and allow decisions to be made about it even after the war. While Zelenskyy was traveling to Finland, Trump and Putin negotiated about Ukraine and agreed that Russia would stop attacking Ukraine's power grid for 30 days, seek "technical talks" on peace in the Black Sea region, and are ready to agree on ending the war. As reported by the U.S. side, Putin refused to establish a 30-day ceasefire across the entire front. Zelenskyy said he accepted the agreement but needed details about what the two sides discussed. The agreement on a 30-day halt to attacks on the power grid immediately raised the question of who benefits more. Those defending Trump's stance say it is a good deal for Ukraine, while those defending Putin say it is good for Russia. Both are probably right, as Ukraine saves ammunition for air defense, and Russia saves missiles and drones used in attacks. However, as spring approaches and winter recedes, it seems like a symbolic gesture. The Same Target, an Even Greater Distance Putin was not the only one rejecting the other side's demands. The Americans say Putin asked Trump to stop sending weapons to Kyiv and to halt the exchange of intelligence data between the U.S. and Ukraine. Trump rejected the proposal. Zelenskyy commented on this part of the conversation, saying Ukraine would never agree to such a deal. The fact that Zelenskyy sounds like a commentator on his fate and the future of Ukraine speaks to the absurdity of the Trump-Putin negotiations. If the West has declared Ukraine an important ally, then Kyiv should know what is being negotiated and not appear in public as if informed about the conversation's content through the media. Zelenskyy's message that more details are needed and that he does not trust Russia indicates that he does not overly trust Washington under Trump either, a stance in which he previously received support from European powers. But Trump wants to broker peace in Eastern Europe at any cost and then turn to Israel and the plan that has bipartisan support in the U.S.—containing China. For this to happen, Kyiv must accept whatever is offered, and Putin must satisfy his territorial ambitions. Kyiv showed yesterday that this is not acceptable. After partially withdrawing forces from the Russian region of Kursk, Ukrainian troops entered the Belgorod region, about ten kilometers from the state border. This shows Kyiv's intent to once again signal to Moscow that they do not have enough troops for the entire front and that a fair agreement is the only way to end the war. Russia announced yesterday that it had repelled five attempts by Ukrainian forces to enter Russian territory, assessing that Kyiv carried out the operation to sabotage the Trump-Putin talks. Trump will certainly present the talks with Putin as a success. However, everything indicates that they are at the beginning of a difficult path and that Trump is further from peace than his predecessor, Joseph Biden. Biden tried to break Moscow and bring a "just peace" for Ukraine, while Trump is simultaneously pressuring both sides. Trump's insistence yesterday on peace in the Black Sea region is good news for Ukraine, as it could help retain the city of Odesa, which many see as key to this war. Whether Trump and Biden discussed only Ukraine is not known to the public. However, Ukraine will sooner or later cease to be the sole topic of conversations between the White House and the Kremlin. Some of the topics that are emerging include the Middle East (Israel, Palestine, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, and Iran), China, Greenland and the Arctic, Western sanctions against Russia, energy security, and relations with Europe. Both Washington and Moscow are in a hurry to end the war in Ukraine, while Kyiv demands that its interests be respected. The Trump-Putin talks without Ukrainian officials guarantee that some of these desires will not be fulfilled. This article was previously published on the nap.ba .

Last night, according to claims by Serbian media, the largest protests in the history of Belgrade and Serbia took place. Estimates suggest that ninety thousand and a half a million people were on the streets. After another protest, Serbia finds itself where it has always been—President Aleksandar Vučić retains the power to govern the country as he sees fit, while the number of dissatisfied citizens ready to resist continues to grow. Photo: Crowd gathers in protest near the National Assembly building in Belgrade. The state of political emergency in Serbia, with brief interruptions, has persisted since the Belgrade nationalist elite decided to dismantle Yugoslavia in the late 1980s. Even when the situation in Serbia was at a satisfactory level, the authorities never missed an opportunity to change it, to find an enemy, or to create a crisis at home or in the neighborhood. The new wave of emergency began a little less than five months ago, when a roof collapsed at the Novi Sad railway station. Vučić then presented himself as the person responsible for everything happening in Serbia, even though students demanded that institutions, not the leader, do their job. Belgrade Protests Last night's gathering in Belgrade was the culmination of the students' struggle after months of protests in several cities and after they marched across almost the entire country to free it from fear of the repressive regime. Many expected this protest to end in a major clash with Vučić's supporters and security forces. But that did not happen. At the first signs of force being used, the students halted the protests and urged citizens to disperse, stating that this was no longer their protest. Many Serbian media outlets and protest participants claim that a "sound cannon" was used. Emitting powerful noise, the device causes pain, panic reactions, and forces people to move away from the protest site. In many countries, the device is banned because it can cause permanent damage, such as hearing loss. At a press conference held after the protest, Vučić denied that law enforcement used the device and accused the demonstrators of violence, claiming they attacked his supporters in front of the Presidency of Serbia building, among whom were former members of the notorious Red Berets. He said that some would be prosecuted for this and would pay for the damage they caused, including to tractors deployed around the camp where his supporters had stayed for days. Vučić stated that 56 people were slightly injured last night and that 22 people were arrested. In addition to claims, for which he provided no evidence, that foreign forces seeking a "color revolution" and the overthrow of his government were behind the protests, Vučić acknowledged that the protest was large and that he understood the message from the citizens. Student Success and the State of the Opposition There is no doubt that Vučić understood the message, as he carefully monitored everything. The students sparked a kind of popular uprising. On their march to Belgrade, they were joined by farmers, educators, bikers, military veterans, and many others. This is a rebellion of people who have lived for more than a decade in a country where Vučić, as president and prime minister, has repeatedly stepped outside all constitutional and legal frameworks. The students' success is even greater because they did not have the support of any major power, while Vučić enjoyed Western backing. The Archive of Public Gatherings organization estimated that between 275,000 and 325,000 people attended last night's protests, with the possibility of the number being even higher, as people gathered across Belgrade, making it impossible to determine an exact count. If we consider that the last census in Serbia in 2013 showed that the average household in the country has 2.55 members, this means that the students alone mobilized around a million voters around a political stance. This fantastic success in mobilizing citizens is even more impressive given that Serbia has been in a media blackout for years, violence against dissenters is almost tolerated, and elections there have been widely criticized as irregular. In addition to the alleged use of the so-called "sound cannon," media reports indicate that Serbia has purchased Chinese surveillance cameras with facial recognition technology and Israeli spyware to monitor journalists, activists, and the opposition... Vučić did not yield to the students' demands. It was illusory to expect him to hand over power out of fear of peaceful citizens. Moreover, he repeatedly stated that they would have to kill him to get a "transitional government," which, logically, would prepare Serbia for elections, although the students did not demand this. By halting the mass protest in Belgrade, the students sent a message to the opposition that it must lead the rebellion. Given the state of the opposition, Vučić can be content. The opposition, with its divisions and poor choice of leaders, will not win. In other words, changes must occur within the opposition, or Vučić will remain the only significant political figure in Serbia. Peaceful gatherings of citizens do not mean much to Vučić, and the impression is that he would not step down even if all of Serbia's residents took to the streets. Nevertheless, the students have shaken Vučić and the Serbian Progressive Party. A large number of people have overcome their fear of the authorities, as could be seen across Serbia. This is an important fact, considering that the opposition in Belgrade has managed to somewhat counter Vučić, but this has not been the case in the rest of Serbia. The largest opposition parties are almost non-existent in many parts of the country. Through their protests and proclamations, the students have outlined a political program, and surveys show that over eighty percent of Serbian citizens support them. This opens the door for someone to take up that program and, with acceptable candidates, push for elections preceded by changes to electoral conditions. If this does not happen quickly, this great popular uprising could be extinguished like some previous ones. On the other hand, Vučić now has two options. The first is to continue his current policy of constantly creating enemies and crises, and the second is to change his policy both within Serbia and beyond its borders. The fatigue from such a policy was evident in Belgrade, even though many battles have been fought far from the city. This article was previously published on nap.ba .

In recent weeks, political actors from Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia have been discussing how the region is at a turning point. Although their motivations differ, they are correct—the underlying tensions and divisions in the region have become undeniable. Photo: Aleksandar Vučić and Milorad Dodik The recent verdict against Milorad Dodik for ignoring the High Representative’s decisions has exposed a decades-old truth. Despite denial by some in Sarajevo and the West, the former Yugoslav region is divided into two political camps. One camp envisions this part of Europe where wealthy autocrats lead feuding tribes from one battle to the next. The other seeks membership in the European Union and NATO. Following the principle that "what is allowed to Jupiter is not allowed to the ox," Dodik is trying to "prove" that the court has no right to judge. But even if it were as Dodik claims—and it is not—he and his political allies established this court. Thousands of citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina have appeared before this court and accepted its verdict. Aleksandar Vučić, the leader of the "Serbian world," who has long presented himself as a regional peacemaker, has supported Dodik. It did not occur to Vučić to say that court decisions must be respected and that justice can be sought through other legal avenues. Vučić should know this, given that he often emphasizes that he was an excellent law student. Foreign Influence Nenad Stevandić, the president of the assembly of Republika Srpska—the Serb-dominated entity within Bosnia and Herzegovina—which Dodik governs, said that " in everything it does, Republika Srpska is not alone or isolated, as it has the understanding of Serbia, Hungary, and Croatia ." His actions during the aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina should be addressed by courts. All major Western powers have expressed support for the institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina, including the United States, the European Union, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Italy, Spain, NATO, and the OSCE. The stance of those Stevandić relies on is likely supported by Russia, at least until the moment they begin trading with the West. In one such exchange, the Kremlin "sold out" Slobodan Milošević. In his book Midnight Diaries, former Russian President Boris Yeltsin wrote about how the West was handed "one of the most cynical politicians they had to deal with," asserting that Milošević committed crimes against non-Serbs and that the Kremlin defended Belgrade solely for Moscow's interests. On the other hand, there are the countries that were once ideals for Yeltsin and, for many years, for Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev as presidents and prime ministers of Russia. These same Western countries have been "sold" services by Balkan politicians, often to the detriment of their states. Those genuinely committed to the Euro-Atlantic path for this part of the world are trying to open the eyes of the West and are calling on Washington and Brussels to change their policy toward the Balkans. A Warning from Washington The aforementioned Western powers have issued various statements about the events in Bosnia and Herzegovina, pledging to help domestic institutions do what they are paid to do. But one of these comments has shown the international public the real role on the Balkan political stage. The second-ranking official in the U.S. Senate, Republican Chuck Grassley, one of the most important U.S. officials, said that the region is threatened by war, genocide, and a refugee crisis. Grassley also stated that Dodik is aided by "separatists among Bosnian Croats" in undermining Bosnia and Herzegovina and warned them that this would not end well for them. Some dismissed Grassley's remarks from the axis Stevandić appeals to for "understanding," but numerous pieces of evidence suggest the senator spoke the truth. The war against Bosnia and Herzegovina has been ongoing for decades, and nationalist elites in Belgrade and Zagreb have adapted their methods to the circumstances over the years. This was also evident during the formation of the current Council of Ministers of Bosnia and Herzegovina, when Dodik and the president of the Croatian Democratic Union, Dragan Čović, selected the "Muslim representation." The diplomatic offensive by the West against Russia and its partners in Europe, due to the aggression against Ukraine, was survived by the duo in a "pro-European government" that has not brought much to Bosnia and Herzegovina. Before U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio spoke about the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Dodik talked about changed and favorable circumstances in international politics, while his partners from Mostar spoke of "legitimate representation," the meaning and essence of which even their biggest advocates cannot explain in two coherent sentences. Senator Grassley, from a prominent position, painted the problem Bosnia and Herzegovina faces and practically explained the core issue to the American public—institutions controlled by ethnic groups. The fact that a verdict against one man could lead to another genocide speaks to the absurdity of Bosnia and Herzegovina's political system. This is an admission from Washington that the Dayton Constitution has expired. From Kosovo to Bosnia and Herzegovina If the political matrix is repeating itself across the region, its source is likely at one address. In recent years, we have witnessed similar rebellions as part of the struggle for the "Serbian world." Kosovo, Montenegro, and Bosnia and Herzegovina are under constant threat of ethnic conflicts, with political and police organs looking to Belgrade refusing obedience. Protests organized by the government and the church feature Russian flags and images of Vladimir Putin. Since taking power, Vučić has pushed the former Yugoslav region to the brink of crisis. Although, for example, Boris Tadić did not abandon Greater Serbian ideas, he did not threaten violence. Yet, Vučić enjoys the support of much of the West because he supposedly maintains peace. However, in practice, he is turning the Balkans into its worst version—a place of captured institutions, selective courts, and corruption so rampant that it kills random passersby, as shown by the collapse of the roof at the Novi Sad railway station. Protests against the captured state have been ongoing for months and could reach a turning point this weekend, indicating that a large number of Serbian citizens are tired of Vučić's Potemkin villages. The low turnout at Dodik's rallies shows the same on the other side of the Drina, not just because the population has fled Bosnia and Herzegovina during the rule of "patriots." We have also seen Vučić fabricating reality in recent days. First, he went to Banja Luka to support Dodik, then invited him to Serbia to address the parliament, which was supposed to discuss Bosnia and Herzegovina, only to publicly ask him not to come. Meanwhile, Dodik insulted those protesting in Serbia and joined Vučić in accusing students of being foreign mercenaries. This is a strange accusation from those who build their government budgets by borrowing from foreigners and, in exchange for support, offer them land, rivers, and minerals. The changes happening in the West must also affect the Balkans, at least consequentially. Sarajevo, Podgorica, and Priština have been given another opportunity to present their positions and call for Western engagement in this part of the world on a different basis. Periodically extinguishing fires with international military forces is a terrible policy, and pandering to autocrats and politicians who see this part of Europe as a place where European norms do not apply is a pre-written defeat. History teaches us this. The article was previously published on nap.ba .

Last week, agencies reported clashes between "remnants of the Bashar al-Assad regime" and forces loyal to the Damascus government in the Syrian provinces of Latakia and Tartus. Social media has been flooded with footage of the killings of Alawite civilians. Photo: Illustration The final days of Bashar al-Assad's rule remain a mystery to the public, with a conspiracy of silence seemingly surrounding the details of the event. No one has yet provided a full account of how an army that fought for over a decade collapsed in just a few days. More precisely, it is unclear whether the military was truly defeated, whether all forces were disarmed, or whether everyone abandoned the country. Media outlets close to Lebanon's Hezbollah described part of the drama in the vicinity of the city of Homs during those days, which proved to be a key defeat for Assad's government. Homs is an important crossroads, connecting the capital Damascus and the coastal region of Syria, where Alawites, to whom Assad and many other former Syrian officials belong, predominantly live. These media outlets reported that some of Hezbollah's best fighters arrived for the decisive battle for Homs, despite the ongoing war with Israel. In several smaller clashes, Hezbollah fighters emerged victorious, but then inexplicable events began to unfold. The Syrian army approached Hezbollah and other militia members, demanding their withdrawal and surrender of positions. Shortly thereafter, the army handed over those same positions to the Syrian Al-Qaeda, which had long since rebranded as Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and now sits in Damascus with the understanding of the West and numerous other countries. Where the Syrian troops and their most prominent fighters have gone remains unknown to the wider public. Media reports suggest that part of the army went to Iraq, part to Lebanon, and part surrendered to the new authorities and were subsequently dismissed. However, some of the most elite units of Assad's army reportedly retreated to the Alawite Mountains, a natural boundary between the Syrian coast and the interior, inhabited by the minority Alawites. During the rebellion against Assad, this area remained under government control despite attacks by rebels and terrorists from dozens of countries. Just last week, this area was the site of clashes between the new Syrian authorities and rebels allegedly part of Assad's army. This part of Syria was also the scene of civilian killings by HTS or groups affiliated with them. In video footage shared online by the attackers, Alawite civilians are seen being tortured and killed, labeled as "infidels" and "pigs." According to information from the UK-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, which has been anti-Assad since its inception, over a thousand people have been killed since Saturday, including around 745 civilians, among them women and children. The remaining casualties were from the ranks of the new Syrian authorities and rebels. Sectarian Division HTS leader Ahmed al-Sharaa, a Sunni and de facto president of Syria, has repeatedly stated that there will be no sectarian violence and that the new government extends a hand of cooperation to all. His forces justified the killings of opponents by claiming they were former members of Assad's regime who committed crimes against Sunnis and regime opponents. On Friday, al-Sharaa warned that security forces should not "overreact... because what sets us apart from our enemy is our commitment to our values." With the support of forces aiming to quell the rebellion and pursue Assad loyalists, he added that "when we abandon our morals, we and our enemy end up on the same side," stating that civilians and prisoners should not be mistreated. What exactly is happening in Syria these days still has at least two versions. But based on what the public knows, dozens of soldiers from the new government have been killed in ambushes by alleged former Assad soldiers. HTS members reportedly killed hundreds of civilians. Reports from Syria indicate that thousands of civilians have sought refuge in Russian military bases still present in the country. Among them are Syrian Christians fleeing fear of HTS and affiliated militias. Damascus claims that the forces behind the attacks are "loyal to Assad." The public has no information on whether Assad maintains any connection with forces in Syria, as he has been under Russian protection in Moscow for months. It is unlikely that Assad could issue orders from Russia without Kremlin approval. Major Western media outlets have shown little interest in Syria since Assad's fall, as the primary goal of Western governments in the country was achieved with the regime's collapse. Since the "Syrian opposition" has now come to power, having received media and other support from much of the West for years, some media have decided to relegate Syrian stories to the background. It is worth recalling the reactions of Western media and officials when Assad-led Syrian forces committed or were accused of crimes against civilians. Crimes against civilians from Assad's sect are now of little importance to the West. Violence in the part of Syria where Alawites live was expected from the moment Assad left the country. It was clear that the new authorities would seek revenge and punish prominent members of the previous regime, and that foreign fighters, mostly from Salafist sects, would show cruelty towards "infidels," meaning practically anyone could be their victim. Al-Sharaa has largely prevented such scenes in Damascus, but he cannot control the entire country. There are several reasons for this. First, the new government seeks legitimacy and wants to present itself as inclusive. Second, al-Sharaa does not control all the forces that overthrew Assad. Third, the new Syrian government does not control the entire territory of the country. In the northeast, Kurds supported by the United States refuse to submit to Damascus, and Israeli forces have reached the outskirts of the capital without resistance from HTS or al-Sharaa. The rebellion in Latakia and Tartus indicates that others are also dissatisfied with the current situation. Al-Sharaa explains his policy by the weakness of the central government and the devastation of Syria. But more and more people are skeptical of this narrative. Not long ago, al-Sharaa, as a member of ISIL and Al-Qaeda, fought against the United States, Russia, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Hezbollah, and numerous Shiite militias. His retreat from the Israeli army and hunt for "remnants of the regime" have raised eyebrows. For example, some Syrian groups have clashed with the Lebanese army and Hezbollah in the border area between the two countries, while al-Sharaa has claimed that Iran and its allies are the greatest threat to his rule. Al-Sharaa has simultaneously turned a blind eye to Israeli attacks and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's announcements that his army will protect the minority Druze, who live on the strategically important Golan Heights, and sent troops to the outskirts of Damascus. Netanyahu warned that he would not allow "extremists" in Damascus to attack the Druze after an exchange of fire between two opposing militias, one allegedly loyal to the government and the other belonging to the minority group. The Israeli Prime Minister is thus redrawing the map of Syria by advancing into the Syrian side of Mount Hermon, giving him a strategic advantage over Damascus forces and creating conditions to semi-encircle Hezbollah, as HTS views the Shiite group as an enemy. Rebellion or Social Agreement? The massacre of Alawite civilians has been condemned by Iran, while Lebanese Hezbollah has denied accusations of being behind attacks on forces loyal to Damascus. Turkey and Saudi Arabia have supported the Damascus regime. Last week's conflict is not the first of its kind since Assad's fall. Remnants of the army and various groups have ambushed government forces in other parts of the country, and civilian casualties have been recorded in similar scenarios to Latakia and Tartus, albeit on a smaller scale. All this could be a prelude to renewed conflict in Syria, potentially involving numerous countries. With the collapse of Assad's regime, Iran has been pushed out of the Syrian chessboard, and Israel has entered the game. Turkey, the United States, and Russia remain players. Thus, Syria today has at least four foreign armies, at least two of which were not invited by the central government in Damascus. Al-Sharaa has attempted to reconcile these differences in several statements. Some progress has been made, but rebel Kurds refuse to lay down their arms, relying on Washington and the US military, despite Turkish threats to disarm. Alawite leaders criticize the new Syrian ruler for failing to negotiate with their leaders, despite promising inclusivity for all Syrian groups and communities. Agencies report that there has yet to be a meeting between Alawite representatives and the new Syrian leader, nor are there any indications that such a meeting will occur, unlike with other minority groups. Al-Sharaa has restored optimism among many Syrians after meeting with Walid Jumblatt, leader of the Druze, and Joseph Aoun, the Christian president of Lebanon. In addition to them, al-Sharaa has met with senior officials from Turkey, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, many EU countries, and representatives of the United States, even Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, known as a secular politician who considers the Muslim Brotherhood, close to the new Syrian government, a terrorist organization. However, it is indicative that there have been no meetings with Alawite representatives, who are a branch of Shiites. Additionally, the target of the Damascus government is the Shiite Hezbollah. Beyond efforts to prevent Iran from supplying Hezbollah with weapons via land routes through Iraq and Syria, border clashes involving the Lebanese army have also been recorded. Earlier this month, al-Sharaa stated that "the presence of Iranian militias under the previous (Syrian) regime posed a strategic threat to the entire region," and that Tehran "encourages instability" in many countries, continuing his stance on Iran since he became known to the public. The New Syria Al-Sharaa has promised not to build a state where one man makes all decisions, but there are still no signs of when political parties will be allowed to form or when elections for Syria's highest bodies will be held. On the other hand, some groups, particularly Alawites, fear being ruled by a former member of ISIL and Al-Qaeda. Syrians are well acquainted with the methods of these groups from recent years. Al-Sharaa is not alone. Various "emirs" from these two groups have been appointed to other positions, facing serious accusations. Thus, the Syrian question remains open, with many wondering if Syria exists as a state. But even if it exists as a state, it certainly does not exist as a secular Arab republic, a bastion of pan-Arabism. The new Syrian government prioritizes Sharia law. The problem lies in interpreting religious laws and their application, given that many Syrians from all sects desire a secular state as it once was. This presents one of the greatest dilemmas for the new government—choosing a social order and allowing sects to be what they are, or imposing the dominance of one over the others. The new government has stated that it rose against Assad because, among other reasons, he favored the sect from which he hails. But even if al-Sharaa finds a salvific solution, he would not be able to decide alone. The behavior of, for example, Israel in southern Syria and the West's stance towards it indicate that they expect a certain pattern of behavior from it, primarily meaning it does not threaten Tel Aviv's interests, or else they will impose sanctions and seize territories under various pretexts. And they are not the only ones. Turkey, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates also have interests in Syria. Whether al-Sharaa can endure all this is a question, as is whether many war-weary Syrians can or will. This article was previously published on PISJournal.net .

"America is back," Trump began his address, which lasted just under one hour and forty minutes—the longest speech by any U.S. president at a joint session of Congress. Photo: President Trump delivers a fiery address to Congress, doubling down on 'America First' amid cheers and jeers. On Tuesday night (local time), U.S. President Donald Trump delivered a speech before both houses of Congress. U.S. presidents often use such addresses to call for unity and highlight challenges facing the nation. But not Trump. In his world, everything is rosy—except the politics of defeated American Democrats. "America is back," Trump began his speech, which lasted just under one hour and forty minutes, the longest by any U.S. president at a joint session of Congress. His addresses during his first term averaged around eighty minutes, suggesting he was particularly inspired for this performance. Trump was frequently interrupted by applause from politicians and dignitaries, as well as his applause directed at individuals he mentioned who were present in the chamber. The hall, often synonymous with serious politics, resembled a sports arena where the crowd cheers and applauds their favorites. To complete the sports arena atmosphere, Democratic Congressman Al Green, who was escorted out of the chamber just minutes after Trump began speaking, shouted and heckled Trump, claiming he "has no mandate" and refusing to sit down. House Speaker Mike Johnson, a Trump ally, stated that Green had "terribly made history." Some Democrats held signs reading "False" and "Musk Steals," targeting the world’s richest man, whom Trump’s critics call the "real president" of the United States, highlighting his influence in the White House. Elon Musk was in the audience and received strong applause after Trump praised his work in the "Office of Government Efficiency." Trump Against All Odds Trump remained undeterred by the behavior of some Democrats. From start to finish, he maintained the same energy, never relenting in proclaiming himself and his policies as the greatest in U.S. history while portraying his political opponents as the exact opposite. He presented arbitrary and false data, made threats... Some media outlets fact-checked Trump’s claims and concluded he had uttered many falsehoods. Some statements were difficult to assess. "We’ve achieved more in 43 days than some administrations have in four or eight years, and we’re just getting started," he said, touting his administration’s successes. For those outside the U.S., however, this was the least of the issues with Trump’s speech. He threatened certain countries, repeating that he would "take the Panama Canal back from Panama" and that Greenland would "one way or another" belong to Washington. Trump’s remarks about other nations often sounded like a call for submission, disregarding their positions. Nearly every mention of foreign countries or international agreements was framed as "cheating" the U.S., even as he spoke of a "golden age" under his presidency. As proof of success, he cited executive orders signed since returning to the White House. Ideological Warfare The most critical part of Trump’s address was his continued feud with the minority Democrats in Congress and former President Joseph Biden, whose political career appears to have ended with his term. Targeting Biden was no accident and likely signals the revenge many feared when Trump returned to the White House. Undoubtedly, Trump used the congressional address to legally and legitimately dismantle Biden administration policies. From the same podium, Biden had targeted Trump long before the November presidential elections. Trump’s spin doctors framed LGBTQ+ issues and ‘woke culture’ as symbols of America’s decline. He pinned these policies—some even backed by Republicans and parts of their base—on Democrats. Such easy targets, Trump attacked by citing U.S. funds funneled to Lesotho, Serbia, Moldova, Uganda, and others—tens of millions wasted, he claimed. Many voters will support this. It’s easy to argue that an over-indebted nation like the U.S. should not send millions abroad for programs voters wouldn’t support in their neighborhoods. To Americans struggling to feed themselves, the idea of sending U.S. funds for social inclusion programs in Peru or Colombia sounds absurd. Support for Trump’s stance will grow, especially if economic hardships persist and his narrative dominates. This is how Trump aims to bury the policies he defeated in the presidential election. This ideological battle, spanning various spheres of life, will be Trump’s trump card on the domestic political scene. Regardless of results in other areas, his administration will leverage its elimination of all genders except male and female, its protection of women’s sports from transgender athletes, and its removal of gender-inclusive language. Trump will "export" this worldview to regions where his political allies and followers of so-called conservatism—claiming to "save ordinary people from the evil left"—still exist, despite the left having largely abandoned such rhetoric decades ago. Through this framework, Trump will garner global sympathy and strengthen U.S. influence in certain regions. However, this won’t change the fact that the U.S. and the West need change, as problems pile up. Divisions among Western nations are growing, and Trump fuels them. In Biden’s speeches, there was at least hope for cooperation and the need for allies. In Trump’s worldview, even the closest ally can become an enemy. During his congressional speech, he reinforced this by implying that Democrats and U.S. allies have only done wrong. Some Republicans, aware of this, will likely push Trump toward positions held by past administrations, regardless of party affiliation. Otherwise, talk of the United States "we once knew" will resurface quickly. The article was previously published on nap.ba .

If Tusk or Starmer know the answer, they will likely find a way to strengthen Europe. Until then, even London’s best intentions to help Kyiv will depend on Washington’s will and strength, as well as European unity in the face of fear of Russia. Photo: UK PM Sir Keir Starmer, flanked by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy (R) and French President Emmanuel Macron (L), at the European leaders summit in London. Last weekend, leaders from numerous Western countries, at the invitation of UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer, gathered in London intending to find a response to Russian aggression in Ukraine, following a series of unexpected moves by U.S. President Donald Trump. Since the end of World War II, the United States has been the driving force behind Anglo-Saxon and Western policy. Until this year, Washington was the place where policies were forged to minimize Moscow’s influence outside Russia to the greatest extent possible. The focus of this policy shifted over time. In the early years after World War II, the emphasis was on Europe, ensuring that Russian tanks from Eastern and Central Europe did not reach the Atlantic. As the years passed, almost the entire world became a battleground between capitalism and communism, Washington and Moscow, with Europe divided by the "Iron Curtain." Eastern Europe and London In recent years, things have changed. China has taken center stage on the global scene, and some old Russian strongholds (such as Warsaw or Prague) have permanently switched sides. However, a drama began on Russia’s borders that has kept Moscow and the West on opposite sides for about a decade. Russia’s aggression against Ukraine in February 2022 is a continuation of the war in the east of the country and the annexation of Crimea in 2014. Now, other factors are at play, as Trump has shaken the Western alliance. Simply put, Trump is not overly focused on containing Russia, as he intends to deal with China, as he did during his first term. But official London has different plans. Any attempt by Russia to push toward Europe’s warm seas and the central part of the continent triggers alarm bells in London. And if London were to try to extend its influence toward Russia’s borders, Moscow would respond harshly, as Ukraine recently experienced when it sought to move closer to NATO and distance itself from Russia. The history of relations between London and Moscow has shaped some of the most important processes in Europe. The two capitals have fought directly and through proxies, supported rivals to the detriment of the other side, and at times jointly drawn spheres of influence. Even alliances in wars against third countries have not changed the fact that London and Moscow view each other’s geopolitical plans as a threat. Since the beginning of the war in Ukraine, London has sided with Kyiv. The UK has allocated enormous resources to the Ukrainian military, sent weapons, trained Ukrainian troops, and exerted diplomatic pressure on Russia... Moscow has not forgotten this. Russian propagandists have repeatedly stated that in the event of a war between NATO and Russia, London should be the first target. Russian media have shown simulations of nuclear strikes on the British Isles, the activation of bombs that could trigger tsunamis and wipe out British cities, and questioned the capabilities of the British military... Perhaps the greatest insult to London is Moscow’s public appeal to Washington to negotiate peace in Ukraine without Europeans, particularly without the British. In these Russian statements, London’s interests are dismissed, and British policy is seen as confrontational. The London Summit Despite all the blows and Trump’s wavering, London has not given up on the fight against Russia. How deeply rooted this policy is in the British political establishment is evidenced by Boris Johnson’s address to parliament shortly before leaving the prime minister’s office. Among the advice he gave to his successors on how to lead the country, he particularly emphasized that they must not abandon Ukraine. Sunday’s summit confirmed that even Labour is following the Conservative Johnson’s guidance. The British, as masters of protocol, paid attention to the smallest details, from showing support for Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky after he clashed with Trump at the White House, to the reception and seating arrangements for those invited to the summit. The "coalition of the willing" was gathered on two sides of the table, with Starmer, Zelensky, and French President Emmanuel Macron presiding in the middle. How important Ukraine is to London was shown by Starmer’s words that this is a "once-in-a-generation" event. Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk summed up the gravity of the situation with a striking statement: "It’s a paradox, listen to how it sounds: 500 million Europeans are begging 300 million Americans to protect them from 140 million Russians. If you can count—rely on yourself!" The summit sent a message that Kyiv will not surrender to Russia and that those present will help in this fight, although many did not commit to what that aid might look like. At the informal meeting, in addition to the presiding leaders and the Polish prime minister, the heads of state and government of Italy, Germany, Spain, Norway, Finland, Sweden, Denmark, Romania, the Czech Republic, the Netherlands, Canada, the leaders of the European Union, the NATO Secretary General, and the Turkish foreign minister were also present. Starmer and Macron argue that peace in Ukraine is impossible without Kyiv and Europe’s involvement and are asking Trump to bring them to the table with the Russians. In return, the UK and France will try to take on part of the burden of defending Ukraine, relying on European capabilities. "Today we are at a historic turning point," Starmer said from London, explaining that "Europe must take on the burden" and then gain the support of the United States. In other words, continue the policy designed by the Biden administration, for which Trump has no time. Trump’s calls for Europe to arm itself are reaching European leaders, but not quickly enough. In January, Tusk declared that "the era of comfort is over" and called on Europeans to strengthen their military capabilities. Tusk is one of the European leaders who has precisely summarized Europe’s problems and pointed out where the continent should go if it wants to strengthen itself against Russia. From London, at the summit, he noted that Europe and Ukraine have 2.6 million soldiers compared to Russia’s 1.1 million, that Europeans have 2,091 combat aircraft compared to Russia’s 1,224, and that Europeans have 14,400 artillery pieces compared to Russia’s 5,157. In other words, quantity is on Europe’s side. But more important than these numbers is Tusk’s reflection on the "paradox" that 500 million Europeans seek protection from 300 million Americans against 140 million Russians. The most important question is how Europe ended up in this situation and who is to blame. If Tusk or Starmer know the answer, they will likely find a way to strengthen Europe. Until then, even London’s best intentions to help Kyiv will depend on Washington’s will and strength, as well as European unity in the face of fear of Russia. The article was previously published on nap.ba .

French President Emmanuel Macron is attempting to improve Europe's position and restore some of his country's glory as a former great power under these unfavorable circumstances. Photo: Emmanuel Macron The U.S.-Russian negotiations over Ukraine, and subsequently over Eastern Europe and the future of relations on the continent, have been ongoing for weeks. In these challenging circumstances, French President Emmanuel Macron is striving to strengthen Europe's position and reclaim some of his nation's prestige as a former great power. If Macron could choose when to focus intensely on foreign policy in parts of the world where French influence is limited, it certainly wouldn’t be now. At home, a political crisis is unfolding, and his party is not performing as he would like. Additionally, his popularity is far from its peak. However, Macron must engage with Eastern Europe, trying to extract the maximum for the European Union from the United States and Russia. The EU, along with Ukraine, could likely be the biggest loser in any deal struck between Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin behind closed doors. For Paris, this is an obligation. First, France is the only nuclear power in the European Union. Second, Macron is testing two key ideas he has been working on. He has long advocated for the formation of European Union armed forces without U.S. involvement and has launched the European Political Community (EPC), which includes non-EU member states. Macron Aims to Counter Both Putin and Trump Since the beginning of the Russian aggression against Ukraine, Macron has tried to position France as a key player in Eastern Europe. This has not ended well. Many remember his meeting with Putin in Moscow, where the host seated him at the opposite end of a table over ten meters long. Macron later aligned himself with the administration of U.S. President Joseph Biden and, alongside other European nations, supported Ukraine. He sent long-range SCALP missiles to Kyiv, making France one of the countries that particularly angered Moscow. These missiles have been used by Ukrainian forces to strike high-value Russian targets in Ukraine and Russia. Macron didn’t stop there. He spoke of sending French troops to Ukraine, specifically mentioning the city of Odesa, which many believe could be a key factor in the Ukrainian war. Odesa, a port city on the Black Sea, is Ukraine’s only operational seaport and its gateway to the sea. With Trump’s return to the White House, things have changed rapidly. Official Washington has since been unwilling to involve European allies in negotiations with Moscow over Ukraine. Earlier, the Kremlin had signaled to Washington that Europeans were not needed in these talks. Macron has tried to convince Trump to include European powers at the negotiating table, but success seems limited so far, as the White House still lacks a broader vision of an agreement with Russia without its allies, especially in the context of China and its intention to focus on the Pacific after ending the war in Eastern Europe. At the core of the negotiations between Washington and Kyiv are Ukraine’s rare earth metals, which major U.S. tech companies are eager to acquire. Talks have been ongoing for weeks over who will gain the rights to these resources, with Trump stating that they should go to Americans as a guarantee and gratitude for the aid provided to Kyiv. France has also entered this discussion. Yesterday, French Defense Minister Sébastien Lecornu stated that negotiations with Ukraine on this issue have been ongoing since October and that French industry, particularly the arms sector, will need these rare minerals "over the next thirty or forty years." Lecornu also mentioned that France is proposing that Europeans take responsibility for Ukraine’s security. "This is an idea we intend to propose to European countries," he said, explaining the proposal for Europe to create arms reserves for the Ukrainian army. "The point of the current discussions is to ensure that the Ukrainian army can continue to defend itself, not just now but also when the guns fall silent." European (Non-)Alignment France’s plan to aid Ukraine and rely on European forces is currently supported by Germany and several other countries. However, complications arise here. France’s policy toward Ukraine is also backed by the current UK government, as is the aforementioned European Political Community. However, London has opposed European armed forces without U.S. involvement, and the list includes staunch U.S. allies like Poland and most Scandinavian and Baltic states. Macron, whose presidential term ends in two years, has little time. But apart from him, there are few leaders in Europe who would dare to attempt what he is doing. The leadership crisis in Europe has been present for decades, and it is not uncommon to hear assessments that the European Union does not know what to do with itself, let alone how to compete with geopolitical giants like the United States, China, Russia, and India. Macron is also trying to extend his influence beyond the EU. He is one of the few European leaders attempting to maintain a strong presence in almost all Balkan countries. His offers include energy projects, arms deals, investments, military missions, special envoys, and strengthening the EPC. France is aware that its influence is limited, particularly its resources. The fact that France, along with Germany, remains the most powerful country within the EU speaks volumes about the state of the old European powers. However, this relative weakness could be an advantage for France, especially in a Europe where small states have favored joint projects for decades and where some are wary of the idea of a new hegemon emerging on the continent. This is why Macron has repeatedly proposed joint projects to Europeans, particularly insisting that they produce most of their combat systems. The French military relies on French ingenuity, which means that joint investments could quickly change the situation on the ground. The Ukrainian war is a unique opportunity but also a danger that the EU and European powers could sink into irrelevance on the global political stage. The transformation of France and other European states into regional powers began after the end of World War II. Over the past two decades, European powers have been losing ground in the Mediterranean, the Middle East, and Africa, while the U.S., Russia, China, Turkey, Iran, Egypt, and even smaller states have been gaining influence. This is all the more reason for Europeans to focus on their continent, addressing issues within the EU and its periphery. Macron’s stance is well-known: there can be no EU enlargement without internal reforms, and in recent years, France has pursued a more robust policy in countries leaning toward the bloc, even at the risk of confrontation. Although France is not a dominant power in Europe, it should not be overlooked that this nuclear power is, among other things, a permanent member of the UN Security Council, a NATO member, a leading EU state alongside Germany, a major arms and equipment producer, and, more recently, the only European country seriously investing in artificial intelligence technology. Macron’s plan is currently being tested on the issue of Ukraine. Official Kyiv has not rejected the idea of relying on European powers, though they are aware that the U.S. is currently the only real guarantor of Ukraine’s security. Simply put, Putin only fears Washington militarily, knowing that most European armies are in dire straits. But if Macron succeeds in finding countries willing to work on strengthening the European factor, the situation could fundamentally change, while opponents rely on European states that prioritize the United States. For Macron and France, this would be a success, even in the short term, if it helps "survive" Trump’s presidency. This article was previously published on nap.ba .

While many in the West are questioning what Washington and Trump stand to gain from this meeting, there is no doubt in Russia that a deal would be a major victory for the Kremlin. Photo: Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump U.S. President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin are eager to meet, and diplomats from both countries are already working to make it happen. While many in the West wonder what Washington and Trump would gain from such a meeting, in Russia, there is no hesitation—any agreement would be seen as a significant win for the Kremlin. By criticizing former President Joseph Biden and his policy toward Ukraine, Trump has stepped into a contentious arena. It would have been far easier for Trump to turn a blind eye to Ukraine, as he has done with other issues, and pretend nothing was happening. However, he promised to end the war in Eastern Europe as soon as he won the election, even before entering the White House. Such an initial stance does not bode well for diplomatic negotiations, as it allows the other side to negotiate from a position of strength. When combined with the current situation on the frontlines and the months-long confusion in the West, the challenges for Trump become even more complex. Putin’s Position For Russia, the situation is simpler—at least until the moment, any agreement is presented to the public. This is especially true when it comes to calculating losses, whether demographic, military, economic, or diplomatic. For Putin, any deal that grants Russia de facto and de jure gains, and is endorsed by the West, would be a victory. His enthusiasm for negotiating with Trump, along with the broad support for this move in Russia, underscores this point. Russia is well aware that its resources are not unlimited and that the war in Ukraine is taking a toll. A three-year conflict involving the most advanced weaponry in the world is bound to leave deep scars. The rapprochement between Putin and Trump comes on the third anniversary of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. War fatigue is palpable on all sides. If Ukraine is at risk of running out of soldiers, Russia faces the danger of its economy entering a prolonged race against the West, which has been accelerating arms production for three years. This is why Putin must capitalize on Trump’s desire to end the war. In a short span, both leaders have spoken about economic cooperation between their countries, following years of no direct contact between the White House and the Kremlin. “I am in serious talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin to end the war, as well as to pursue major economic development deals between the United States and Russia. The talks are going very well,” Trump wrote on his Truth Social platform. A day later, on Tuesday, Putin spoke favorably of Trump on state television, stating that the U.S. president is acting “in the interest of Ukraine” and “to preserve Ukrainian statehood.” Putin then publicly offered Trump the opportunity to jointly exploit rare minerals in Russia, emphasizing that the world’s largest country possesses “orders of magnitude more” of these resources than Ukraine. Putin made this statement just hours after Trump met with French President Emmanuel Macron, during which Ukrainian rare minerals—sought by Trump for American companies as compensation for U.S. aid to Kyiv—were reportedly discussed. While Macron was still in the United States, neighboring Canada imposed new sanctions on Russian officials, individuals, foundations, and even the head of the Russian Ski Federation. These sanctions were a symbolic message from Prime Minister Justin Trudeau to Washington. Post-War: Sanctions and China Putin’s offer to Trump regarding joint exploitation of Russian minerals, coupled with Trump’s confirmation of ongoing economic talks, is a ticking time bomb for the West. If the United States agrees to such deals, it would necessitate lifting the extensive sanctions against Russia, potentially causing divisions within the Western alliance. For now, Europe and Canada are not ready for such a move. Putin is offering rare minerals that American companies are eager to acquire. If Trump accepts, Putin will secure peace in Ukraine and Russia, a suspension of sanctions, and divisions within the West. Macron was aware of this when he told Trump in Washington that the U.S. should focus its economic war on China, not Europe. The inclusion of China in this equation is no coincidence. After the war in Eastern Europe concludes, Trump plans to focus on containing China. However, any U.S. economic strategy against China is doomed to fail without European support. This is why some supporters of Trump and Putin’s negotiations are now considering whether Russia might assist the U.S. in its confrontation with China. Regardless of China, Putin is determined to see sanctions against Russia lifted. Over the past three years, he has demonstrated that Moscow cannot be diplomatically isolated in much of the world, but he has failed to achieve his ultimate goal—reducing dependence on the U.S. dollar and the economic and financial mechanisms controlled by the West. Putin is ready to negotiate with Trump as soon as possible. Economic cooperation with Trump could be more valuable than gaining control over a small town in Eastern Ukraine, as it would lead to the lifting of sanctions and the entry of American companies into Russia. These companies, which supported Trump’s rise to power, could then establish operations in Russia. If Ukraine were to concede its rare minerals to American companies, the same players would emerge as key actors on both sides of the Russian-Ukrainian border. Putin now has the opportunity to capitalize on what his troops have achieved in Ukraine and what his economy has accomplished under wartime conditions. A deal with Trump would mean an end to Western isolation, the lifting of sanctions, divisions among U.S. allies, and a devastated Ukraine serving as a warning to Russia’s neighbors about the consequences of defying Moscow. In such a scenario, Washington and Trump would gain far less, while Ukraine and Europe would gain even less. European resistance to Trump, particularly from Paris, London, and Berlin, could pressure Washington to consider Kyiv’s and Europe’s positions in negotiations with Putin. This would test the U.S.’s relationship with its European allies. Europeans argue that Putin cannot be trusted, citing his 2008 invasion of Georgia, the 2014 annexation of Crimea, and the 2022 attack on Kyiv. They are not alone in this view. Current U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, speaking as a senator on a Spanish-language channel, stated that he “does not believe anything coming from the Kremlin” and that Russia “invaded” Ukraine, which is “defending itself.” It will be interesting to see what Rubio and the U.S. delegation negotiate with the Russians and whether those not at the negotiating table will trust the outcome. The article was previously published on nap.ba .

In the initial weeks of his second term, newly re-elected U.S. President Donald Trump has demonstrated a keen interest in various regions across the globe. Naturally, America's closest neighbors are among his top priorities. Photo: Illustration Since Barack Obama's presidency, U.S. presidents and top officials have been announcing a confrontation with China. According to official U.S. documents and presidential statements, often later categorized under the term "doctrine," China is the only country capable and willing to challenge Washington globally on political, technological, and ideological fronts. China is indeed doing so, though it often appears to avoid confrontations with the U.S. while calling for peace and cooperation. In international relations theory, it is common for the leading global power to be replaced by its closest rival after some form of clash, usually a war. However, China has a different strategy, which has been successful so far. For decades, impoverished China relied on its large population and cheap labor, eventually transforming into a global power capable of competing with the U.S. in various fields. America’s Backyard For two centuries, the United States has adhered to the Monroe Doctrine, which asserts that any European interference in North and South America would be considered an act of hostility by Washington. President James Monroe was already mapping out the geopolitical landscape of a world emerging with the decline of old European colonial powers. Consequently, the U.S. systematically ousted Britain, France, Spain, and Portugal from its "backyard" through various means. Trump's recent actions upon re-entering the White House last month suggest that he still considers this region America's backyard. A closer look at the territories he has referenced confirms his intention to consolidate control over these areas, even if, as many predict, the U.S. under Trump moves toward a form of isolationism. He has demanded Greenland from Denmark and the Panama Canal from Panama, not ruling out the use of military force. He then called for Canada to become a U.S. federal state, referring to the Canadian prime minister as a governor. Trump also threatened Mexico, Colombia, and Brazil with sanctions and tariffs, Venezuela with military intervention, and at the southern tip of South America, Argentine President Javier Milei does not question the idea that Washington should dictate terms while China or any other power has no place in the region. That this struggle is ongoing and escalating was confirmed last week by China. Notably, Beijing’s response was uncharacteristically bold, confrontational, and direct, making it even more significant. "Latin America belongs to the people of Latin America and is not anyone's backyard," said Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi. "China supports Latin American countries in preserving their sovereignty, independence, and national dignity and supports Bolivia in defending its legitimate rights and interests. China will always be a reliable friend and partner to Latin America," he added. His statement was published by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Wang Yi made these remarks at the United Nations last week during a meeting with Bolivia's foreign minister. Celinda Sosa Lunda, along with many leftists across Latin America, was eager to hear this assurance—that their countries would receive Chinese support, particularly in technology, and that China's market would remain open to their products. During the UN gathering, Celinda Sosa Lunda stated, "We are fighting for a transition to a multipolar world." This statement was not just diplomatic rhetoric; it was music to Beijing’s ears and a boost for the government in La Paz. The Bolivian News Agency (ABI) recently reported, not coincidentally, on two previously signed agreements allowing the Chinese consortium CBC, a subsidiary of CATL, access to Bolivia's lithium reserves. Bolivia, home to some of the world's largest lithium reserves, has partnered with CATL, the world's leading lithium battery manufacturer. The same ABI article noted that Russia's Uranium One Group, part of the state corporation Rosatom, has a similar agreement with Bolivia. Awarding critical industry contracts to China and Russia signals Bolivia's intent to resist Washington’s influence, opening doors for Beijing and Moscow to strengthen their foothold in Latin America. A statement from the Chinese Foreign Ministry following Wang Yi's meeting with the Bolivian diplomat highlighted that China welcomed Bolivia as a new partner in BRICS. Trump vs. China Wang's statements were not just intended for impoverished Bolivia. Beijing is reaching out to Latin America, particularly leftist-led countries that have historically resisted Washington's dictates. This includes major nations like Brazil, Mexico, and Colombia, which collectively have nearly 400 million people—more than the combined populations of the U.S. and Canada. Newly appointed U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio made his first trip in office to Panama, attempting to "persuade" its government to cut ties with China and protect the Panama Canal from Chinese influence. After meeting with Rubio, Panamanian President Jose Raul Molino announced that Panama would not renew its participation in China's Belt and Road Initiative, an agreement nearing expiration. Thus, Central America unexpectedly became a focal point of global attention, placing these small, economically struggling nations in a position to choose between two superpowers. By appointing Rubio as Secretary of State, Trump underscored his commitment to Latin America. Rubio, from a Cuban exile family, speaks Spanish fluently and, as a U.S. senator, was a staunch opponent of Cuba, China, and anything remotely associated with communism and leftist ideologies. In other words, Rubio has a well-defined perspective on Latin America, politically, culturally, and in every other aspect. Rubio’s interest in Latin America and China aligns perfectly with Trump’s strategy of containing Beijing. While logic suggests that containment should occur near China's borders, Beijing has instead strengthened its presence near U.S. borders. Thus, Rubio must begin countering China in America's neighborhood, where the Asian superpower has gained significant ground by capitalizing on long-standing regional resistance to U.S. hegemony. Chinese Investments China is now South America's largest trading partner and is deeply involved in all aspects of the region's economy. Chinese investments span from basic trade to the construction of ports, roads, and railways, as well as ventures in communications, energy, and rare metals. In recent decades, Chinese weapons have also entered the region, and the Chinese diaspora continues to grow. Consequently, Chinese state-owned enterprises have become major investors in America's "backyard," causing unease in Washington. President Joseph Biden labeled China a "strategic competitor" in the Americas but did not focus much on the region. His presidency was dominated by the Russian invasion of Ukraine, leaving Latin America below the radar—an opportunity China seized. However, as the war in Ukraine winds down and Washington shifts focus to confronting China, Trump is expected to intensify engagement with America’s immediate neighbors. This explains his aggressive stance toward Mexico and Colombia, aiming to demonstrate his willingness to push back against China. Yet, this will not be an easy task. China’s rise in Latin America has been swift. Since joining the World Trade Organization in 2001, Beijing has deepened its ties with the region. At the start of the 21st century, less than 2% of Latin America's exports went to China; now, the figure has increased dozens of times for many nations. According to Chinese government data, trade between China and Latin America reached $450 billion, with projections to rise to $700 billion in the coming years. Trump's administration will focus on confronting China, and the Americas will be a key battleground. Numerous countries may face U.S. sanctions—Trump’s preferred foreign policy tool. Some nations are already under sanctions yet remain aligned with China, as Beijing has consistently kept its doors open whenever Washington has closed them. The article was previously published on PISJournal.net .

For weeks, the new U.S. administration has been questioning Washington’s previous policies while setting conditions for Europe and probing Russia for possible concessions. Photo: Volodymyr Zelensky and Donald Trump In Kyiv, those familiar with diplomatic history recall Henry Kissinger’s famous remark: "America has no permanent friends or enemies, only interests." Others remember reports that former UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson allegedly persuaded Kyiv to abandon a peace deal with Moscow early in the war. While Kissinger had varying views on alliances, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky recently denied Johnson’s involvement, insisting he made decisions independently. (In)experienced Politicians Zelensky, once a comedian, won the presidency promising peace, only to find himself at the heart of Europe's biggest geopolitical struggle. His lack of experience led him to trust one great power against the world’s largest nuclear state. Defending the more seasoned Johnson, he claimed sole responsibility for critical decisions—a statement that raises questions about his leadership. His decision-making remains a topic for historians and analysts, but his approach—such as reshuffling Ukraine’s military leadership amid elite conflicts—raises eyebrows. Meanwhile, the world watches how the U.S. and NATO, without the right to strategic errors, handle the war that supposedly defends European democracy and security. What does Taiwan think now? Biden’s departure marks the end of a strategic vision backed by hundreds of billions in military aid. While costly, it yielded successes. Trump's stance isn't surprising; he has repeatedly dismissed previous U.S. commitments. However, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte’s recent claim that Ukraine was never promised membership contradicts his earlier statements that Kyiv was closer than ever to joining. Trump’s Approach and Zelensky’s Fate With Trump’s return, Western leaders face a new reality. Trump openly declares that Ukraine must offer rare minerals and natural resources in exchange for U.S. support. His blunt rhetoric shatters the traditional Western narrative of "fighting for democracy and human rights," instead framing the war as a transaction. For Ukrainian soldiers, his words may sound like a call to abandon their fight. Yet, Trump isn’t solely responsible. Biden’s late 2023 decision allowing Ukraine to strike deep into Russian territory limited Trump’s leverage, as it escalated tensions and removed a potential bargaining chip. Now, Trump must either continue Biden’s policy or strike a deal with Moscow—one likely to disadvantage Ukraine and Europe. As Russian and U.S. representatives discuss Europe’s future, the continent must decide: Will it strengthen Trump’s negotiating power through further funding and arms purchases, or push for an independent European military strategy? Zelensky sees Denmark’s direct investment in Ukraine’s defense industry as a model, urging Europe to follow suit—without Washington. But does he have the backing of Ukraine’s political and military elite? For nearly two years, rumors have swirled that Zelensky is a burden for the West. Now, with Trump calling him a "dictator" and Putin questioning his legitimacy, his position is more fragile than ever. His vision of reclaiming all occupied territories seems increasingly distant—an idea no major Western leader considers realistic. This article was originally published on nap.ba .

On Sunday, Germany will hold the most important and uncertain election of this century. Never before has a single party had such a strong chance to change the existing system—with the backing of the world's most powerful nation. Photo: Alice Weidel The United States has had enormous influence over German politics since the end of World War II, partly due to its numerous military bases there. Moreover, what is known as American “soft power” has remained largely unquestioned in a country with a long and rich history of political and social thought. Germany, which has long looked to Washington—particularly the current government under the administration of Joseph Biden—has been in shock since Donald Trump’s return to the White House. The current U.S. administration believes that Berlin is pursuing the wrong policies. U.S. Vice President JD Vance claims that Germany is being destroyed by illegal migration and deindustrialization, while the world's richest man, Elon Musk, criticizes its bureaucracy, saying it is terrible based on his experience running a company there. Musk has stated that the “only hope” for Germany is the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD), which the government views as a radical right-wing party. A Tough Time for Polls Since the emergence of COVID-19, economic problems have become more evident. When the pandemic ended, the war in Ukraine began, causing a major shock to German companies. The largest economy in Europe lost access to cheap Russian energy and the vast Russian market, where German companies had long been thriving, due to sanctions imposed on Moscow over its aggression against Ukraine. Another issue has been brewing in the background—(il)legal migration to Germany, particularly since 2016. While the government in Berlin, along with many German media outlets, often dismissed any criticism of migration and accused critics of xenophobia, the issue has become increasingly important. Some frame it as a security concern, given the rise in attacks on citizens, while a few views it from an economic perspective—an influx of immigrants means cheaper labor. AfD has been Germany's loudest critic of migration, adding ideological and demographic concerns to security and economic arguments. The party has fueled fears among millions of Germans that their country is losing its identity. Given the mounting problems, it is no surprise that AfD is gaining strength, especially since other parties tend to approach these issues with “kid gloves.” To improve its image—since AfD is widely seen in Germany as an extreme right-wing party that has not distanced itself enough from Nazi heritage—the party has begun rebranding itself, following the example of Marine Le Pen in France. AfD’s co-leader, Alice Weidel, attempts to present its radical stances on migration, the European Union, NATO, and the euro as acceptable policies. She claims to be a liberal, citing former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher as her role model. The leader of the German right-wing party is in a relationship with a migrant of Sri Lankan origin, supports Israel, opposes setting a minimum wage in Germany, backs Trump, and calls for the deportation of certain migrants, especially Muslims. Speaking about the state of Germany and her same-sex relationship, she said: “I don't want to live in a society with a Muslim majority under Sharia law, where I could be thrown off a rooftop with a bag over my head.” Mainstream Parties Have No Answer Germany’s major parties largely have no response to AfD’s rising popularity. About fifteen months ago, there were discussions about banning the party through a court ruling, as suggested by its political rivals. Recent polls show AfD at around 20% support, just behind the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU), which has about 30%. Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s Social Democrats (SPD) and the ruling Greens each stand at around 15%. No other party is certain to pass the 5% threshold required to enter parliament. One major challenge for AfD is that all leading German parties have vowed not to form a coalition with them, meaning that even with significant public support, they may not be able to take power. However, Weidel has received backing from Musk, who has even addressed AfD rallies via video link. This week, Musk shared a post on his social network X in which a user asked, “Is it time for Germany to be liberated again?”—to which Musk responded, “Yes, seriously.” Last Friday, American support for AfD reached unprecedented levels. Vice President JD Vance met with Weidel after causing outrage—bringing some to tears—at the Munich Security Conference, where German hosts accused him of interfering in their elections. In his speech, Vance echoed AfD’s platform, particularly on migration. After the Elections As things stand, neither AfD nor any other party will have enough votes to form a government alone after Sunday’s election. The most likely outcome is another “grand coalition” between CDU/CSU and SPD, as last seen under Angela Merkel’s government. In that case, the chancellor would likely be the CDU’s leader, Friedrich Merz. However, if Germany's political elite excluded AfD from power, they could face backlash from the White House. This would be especially risky for Germany’s economy, as Trump has threatened tariffs and has leverage over energy prices. If German parties leave AfD in the opposition, it would mark Trump’s first major foreign policy defeat. That makes this election even more significant, as the new Berlin government will have to respond to Trump’s stance on Russia and Ukraine. In other words, forming Germany’s next government will also be a test of whether Europeans have the strength and willingness to stand up to Trump. Regardless of the election outcome, some policies will inevitably change. Migration is already high on the priority list. Many in Europe and the West have realized that keeping the doors wide open for immigrants is unsustainable, and they have been preparing for a policy shift for some time. Whether Germany will address the root causes of migration or just its consequences remains unclear. It would be absurd to expect the continued destruction of the Middle East and Africa while shutting the doors to those who have lost everything there. As discussions about the displacement of people from Gaza continue, a parallel debate about censorship is unfolding in Germany. Former Greek Finance Minister Yanis Varoufakis, through his political project, reports on social media that while mainstream media remain silent, German police have been disrupting events featuring Francesca Albanese, the UN Special Rapporteur on the Occupied Palestinian Territories, who speaks about Palestinian suffering. “Totalitarianism has returned to Germany even before AfD has won,” Varoufakis wrote on X. Germany’s stance on Palestine and Israel mirrors the position of Joseph Biden and Kamala Harris, as well as the response of Muslim voters and liberals who previously supported the Democrats. Many of them backed Trump or simply refused to vote for Harris. One of the key questions in this German election is the turnout of immigrants with voting rights. Managing Germany’s political landscape has become increasingly difficult. Problems are mounting, and external influence—both direct and loud, as in the case of Vance and Musk, and indirect and quiet, through those who have migrated to Germany—is growing. Any development in this election would not be surprising, including the possibility of the results being annulled, as happened in Romania a few months ago. Everything points to significant reforms awaiting the new German government, regardless of who formed it. Some of these measures may not even be mentioned during the election campaign, but they will inevitably be implemented. The course Germany’s next government takes will heavily influence the direction of the rest of Europe. This article was previously published on the news portal nap.ba .

In the past few days, several public figures, commenting on Trump's moves and his policies, have said almost the same thing – we are only at the beginning of his term, and we have four years left. Photo: Donald Trump The return of Donald Trump to the White House is seen as a disaster by many politicians in Europe. Long before the U.S. presidential elections, the majority of European leaders supported Joseph Biden, and after his withdrawal from the race, they backed Kamala Harris. Three weeks into Trump's new term, it has become clear why they held such a stance. In Europe, where the majority of U.S. allies are located, many would likely say the same if they were not afraid of the White House's reaction. This is especially true for officials of the European Union, which Trump has never shown much respect for. During his first term, there was a notorious conversation with Angela Merkel, where he repeatedly asked the Chancellor to sign a trade deal between Washington and Berlin, to which she responded that it was only possible with the European Union, of which Germany is a member. The first to respond to the new U.S. president's policies should be Estonian politician and EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Kaja Kallas. The fact that there is no confirmation that Trump and Kallas have spoken since his return to power speaks volumes about how much he values her opinions. Meanwhile, Trump has already spoken with Russian President Vladimir Putin. The case of Denmark, a long-time ally of Washington, also shows that Trump does not prioritize small European countries. In the early days of his term, Trump threatened the EU and NATO members, demanding they hand over Greenland or face potential military and economic measures. Aligning with Trump Such a stance from Trump towards Europe was expected. Trump is well aware that Europe depends on Washington, while European allies sometimes act as if this is not the case. This primarily concerns European security, which Washington takes care of, while Europeans refuse to fulfill their NATO obligations of allocating two percent of their GDP to defense. During his first term, Trump reminded Europeans of their obligations and threatened not to defend them for free. This prompted action, and during his and Biden's terms, almost all countries have met the required defense spending. However, this is not enough, as most European armies, by their admission, are not ready for war. Polish President Andrzej Duda, who maintained communication with Trump even when facing potential jail time in U.S. courts, spoke this summer about allocating at least three percent of GDP to defense. Now, some are even talking about five percent, gauging public opinion. Massive military investment by European allies could soften Trump, especially given his threats to impose tariffs, as the U.S. economy has a trade deficit with Europe. Such investment would not necessarily mean war. There are similar examples elsewhere in the world. For instance, some wealthy Arab monarchies buy weapons they will never use, while the U.S. guarantees their security. Such examples were also noted during Trump's first term. Purchasing weapons from the United States gives Trump significant leverage regarding Russia and the war in Ukraine. It is not hard to imagine that Trump would agree to continue arming Ukraine, directly or indirectly, if European allies were to foot the bill. Musk's Hammer But Europe's problems with Trump do not end there. The world's richest man, Elon Musk, has been waging an ideological war against some European countries for months. Musk, whom Trump's critics call the "real" U.S. president, has recently targeted the United Kingdom and Germany. The former is a nuclear power outside the EU, while the latter is the economic engine of the Union and a country with significant influence from the Baltic to Turkey. Musk is particularly bothered by some positions of the modern left, which he sees as disconnected from their roots. He targets illegal migrants and transgender policies, which he called "neo-Marxism" in an October 2022 interview. Earlier this year, he shared a post by J.K. Rowling on social media platform X, where she wrote that "gender ideology has undermined free speech, scientific truth, gay rights, and the safety, privacy, and dignity of women and girls." Musk commented on the lengthy post with "Absolutely." Musk's ideological war with Europeans, after taking on the policies of U.S. Democrats, also has a personal touch. The issue of (il)legal migration is at the core of his success, as he is an immigrant to the U.S. and employs experts from around the world in his companies, which some criticize as a way to pay workers less. Additionally, his son Alexander has transitioned and now, as Vivian Jenna Wilson, refuses to have contact with him. For weeks, Musk has been targeting British Prime Minister Keir Starmer, accusing him of protecting gangs of rapists, mostly of migrant origin, during his time as a prosecutor. Musk claims that Starmer is protecting illegal immigrants in the UK, preventing their deportation, and introducing censorship in public spaces. In one of his many posts about Starmer on X, Musk asked his followers in a poll, "Should America free the British people from their tyrannical government?" Musk's target is also the current German government. Despite having a significant company in Germany, Musk is dissatisfied with the government there. Yesterday, he posted on X that "AfD is the only hope for Germany." In recent weeks, he has supported the Alternative for Germany (AfD) in various ways, even addressing their rallies, as they prepare for general elections while other parties refuse to cooperate with them. Trump's Strategic Advantage and the Lack of European Leadership Those who study Trump's moves say that the U.S. president often makes statements to improve his negotiating position. In other words, Trump sometimes bluffs. But in the case of Europe, he may not need to, as the old continent is now even more dependent on the United States than before. This is especially true for Germany. Since the start of Russia's aggression against Ukraine, Europeans have been cutting energy ties with Moscow, making themselves dependent on the U.S. and its more expensive liquefied natural gas. On this issue, Trump has both Moscow and Brussels in a passive position. If he wants to impose new sanctions on Russian energy and if Europeans follow as allies, the price of oil and gas will rise. At the same time, Trump has ordered increased oil and gas extraction across the U.S., disregarding environmental standards that the previous administration sometimes upheld. Thus, Washington can now dictate oil and gas prices, with no guarantee that prices won't rise, potentially leading to inflation across the EU, particularly in Germany. Europeans fell into this double trap by aligning with Biden against Russia, assuming that Washington would always have the same stance towards Europe. Now that ties with Russia are severed, rebuilding them would cost the current European leadership their political careers. But even for better relations with Russia, European unity is a prerequisite, which under Trump will not exist if it means opposing his policies. The aforementioned Duda, Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, Austria's Freedom Party, Spain's Vox, and France's National Front... are just some of Trump's admirers. This unification on the new right has been acknowledged by Argentine President Javier Milei, who, along with some of the aforementioned, included himself and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in the same group. All of them, Milei says, stand with Trump. For all European politicians who disagree with Trump, there is a way out of this blind alley as a battle plan that must be fought without knowing the outcome until the very end. The idea of a common European defense without Washington's involvement, for example, advocated by France's Emmanuel Macron, will once again be relevant in the coming period, as will questions about relations with China, international trade, the development of modern technologies, access to energy and rare metals, and the development of artificial intelligence... This plan might be more achievable in another generation of European politicians. However, Europe has long lacked politicians of the caliber of Helmut Kohl, Jacques Chirac, or Margaret Thatcher. But if Musk is right and the "only hope" for Germany, and consequently for Europe, lies with those he supports, then Europe has little to hope for in a clash with Trump and the billionaires behind him. This article was previously published on the news portal nap.ba .

February brought optimism to the residents of Lebanon as a government was finally formed and a president was elected earlier. On the other side of the world, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu brought a gift to U.S. President Donald Trump, which The Independent described as "morbid." Photo: Newly elected Lebanese government The formation of the Lebanese government took months. The story became particularly relevant after the ceasefire between Hezbollah and Israel, when Nawaf Salam was appointed prime minister and tasked with forming a government. Some believed that this was the right moment to reshape Lebanon's political landscape, as Hezbollah had lost its leader, Hassan Nasrallah, and a number of officials. The goal was to eliminate Hezbollah as a significant factor in Lebanon's political life, with Beirut promised aid in return. Such an offer implies that Lebanon is the focus of larger states, and no one is hiding it. The United States and France have promised financial and military aid, Saudi Arabia investments in Lebanon, and neighboring Israel peace if Hezbollah, supported by Iran, is removed from power. American and Israeli Interests The U.S. has backed Israel for decades, regardless of what Tel Aviv does. But just last year, Washington tried to maintain a semblance of neutrality in mediating between Lebanon and Israel. With Trump's return to power, Washington has shed formalities—Israeli interests are now American interests. On Friday, Lebanese President Joseph Aoun, a Christian, was visited by U.S. Deputy Special Envoy for the Middle East Morgan Ortagus. Unlike her boss, Special Envoy Steve Witkoff, who, like his predecessor Amos Hochstein, tried to maintain diplomatic protocol, Ortagus has no brakes. Lebanese media, especially those close to Hezbollah, reacted angrily after Ortagus stated that the entry of the Shiite party into the new government was a "red line" for the United States. Additionally, she wore a ring shaped like a six-pointed star, known as the Star of David, a clear reference to her adopted Judaism during her mission in Baghdad. Photo: The gift Trump received from Netanyahu In other words, she publicly pressured the Lebanese to ensure Hezbollah would not be part of the new government, exactly as Netanyahu had demanded. France, for example, issued a much milder statement, calling for all parties to focus on reconstruction and reforms in Lebanon while respecting its diversity. However, the Lebanese had different plans from Ortagus, given the balance of power and the fact that, according to unwritten rules, Shiites hold a significant share of power in one of the world's most complicated political systems, with Shiites making up about a third of Lebanon's population. After her statement, Hezbollah supporters blocked the road she was supposed to travel on. The New Government Nawaf Salam faced an extremely difficult task of reconciling the interests of domestic and foreign actors in Lebanon. This specifically meant that he had to secure support from the Lebanese parliament, led by Shiite politician Nabih Berri, head of the Amal party, an ally of Hezbollah. Berri has been the contact person between Hezbollah leadership and Western envoys since the start of the war with Israel. Thus, Sunni Prime Minister Salam, with the consent of others, formed his cabinet with 24 ministers, five of whom were Shiites. Hezbollah and Amal appointed four, including the very important finance minister, while Salam appointed the fifth. This development has been variously commented on in Lebanon, with some claiming that Hezbollah suffered a defeat, while others argued that it had extracted the maximum under the circumstances. Some say that the Shiites and Hezbollah have lost a third of their seats in the government for the first time and the ability to block decisions and that some Shiite ministers are aligned with the West, concluding that this is a result of the weakening of the Shiite movement and official Tehran after the war with Israel. Others argue that Hezbollah got what it wanted—a breather for reorganization. Indeed, after the fall of Bashar al-Assad's regime, Hezbollah must undergo transformation, turn into local forces, and seek new supply channels from Iran, as the new government in Damascus does not allow this to continue through Syria. Additionally, Hezbollah is seeking the reconstruction of Shiite community homes, as the Israeli army targeted these sites, even as its withdrawal from southern Lebanon is expected. Ceasefire Expires, Netanyahu Sends a Message to Trump The ceasefire agreed upon by Hezbollah and Israel expired at the end of January and was unilaterally extended by Israel, under Western pressure, until February 18. Israel has repeatedly violated the ceasefire. Dozens of civilians attempting to return to their homes in southern Lebanon were killed, Shiite-populated areas were bombed, and the Lebanese army was prevented from reaching the border. Hezbollah, however, did not fall into the trap and refrained from responding to the attacks. But Netanyahu wants war and does not hide it, believing he is on the path to creating a "new Middle East." During his recent visit to Trump, he gifted him a golden pager. The British Independent called this act "morbid." The golden pager, inscribed with "press with both hands," is an allusion to the operation against Hezbollah, in which dozens, including children, were killed and hundreds wounded. In Lebanon, some were particularly angry because the pager was placed on a tree stump, which they believe was an olive tree. Olive branches are a symbol of peace, and the olive tree often symbolizes the presence of a people in a certain territory, as some trees grow for hundreds of years. Palestinians and residents of southern Lebanon see the olive tree as a metaphor for their presence and survival, and the Israeli army has sometimes destroyed these trees for various reasons. "To President Donald J. Trump, our greatest friend and greatest ally. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu," reads the gift brought to Washington. A source told The Telegraph that Trump responded upon receiving it: "It was a great operation." The Lebanese Puzzle What will happen in the region can be guessed if the ceasefires in Lebanon and the Gaza Strip collapse and if Netanyahu does not get what he wants. Trump has already approved Israel for a new arms sale worth more than seven billion dollars, and some media report that the new administration, after decades of refusal, is ready to deliver eleven tons of a heavy bomb known as MOAB (Mother of All Bombs), intended for destroying fortifications, which would be a message to Iran and Hezbollah, whose leader was killed when his bunker was reportedly hit with eighty tons of explosives. While waiting to see what Netanyahu and Trump will do, Salam must reform Lebanon, initiate reconstruction, and prepare the country for elections next year. The main thing Trump and Netanyahu will be watching is the status of Hezbollah, specifically whether and to what extent the group will disarm. All parties refer to United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701 from 2006 and interpret it differently, especially the part about who has the right to bear arms in southern Lebanon. At yesterday's meeting of the Lebanese government, this was one of the topics. The text, which is supposed to become the government's position, states that the state has a "monopoly on weapons," meaning that the Lebanese army, trained and supported by the U.S., is responsible for the country's security. The text does not mention "resistance," a reference to Shiite militias. According to Al-Akhbar, Amal and Hezbollah persuaded Prime Minister Salam to include Article 51 of the UN Charter, which emphasizes the "inherent right to individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations, until the Security Council takes measures necessary to maintain international peace and security." This is a continuation of the dispute over what Hezbollah will look like in the future, which is being prepared, as announced, for the historic moment of Hassan Nasrallah's funeral with participants from 79 countries on February 23 in Beirut. Tens of thousands of people are expected to take to the streets of Beirut that day, confirming that Hezbollah leads Lebanese Shiites, who, many warn, are now in fear and more reliant on each other after Nasrallah's assassination and the fall of Assad in Syria. Hezbollah-affiliated media these days highlight that Nabih Berri told Morgan Ortagus at a meeting on Friday, "Israel is absolute evil," and that everyone must adhere to Resolution 1701, especially the part that demands Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon. At the same time, Hezbollah's rivals in Lebanon express hope that the party's dominance in Lebanon has ended and that a time of stability is coming. But both sides are aware that a small country like Lebanon, located amid regional tremors on the Iran-Israel-Saudi Arabia-West axis, will not decide its fate. On the border between Lebanon and Syria, clashes between local groups and smugglers were reported this week, Trump is developing a plan to resettle Palestinians from the devastated Gaza Strip and develop tourism there, and Netanyahu is pushing him into a confrontation with Iran. Thus, Lebanon is simultaneously very close to both a new war and a period of stability. This article was previously published on the portal nap.ba

The return of Donald Trump to power in the United States continues to be a major topic in media worldwide. On the agenda of the unpredictable president is once again Iran, a responsibility imposed on him by those who helped him come to power. Photo: Illustration If someone were to ask Donald Trump, away from television cameras, why Iran is the subject of his interest and what exactly bothers him about Tehran's policies, they would likely receive no answer. The newly elected president would struggle to find a strong argument that the policies of this Asian country contradict the positions he advocates. Let's list just a few examples that Trump's supporters tend to ignore, likely to avoid raising the question of why the newly elected president of the world's greatest power is bothered by Iran. This would inevitably open the question of why he is so determined to focus on a country on the other side of the world, which over the past eight years has gone from being interested in communication with Trump to issuing an arrest warrant for him, to completely rejecting any contact with him. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei wrote on the social network X on Friday that "there should be no negotiations with a government like the United States," targeting Washington's failure to adhere to agreements. This particularly applies to Trump, who destroyed the Tehran agreement with major powers on Iran's nuclear program at the beginning of his first term. For decades, Washington and Tehran have had almost no diplomatic relations and mostly communicate through weapons and intermediaries. Trade, which has been Trump's obsession since the beginning of his second term, does not exist between the United States and Iran. Iran has no ambition to camp on American borders, and Trump wants to withdraw American troops from missions around the world. Similarly, when discussing the ideological basis of the policies of the two sides, assuming Trump adheres to any ideology, the conservative values that Trump wants to reimpose in the United States have not been questioned in Iran for almost half a century. Thus, Trump's isolationist policies and economic model based on achieving a trade surplus with other countries should keep Iran out of his interest. Yet, Trump has been dealing with Iran since his first day in the White House. It is clear that someone for whom Iran is much more important than Trump, who is working to isolate the United States to avoid involvement in other parts of the world unless it brings profit, is pushing Trump in this direction. From sanctions to sanctions Trump's first term was also marked by his policy towards Iran. Trump entered into dangerous confrontations with Iran at least three times. First, he withdrew the U.S. from the aforementioned nuclear agreement, then imposed heavy sanctions on Iran, and finally brought the two countries to the brink of war, with American troops in Iraq under attack by American missiles, when he ordered the assassination of General Qasem Soleimani in Baghdad. The famous Iranian general was planning to meet with Iraqi Prime Minister Adil Abdul-Mahdi. On that occasion, the leader of the Popular Mobilization Forces, Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, was also killed. The mentioned Shia militia, later largely integrated into Iraq's military and security system, is one of the most deserving of the defeat of ISIL. In addition to the three aforementioned acts targeting Iranian diplomacy, economy, and military, Trump prevented Iran and Russia, along with the Syrian army, from bringing large parts of the country and its oil fields under Damascus' control. Later, Trump said that American troops were in Syria to control oil fields, prompting then-Syrian President Bashar al-Assad to "praise" him as the best American president in history for telling the truth about what he was doing. Trump also began his new term with sanctions against Iran. Last week, Trump sanctioned, according to agencies, a network of Iranian companies and individuals transporting Iranian oil to China. This symbolic move, since, for example, the company Sepehr Energy was sanctioned by then-President Joseph Biden at the end of 2023 and now again by Trump, is not typical of the current president's policy. Without fanfare, Trump imposed sanctions on an already sanctioned company, then stated that Iran must not have a nuclear bomb and that he wants negotiations with Tehran and peace in the Middle East. Before and after that, Trump threatened "maximum pressure" on Iran, essentially announcing a return to his policy from his first term. The fact that Trump wants negotiations with Tehran and openly says so, which he refused in his first term, is an important moment. He is now simultaneously extending a hand to Iran and threatening financial sanctions, preparing the ground for his next moves, and improving his negotiating positions while threatening the harshest financial measures at his disposal. Last week, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was in Washington, undoubtedly the main reason why Trump is dealing with Iran again. The new round of sanctions was a kind of gift to the guest who has long advocated military intervention against Iran. Netanyahu knows that Israel cannot successfully carry this out without direct American military support. What Trump and Netanyahu discussed behind closed doors is not known to the public, but what the American president said in front of cameras certainly did not please his guests. In a verbal exchange with a journalist, Trump even claimed that Iran is militarily strong, and before and after that, he called for the mentioned talks and expressed his intention not to allow Tehran to have nuclear weapons. In this regard, it should also be noted that Iran has repeatedly said it does not want to build a nuclear bomb, and that part of the American media, before Netanyahu's visit, "prepared the ground" with articles, published as needed for decades, claiming that Iran is a few months away from producing such a weapon. Trump has not publicly said he will undertake a military operation against Iran, which he has not ruled out in the case of Panama, or even Denmark—an American ally in NATO—over Greenland, which he claims is important for American national security, or in the case of the displacement of Palestinians from the Gaza Strip. Iran's Stance The media have reported, and both sides have sometimes denied, that Trump's administration contacted the Iranian leadership immediately after his electoral victory in the presidential race last November. In this context, even Elon Musk, the richest man in the world, was mentioned, whom some of Trump's critics these days call the "president" of the United States to show his real power in the new presidential administration. On the other hand, since Trump's return to the White House, Iran has conducted military exercises and then shown the public secret underground bases filled with missiles, and tunnels hiding the capabilities of its navy. Finally, Iran presented to the world a drone carrier and new missiles and air defense systems. Tehran also said they have purchased modern Russian Sukhoi Su-35 aircraft, without giving details on the number or whether they have been put into service by the Iranian military. It seems that Iran has decided to show Trump that the country has the strength to wage war, and Ayatollah Khamenei's stance on negotiations with Washington indicates that they are not ready to agree to new tricks and are seeking guarantees that they will not negotiate only for the other side to withdraw from the agreement again. There is no doubt that Trump does not shy away from using the military and any other force. After all, that is what Netanyahu expects from him in the case of Iran. This should not be overlooked, especially since Trump is building an image of a leader without limits. But more important is the fact that Trump has the same capabilities as Biden, and in that regard, nothing has changed in the twenty days of his presidency. This is clear to both Tehran and Washington, and the balance of power is more or less the same as before. What is even more important in this strategic maneuvering between Washington and Tehran is the fact that in the past four years, the world has undergone numerous changes, and American rivals are more connected than ever. The integration of the payment systems of Iran and Russia, for example, illustrates this new world, as does the fact that the number of Chinese and other companies and individuals sanctioned by the United States is increasing, meaning that some of them naturally turn to those who reject these sanctions. New Middle East or Old Balance of Power? Hamas's attack on Israel on October 7, 2023, changed the Middle East. The direct consequences were the ousting of Assad from power in Damascus, the assassination of the leader of Lebanon's Shia Hezbollah, Hassan Nasrallah, a double direct attack by Iran on Israel, and one in the opposite direction, the rise of Yemen's Houthis as a regional factor, and the suffering of Palestinians that led Netanyahu and other Israeli officials to international manhunts and pillars of shame around the world. Netanyahu, however, does not stop. His army has occupied parts of Lebanon and important parts of Mount Hermon in Syria. He believes that the next target should be Iran and that now is the time to do it. However, Israel cannot defeat Iran alone. An Israeli attack on Iran showed that it can strike, but that is not enough for a strategic defeat. The double Iranian attack on Israel, defended by the United States and several of its Arab allies, was a moment that irreversibly shook Netanyahu's rule and shattered the myth that Tel Aviv could not be the target of an attack. Netanyahu repeats that Israel has a historic opportunity to create a "new Middle East." The consequences of this stance are Israel's behavior in the Gaza Strip, Lebanon, and Syria. Victories along Israel's borders could be a sufficient reason to continue such a policy in the coming period, counting on the fact that in politics, there can always be a turnaround. But if the conflict between Iran and Israel continues in this way, without direct American military involvement, it could last a long time and, as before, have ups and downs for both sides. (Pro-)Iranian forces and Israel have exchanged heavy blows in recent years, but neither has been strong enough to bring the other to its knees. Trump can now choose between continuing sanctions against Iran, direct military conflict with the participation of Israel and perhaps some Arab regimes, or attempting to reach at least a tacit agreement with Tehran on what the Middle East will look like in the coming years. Knowing Trump's history of choosing possible solutions, it would not be surprising if, even with the best intentions, he chooses the worst, whether for the United States and Israel, or Iran, or the entire Middle East. Netanyahu will push Trump towards escalating relations with Iran. These days, Netanyahu stated that Tel Aviv has found the greatest friend in the White House ever, and the biographies of the people Trump has surrounded himself with suggest that this is probably the most Israel-friendly administration in history. Trump certainly has in mind that any prolonged military conflict with Iran would lead to scenarios like Iraq and Afghanistan, which he has repeatedly cited as reasons for the decline of American power. Iran's show of strength does not please him, as it should be remembered that the announcements of tough measures against Mexico and Colombia, made about ten days ago after their response, were changed into a good-neighborly conversation about real problems. In other words, Trump is not immune to resistance and preserving the image of a man who does not lose battles. And that is the crux of the problem that Trump has with Iran and Iran with Trump. All the moves Trump can make are known to Iran and its allies, just as all the cards Tehran is counting on are known to Washington. In such circumstances, entering into open conflict is preceded by a calculation of how much it will cost each side and then the question of whether each side is willing to pay that price. Trump does not have a magic wand to change this, so an analysis of the conflict with Iran would lead him to the same conclusion reached by George W. Bush, Barack Obama, and Joseph Biden. However, if he achieves a sustainable agreement with Iran, to the satisfaction of both sides, it will set him apart from his predecessors. In that case, many worldwide would applaud him, but it would likely mean a break with Netanyahu's policy. This article was previously published on PISJournal.net .

The Gaza Strip is a place of destruction, a "hellhole," a place where everything is destroyed and life is impossible, Trump conveyed, among other things, to Netanyahu. Photo: Benjamin Netanyahu and Donald Trump Two days ago, during a visit by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, the President of the United States, Donald Trump, shocked the world and surprised only those who did not want to see it – there is a plan to relocate Palestinians from the Gaza Strip under the guise of concern for their safety. The Gaza Strip is a place of destruction, a "hellhole," a place where everything is destroyed and life is impossible, Trump conveyed, among other things, to Netanyahu, who was smiling and who is the main culprit for why that piece of territory is exactly as the American president described it. The United Nations has estimated that there are fifty million tons of rubble in the Gaza Strip and that it will take over twenty years and more than a billion dollars to remove it. Trump did not criticize his guest, who is on an international warrant for crimes in the Gaza Strip, but at one point even held a chair for him as he tried to sit down. The American president said he is ready to send American troops to take over the Gaza Strip, clear the rubble, turn it into a tourist destination, and "create thousands and thousands of jobs." Who is Running the United States? This performance by Trump towards his guest did not go without criticism from his supporters. On social media, they expressed their disappointment, seeing it as a departure from Trump's proclaimed "America First" policy. Others noted that Trump is returning favors to the pro-Israel lobby in the United States for the help they provided him during his campaign. Returning favors in the American political system is not new. Everyone has the right to lobby as long as it is transparent. Politicians are expected to represent the views of those who paid them or helped them in other ways. For decades, powerful Israeli, Armenian, Albanian, and other lobbies have been successfully operating there. But even in such circumstances, Trump's calls for the ethnic cleansing of two million people sound like a conspiracy theory. It is no secret that the current American administration is filled with pro-Israeli officials like never before, which likely led Netanyahu to conclude that Israel has never had a greater friend in the White House than President Trump. What Trump said on Tuesday, Netanyahu did not say. Even for him, it is too much to say that he intends to expel millions of people from their land after their homes, roads, schools, hospitals, water systems, religious buildings, and water sources have been destroyed in bombings... A day later, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, who for many represents the voice of reason in Trump's administration because he upholds known tenets of American policy, tried to fix things. From Guatemala, he conveyed that Trump meant temporary relocation of the population, as otherwise, reconstruction could not begin, adding that the president's offer to the Palestinians was a "generous move" and that they would return to their homes. An Elephant in a China Shop or a Saboteur? Trump's unprecedented performance and Rubio's subsequent attempt to justify the president revealed to the world that a plan to relocate Palestinians exists. With his statement, Trump showed the world that there is a plan to relocate Palestinians and that accordingly, we can conclude that the reason there is no Palestinian state lies in the circles from which Netanyahu comes. Former minister and Netanyahu's coalition partner Itamar Ben-Gvir, who has spoken about this before, did not hide his enthusiasm for Trump's statements. Netanyahu described Trump's call for the de facto ethnic cleansing of the Gaza Strip as "thinking outside the box with fresh ideas." If we accept Rubio's explanation of Trump's good intentions, then the American president has exposed a policy in front of millions of people. Trump has shown that the blame lies on the Israeli side and that the authorities in Tel Aviv do not want the formation of a Palestinian state. Some have concluded that Trump's "strong" statements are just preparing the ground for negotiations and that this is his style, as he has shown recently in relations with Panama, Canada, Mexico, and Denmark. If that is the case, then Trump acted like an "elephant in a china shop," showing ignorance of international politics and revealing the criminal intentions of his allies and his administration, or perhaps he is a cold-blooded saboteur of Netanyahu's policy. In support of this dilemma, let's cite two examples related to Trump's political style. Preparing for Netanyahu's visit, part of the American media rehashed a story several decades old – Iran is a few months away from a nuclear bomb. Then Trump conveyed that Tehran must not have a nuclear bomb and said he wants to see Iran as a "great and successful" country, proposing negotiations and a "great Middle Eastern celebration" in case of an agreement. The second example is an ironic praise of such an approach to politics. Former Syrian President Bashar al-Assad said during Trump's first term that he is the best American president ever because he is honest. Shortly before, Trump had stated that he sent American troops to eastern Syria to control the oil fields there. These days, numerous media reported, that the Israeli army is destroying Palestinian homes in the West Bank, in territory never ruled by Hamas, and Trump is imposing sanctions on the International Criminal Court, which has issued an international warrant for Netanyahu. What Trump and the United States will do shortly in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank is currently unknown. But what is certain is that Trump's management of the White House will leave serious consequences for America's reputation in the world, even among allies, and subsequently, consequences for American political, economic, and other interests around the world. This article was previously published on the news portal nap.ba .

In just a few days, the Chinese company DeepSeek wiped out billions of dollars in value from its American competitors. The backdrop of this story parallels the space race between Washington and Moscow during the Cold War, and its implications could be felt for decades across the globe. Photo: Illustration The importance of artificial intelligence (AI) grows every day. Advanced technologies are changing the world, and AI's development is said to render humans almost unnecessary. Therefore, mastering these technologies is the ultimate goal of the world's major powers, as without AI, it will be impossible to envision the future of, for example, the economy or the military. There is no longer any doubt that China is the United States' greatest rival. American strategists and officials, in both public statements and government documents, assert that China is the only rival capable of defeating the U.S. on ideological, economic, and technological fronts. Such assessments from Washington have not applied to Russia for decades. The U.S.-China showdown has begun. President Barack Obama advocated it, and Donald Trump, during his first term, initiated sanctions against Chinese tech giants. Joseph Biden continued this with regulations preventing Chinese companies from accessing the best American chips, while Trump, in his second term, launched Stargate—a mega AI project worth at least $500 billion—aimed at ensuring the U.S. remains the leading power in technology. China's Response Although the Chinese government encourages its population to contribute to national development with new ideas, some moves can be attributed solely to the government, despite claims to the contrary. The public's introduction to the details of the relatively small company DeepSeek coincided with Trump's rise to power. Slightly earlier, DeepSeek's AI Assistant app was released and quickly became the top-rated free app on Apple's App Store, surpassing the competing ChatGPT. The development of the app cost €5.2 million, which is 95% cheaper than its competitor OpenAI, or 100 times cheaper than the chatbot ChatGPT. Behind the company is entrepreneur Liang Wenfeng, born in 1985, a student at a Chinese university who, in 2021, began purchasing chips from the American company Nvidia and founded DeepSeek two years later. The market value drop of Nvidia following DeepSeek's emergence was the largest in the history of the U.S. stock exchange. Using older types of chips—since the newer versions used by American companies were banned from export to China by Biden—Liang Wenfeng shook the U.S. stock markets, and tech giants, and prompted Trump to suggest that American scientists should spend less money on AI. Billions of dollars were wiped off the value of companies on U.S. stock exchanges, and Trump's donor, advisor, and investor Marc Andreessen wrote on social media platform X that this was a "Sputnik moment" in the world of AI, referring to the shock in Washington when the Soviet Union launched a satellite into Earth's orbit. Those who tested DeepSeek alongside American competitors said the Chinese model performed better in solving complex problems, coding, and mathematics. Additionally, DeepSeek requires significantly fewer resources than its competitors, including the number of chips, energy consumption, and the learning and training process. Considering that the U.S. has spent billions of dollars and brought in experts from around the world for years, China's achievement is even more impressive. Liang Wenfeng is not the only Chinese contender. According to available data, there are at least four Chinese companies believed to have developed AI models comparable to leading American ones. Given China's secretive nature, it would not be surprising if there were many other, possibly more advanced, AI models being used by the state. Political Implications With DeepSeek, China has shown Washington that sanctions have not stopped it and that it is ready for new battles. The fact that this app is free, while some American apps charge $20 per month, is a significant point. People around the world, even in the poorest countries, now have an AI tool at their disposal. This means that DeepSeek will also improve through its learning from data collected from its global users. China has shaken Trump's inner circle. Some of his main supporters are from companies that lost hundreds of billions of dollars due to DeepSeek's launch. This act has led others to question whether spending so much on AI is justified, as the invested money might never be recouped. The money might not be recouped, but the influence gained by leading in this technology is an opportunity that major powers do not want to miss. Many authors believe that the mass application of modern technologies will forever change people's lives. Strategists in Washington have now realized that the U.S. is not the only one capable of such feats, as China has also challenged American tech giants that have shaped the world in recent years. What, for example, Russia could only dream of doing, China has been doing for years. Here are just a few examples. Huawei produces high-quality mobile phones, threatening Apple, while simultaneously becoming a leader in 5G technology. The Chinese electric vehicle manufacturer BYD has surpassed the American company Tesla in a short time. CATL lithium batteries, along with the aforementioned BYD, occupy over fifty percent of the global market, and six of the top ten companies on that list are Chinese. Chinese DJI drones are favored on both sides of the frontlines in the largest war of today (the war in Ukraine), and TikTok is incredibly popular in the United States. In recent years, China has transformed into a global technological power, combining economic strength with modern technologies. Examples include the success of companies like Alibaba, Temu, and Shein, advancements in space technology, and massive infrastructure projects both at home and around the world. Although many have warned about China's development for years, a large part of the American public has been preoccupied with other topics. The success of DeepSeek has shaken many. Trump was explicit that this is a challenge for American experts to work more and cheaper, meaning they need to redefine their plans. Some on social media have already speculated that Trump might force DeepSeek into compliance, as with TikTok, or simply ban the app and impose sanctions. There is no doubt that the United States will respond to this Chinese success, as will the largest American tech companies, which have no equal in the world in this field. Some of them have already suggested that DeepSeek may have taken their solutions without permission, but they will investigate the entire case. In an interview with Chinese media, Liang Wenfeng stated that China is one to two years behind American companies in AI development. Whether this is true is hard to assess, but there is no doubt that China is the only country currently capable of matching the United States in areas where the world's greatest power has dominated for decades. This article was previously published on the news portal nap.ba .

Protests in Serbia have been ongoing for months, with students and other dissatisfied citizens demanding that authorities investigate and prosecute those responsible for the collapse of a canopy at the Novi Sad Railway Station. However, Richard Grenell, a special envoy of Donald Trump, has voiced his disapproval of these demonstrations. Photo: Grenell and Vučić Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić has attempted to quell the protests through various political maneuvers, even as the movement gains momentum daily. Analysts in Serbia argue that the protests signal citizens have shed their fear of the regime and predict that public dissatisfaction will only grow. In another political move, Prime Minister Miloš Vučević and Novi Sad Mayor Milan Đurić resigned yesterday—two months after the incident. The delay suggests the reasons cited in their resignations are disingenuous. Critics note they could have stepped down immediately after the tragedy, as students never demanded resignations. Instead, protesters have called for accountability and concrete action. A day earlier, Richard Grenell, Trump’s envoy for special missions, took to social media platform X to criticize the protests. The U.S. official sided with Belgrade’s authorities, insinuating the student demonstrations were violent. Grenell’s support “It is always important to raise your voice and be heard. But everyone must condemn violence and adhere to peaceful demonstrations. The democratic process must be respected. We do not support those who undermine the rule of law or forcibly seize state institutions. If you disagree with a law or leader, work to replace them—do not resort to violence,” Grenell wrote, alongside a video of Serbia’s peaceful student protests. This stance drew backlash, particularly given that Grenell’s boss, Donald Trump, recently pardoned individuals involved in the deadly January 6, 2021, Capitol riot. Meanwhile, in Serbia, physical attacks on students—some resulting in serious injuries—have been reported before and after Grenell’s remarks. Students have been struck by cars, beaten with batons and fists, and smeared by pro-government media as “foreign mercenaries” aiming to destabilize Serbia. Grenell’s comments were met with outrage from parts of the Serbian public. Opposition figures and civil society leaders urged him not to meddle in Serbia’s internal affairs. Social media users on X also pushed back, with the platform’s community note adding that his claims were deemed misleading and that the protests were “the most peaceful in the past thirty years.” Grenell’s support for Vučić is unsurprising. Serbian media have extensively documented his close ties to the country’s political elite. What is concerning, however, is that Western officials continue to back their favored leaders regardless of their policies, even as they demand citizens pursue democracy and align the “Western Balkans” with the West. Support from Washington and Brussels The change of power in Washington seemed not to faze Vučić, as he had already secured investments with members of Trump’s family to prepare for such a scenario. Vučić has maintained support from both the U.S. and the European Union despite the consequences of his policies in Serbia, Kosovo, Montenegro, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. U.S. Ambassador Christopher Hill, part of the Biden administration, has been particularly vocal in his backing. Recent German media reports suggest official Berlin also stands behind Vučić, contingent on Serbia’s commitment to lithium mining near the Bosnian border. Critics warn that such projects will cause environmental disasters, further distancing Serbia and its neighbors from EU standards. Despite warnings that support for Vučić will leave Serbia and neighboring countries far from the European Union, the West refuses to alter its plans—all due to Serbia’s alleged distancing from Vladimir Putin’s Russia. The government’s treatment of the Serbian opposition guarantees the country will fail to meet democratic standards, while experts warn that lithium and other mineral extraction will trigger an environmental catastrophe, meaning even Serbia and its neighbors will fall short of EU benchmarks. Greneell's "Special Missions" Grenell, who previously served as Trump’s envoy for Kosovo-Serbia dialogue, may now leverage his new role to reengage in the Balkans. During his earlier tenure, he pressured Belgrade toward a form of recognition of Kosovo and pushed Kosovo’s Prime Minister Albin Kurti to accept the Community of Serbian Municipalities. Post-mandate, Grenell has remained close to Belgrade’s leadership—even receiving state honors—while using media appearances to defend Vučić and blame Kurti for regional tensions. If Ambassador Hill’s support for Vučić stemmed from the opposition’s disarray, Grenell’s backing could go further, fueled by personal ties and lucrative economic deals with Trump-era officials. This poses significant risks for Serbia and the region. A government entangled in personal and economic interests with foreign powers—while suppressing dissent and stifling political life—could have unpredictable consequences. In an era of escalating great-power rivalries and eroding international law, no small country needs a government that operates beyond public scrutiny, striking shadowy multimillion-dollar deals. Grenell’s support for Vučić in the clash with students hints at such a scenario. When Trump appointed Grenell as a special envoy, U.S. media speculated his focus would be Venezuela and North Korea. Yet his remarks on Serbia’s protests suggest other regions remain on his radar—and in the crosshairs of great-power politics. This article was previously published on the news portal nap.ba .

Donald Trump officially took office as U.S. President on Monday. Within just a few days, the new leader has made his intentions clear, confirming widespread concerns both domestically and internationally that his presidency will once again be defined by political turbulence and conflict. Photo: Donald Trump signs an executive order Donald Trump has officially returned to the White House, marking the beginning of a new era in American politics that will reverberate across the globe. Many have eagerly awaited his comeback, expecting him to pick up where he left off four years ago. However, the initial days of his presidency reveal a transformed Trump—a leader now aligned with some of America’s wealthiest elites, backed by billions in investments, and promising lower taxes in return. For Trump, who initially self-funded his first presidential campaign, this shift is significant. Once the hero of disaffected middle- and lower-class Americans, he has now become the champion of the ultra-wealthy, whose fortunes have grown exponentially while the middle class has eroded. In recent days, Trump has even made billions through cryptocurrency ventures. Power and Policy Trump’s grand return has been accompanied by bold declarations and media fanfare, especially as social media moguls and influential figures rally behind him. It appears that everything is in place for Trump to deliver on his promises. Yet, this optimism and the image of an all-powerful Trump may fade when faced with resistance. After all, if certain goals were achievable, the previous administration would have accomplished them. For instance, the Biden administration failed to resolve the war in Ukraine. While Washington’s strength remains unchanged under Trump, achieving political goals requires resources as well as willpower. To bypass lengthy and often meticulous legislative scrutiny, Trump has opted to implement policies through executive orders, a power granted by Article II of the Constitution. He has already issued dozens of orders, sparking political and legal battles. For example, he banned birthright citizenship, contradicting the 14th Amendment, prompting a group of Democratic governors to announce a legal challenge. Trump has repealed 78 of Biden’s executive orders, withdrawn the U.S. from the Paris Climate Agreement, left the World Health Organization, ended remote work for federal employees, halted new hiring except in the military and national security sectors, pardoned January 6 Capitol rioters, lifted Biden’s sanctions on Israeli settlers in the West Bank, declared a state of emergency at the Mexican border, deployed troops to block illegal migrants, authorized nationwide oil and gas drilling, designated Mexican cartels as terrorist organizations, reinstated Cuba on the list of state sponsors of terrorism, mandated recognition of only two genders (male and female), delayed the TikTok ban for 75 days, eased investments in AI and cryptocurrencies, and declassified documents related to the assassinations of John F. Kennedy, Robert Kennedy, and Martin Luther King Jr. Allies and Adversaries Trump has not stopped there. He has threatened allies worldwide to fulfill their obligations to Washington or face tariffs and other penalties. This warning particularly targets Canada but extends to other nations as well. Those relying on Washington’s predictability have noted the statements of long-time senator and current Secretary of State Marc Rubio. Speaking on U.S. relations with Brazil, which is strengthening ties with China, Rubio acknowledged that sanctions are becoming less effective. He predicted that Brazil and China would soon conduct trade in their national currencies, rendering dollar-based sanctions irrelevant. Trump’s special envoy, Richard Grenell, triumphantly announced on social media that “diplomacy is back,” signaling meetings with Venezuelan officials, a country under U.S. sanctions but rich in oil. Trump has previously expressed interest in Venezuela’s oil reserves, even suggesting military action against Caracas. Trump has also provoked Mexico by renaming the “Gulf of Mexico” the “Gulf of America” and threatening tariffs and mass deportations of migrants. After deploying troops to the border, Trump may demand that Mexico and Venezuela accept deported migrants. However, domestic resistance could complicate these plans. Economy and China: Isolation or Global Power? Trump believes that countering China requires strengthening the U.S. economy. He has urged countries to open manufacturing plants in the U.S. or face import tariffs. China remains an obsession for U.S. officials. Kurt Campbell, a deputy secretary in the Biden administration, called China “the most significant challenge in our history,” surpassing even the Cold War. This sentiment shapes U.S. policy, including the ongoing TikTok saga. While Trump initially sought to ban the app, he later opened a profile to reach young voters. Recently, he hinted at interest from wealthy investors in acquiring TikTok, though Chinese owners have resisted selling. The war in Ukraine complicates efforts to contain China. Trump campaigned on ending the conflict but has yet to deliver. Washington’s stance on Ukraine tests European allies, NATO’s relevance, and relations with Russia. European Union leaders have called for cooperation rather than unilateral moves from the U.S. While Trump leans toward economic isolationism, the U.S. cannot afford political isolation if it aims to remain the world’s leading power. The question is whether Trump can balance economic and political priorities effectively. It is hard to believe Trump will achieve all his goals, as he fell short in his first term. The cooler heads within the U.S. political elite will determine whether America remains a force others willingly follow or one they follow out of fear and lack of alternatives. This article was previously published on the news portal nap.ba .

For several days now, media outlets around the world have been trying to determine the winner of another round in the conflict between Israel and Hamas. However, other questions are far more important, such as what the future holds for Israel and Palestine, and why the latest round of fighting lasted nearly sixteen months. Photo: The Destruction Inside Gaza These days, often with a partisan tone, some media outlets and individuals are attempting to answer the question of who won the war in the Gaza Strip. Depending on which side they are closer to, their "verdict" leans in that direction. The truth is that Israel did not achieve what it had outlined at the beginning of the war on October 7, 2023, but it is also true that Hamas's attack was the prelude to the destruction of the Gaza Strip on a scale rarely seen elsewhere. The agreement to a ceasefire, and then to the exchange of people held in prisons, was perceived as a catastrophe by part of the Israeli public. Particularly vocal in condemning Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu were his far-right partners in the government. Bezalel Smotrich and Itamar Ben-Gvir, as expected, were the loudest. Smotrich, the Finance Minister, has threatened to bring down the government if Israel does not occupy the Gaza Strip. The Influence of Washington Even before assuming office in the White House, Donald Trump credited himself for the ceasefire that would be implemented in phases and which, as such, could always be violated. Joseph Biden credited his administration, although he acknowledged that Trump's team was also involved in the negotiations. This sudden agreement, when everything on the ground suggested that a ceasefire would not happen, was expected if we look back at the history of U.S. presidential inaugurations and the conflicts between Israel and Hamas, or conflicts in the Middle East in general. Let us cite two examples. When Ronald Reagan took office on January 20, 1981, after defeating the incumbent President Jimmy Carter in the elections, Iran released 66 hostages it had held for 444 days. Barack Obama assumed office on January 20, 2009, and Israel began withdrawing its troops from the Gaza Strip the day before after over 1,200 Palestinians had been killed there. Thus, there is no doubt that Netanyahu was forced into a ceasefire and that the pressure came from Washington, the only entity capable of exerting such influence on Tel Aviv. Without the world's greatest power backing it, Israel would have significantly less strength. In this context, let us cite the statement of Ben Saul, a United Nations expert on human rights, who said in December that "Germany and the United States supply 99% of the weapons exported to Israel," adding that these two countries could "overnight" stop the war in the Gaza Strip. That people have been dying needlessly in Israel, the Gaza Strip, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen is also evidenced by the words of Qatari Prime Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani, who told Sky News on Friday that the agreement reached was essentially the same as the one from December 2023 and that "thirteen months were lost negotiating details that have no significance and are not worth a single life lost in Gaza or a single hostage life lost due to bombing." It is worth recalling that Qatar, along with Egypt and the United States, mediated the negotiations between Israel and Hamas, and leaders of this Palestinian group have resided in this Arab country for years. Tallying the Damage Until the public is informed of what happened behind closed doors in the aforementioned negotiations, let us only mention some of this war's consequences. In Hamas's attack on Israel, around 1,200 people were killed, and hundreds were taken hostage. The Gaza Strip has been leveled to the ground, and reports indicate that nearly every structure has been damaged or destroyed, with the scale of destruction wrought by the Israeli army compared to the effects of the atomic bombs dropped on Japan. Over 47,000 Palestinians have been killed, and over 110,000 have been injured. Tens of thousands of people are still missing. The greatest victims in the Gaza Strip are children and civilians. Thousands of people have died in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen. Dozens of civilians have been killed in attacks on Israel, the north of the country has been displaced, and the economy and tourism there have almost come to a standstill. People have also died in the Red Sea due to Houthi attacks. The number of soldiers lost by Israel is a secret, as are the final losses of Hamas, Hezbollah, (pro-)Iranian militias, the Iranian army, and the Houthis... Israeli and Hamas leaders are on international wanted lists, some countries have severed diplomatic relations with Tel Aviv, and people around the world have expressed outrage at Netanyahu's policies and those who support him. Israel also faces accusations of genocide. Questions Without Answers Even after all that has been enumerated, the question that has been at the heart of the conflict in the Middle East for decades remains: Can the Palestinians obtain a state that would peacefully coexist alongside Israel? In his second term, Trump will face this question and the need for clear solutions. Both Biden and Trump have shown that Washington can force Netanyahu to agree, and in Israel, many voices have been calling for peace with their neighbors for decades. Hamas is weakened but still exists. Recently, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken said that Hamas has mobilized as many new fighters as it has lost in the war with Israel, which is not surprising since even refugee camps were not safe places for those who decided not to participate in the war. The survival of Hamas was expected, and it was known from the beginning that at least the idea would survive, as some of its leaders live outside the Gaza Strip. Meanwhile, Hamas, under Chinese mediation, has decided to submit to the authorities in the West Bank after the end of the war. Hamas has thanked all those who helped them, highlighting Iran, Hezbollah, the Houthis, and Iraqi Shiite militias. This message did not sit well with many in the Muslim world, but it is also believed in Tel Aviv. Last night's operation by the Israeli army in the West Bank, which Hamas has never controlled, was accompanied by Netanyahu's "explanation" that it is part of a "systematic and determined approach by the military against the Iranian axis wherever it sends its weapons—in Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, and Judea and Samaria (the West Bank)." Upon entering the White House, Trump, whose administration has a record number of supporters of Israel, was granted a brief period of peace in the Middle East but also faced the question of a Palestinian state and the belligerent Netanyahu, who does not abandon his policies. Some are already questioning whether Trump will change Washington's policy towards the Middle East or whether the conflicts will continue for the same reasons. The article was previously published on the news portal nap.ba .

Last week, the Petroleum Industry of Serbia (NIS) faced the imminent risk of U.S. sanctions. Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić had been cautioning about this potential development for months, with the government proactively preparing for a situation that might require cutting energy connections with Moscow—a strategic decision intended to ensure unwavering support from the West. Photo: Student protests. Source: @EKOF Blokade, X Given that Aleksandar Vučić is arguably the most prominent figure in Serbian public life and speaks almost daily through media and social networks, his announcements that the United States would impose sanctions on NIS (Naftna Industrija Srbije) initially seemed implausible to many. Christopher Hill, the U.S. ambassador to Belgrade and a strong supporter of Vučić since taking office, stated repeatedly that neither Serbia nor its companies would face any sanctions. The closeness between Hill and Vučić only added to public confusion, as the two offered completely contradictory statements on the matter. In recent days, as Serbia grapples with protests over the collapse of a canopy at the Novi Sad train station and a series of related scandals, Hill has been attending basketball games, enduring insults from fans who hurl abuse at both him and Vučić. Russian NIS and American Vučić Sanctions were conditionally imposed on January 10. The U.S. Department of Treasury sanctioned Russian Gazprom and its subsidiaries, claiming that NIS is one of them. Washington aims to penalize Russian companies supporting the aggression against Ukraine. Belgrade is now tasked with removing Russian ownership of NIS within two months or face American sanctions, which could significantly disrupt Serbia's economy. Once again, Serbia finds itself a battleground between Washington and Moscow. It’s worth recalling that under Vojislav Koštunica's government, NIS was sold cheaply to the Russians in exchange for Moscow's diplomatic support for Serbia on the international stage. For €400 million in 2008, Gazprom Neft, a subsidiary of Gazprom, acquired a 51% stake in NIS. Since Russia invaded Ukraine, Serbia has faced mounting pressure to align its foreign policy with the European Union's, as part of its long-term aspiration to join the bloc. This expectation has been in place since February 2022. Vučić anticipated sanctions and prepared for a planned takeover of the Russian capital in NIS. In mid-September, Serbia's Foreign Minister Marko Đurić, a close ally of Vučić, signed a Strategic Cooperation Agreement on Energy with Washington. Among other provisions, the agreement allows U.S. companies to invest in Serbia's energy sector. Before becoming foreign minister, Đurić served as Serbia’s ambassador to Washington. His close ties to the U.S. have drawn criticism from Serbia’s pro-Russian opposition, particularly after it emerged that he once returned to Belgrade aboard a U.S. military plane. Serbia’s new ambassador to Washington, Dragan Šutanovac—a pro-Western politician and former leader of the Democratic Party—has also sparked controversy, with local tabloids branding his party as “yellow thieves.” Western Alignment The agreement signed by Đurić essentially paved the way for sanctions. To implement it, Belgrade must remove Russian companies from Serbia and make room for Western firms. This mirrors previous moves by Vučić, such as pledging to purchase French fighter jets, collaborate with Paris on nuclear energy, and distance Serbia from Moscow. At the same time, Vučić accuses his critics of working for the West, alleging a foreign conspiracy to overthrow his government. Serbian tabloids, aligned with Vučić, frequently invoke “Ustaše” (a reference to Croatian fascists during World War II) during major political crises. Despite such rhetoric, it’s clear that Vučić enjoys Western support—support he will need more than ever in the coming period. The West expects him to resolve the Kosovo issue in a way that aligns with its interests, a move opposed by most Serbians. Should this opposition merge with growing student protests, Vučić’s political position could become even more precarious. Vučić will need external support to survive politically, particularly if Russia refuses to relinquish its stake in NIS. Serbian media reports suggest that options include selling the Russian share to a Western-approved company, such as one from Azerbaijan, or having the Serbian government assume control. If Russia rejects these proposals, Vučić may be forced to choose between expropriating the company and handing it over to American firms. Vučić also appears to be banking on understanding from Donald Trump and his allies, with whom Serbia has sought to establish political and business ties. Some analysts in Serbia fear that Vučić could become a “velvet dictator,” maintaining power indefinitely with Western backing while fulfilling their demands. These include concessions on lithium mining, compromises on Kosovo, the aforementioned Western arms deals, and opening up Serbia’s energy sector to Western companies. Analysts also point to Chinese investments and U.S.-led highway construction projects as part of this broader trend. Regardless of these fears, Western favoritism toward Vučić is evident. Examples include Serbia’s meddling in Montenegro’s political and religious affairs, support for separatism in Bosnia and Herzegovina through the so-called “Serbian World,” electoral irregularities noted by EU observers, and the deadly attack in Banjska, which remains unresolved in court. This long-standing Western tolerance for Vučić has come at a high cost for neighboring countries, and without clear red lines, new incidents are only a matter of time. In the face of growing opposition, particularly from students, Vučić finds himself with fewer tools to suppress dissent. Many in Serbia are weary of his 13-year rule. In contrast, others in the region have grown tired of his dual-faced rhetoric, alternating between ally and adversary to the West, Russia, China, and the Balkans. He perpetually warns of impending disasters while promising economic prosperity. When the television is turned off, the division of spheres of influence and policymaking remains far from the public eye. This article was originally published on the news portal nap.ba .

After thirty months, Lebanon has a prime minister. Nawaf Salam has gained the support of key parties, following a similar process to that which led to Joseph Aoun being elected president. Salam faces a challenging task, with expectations for results from the people of Lebanon, and regional powers, as well as France and the United States. Photo: Nawaf Salam The biography of the 71-year-old Nawaf Salam is impressive. Among other roles, Salam returns to the position of prime minister from his previous role as presiding judge of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), having also held other significant positions. However, this is no guarantee of Salam’s success—not because he lacks the expertise to lead Lebanon’s government, but because his appointment is the result of domestic and regional dynamics. Salam was chosen as the most acceptable solution for Sunni, Christian, and Shia factions in Lebanon, with prior backing from Saudi Arabia, France, and the United States. Lebanon’s complex political system, where the prime minister is predominantly Sunni, the president is Christian, and the parliament is led by a politician loyal to Shia parties, is only part of the problem. Salam must also balance regional interests, as Lebanon finds itself in dire need of assistance, particularly economic aid, to prevent the country from descending into chaos. Regional Implications Lebanon has faced economic difficulties for the past decade, largely due to regional developments. The country has taken in millions of refugees from Syria, lost revenue from Western sanctions on Damascus, and since October 7, 2024, has been a battleground for conflicts between Shia Hezbollah and Israel. Additionally, Lebanon still bears the scars of its civil war. Arab media report that Salam was favored by Washington, Paris, and Riyadh, in exchange for promises of financial and other aid to rebuild Lebanon. A lack of Hezbollah support previously blocked his path to the premiership. It was critical in 2022 when the party used its majority to appoint Najib Mikati as acting prime minister, bypassing Salam. This time, after prolonged negotiations and tactical delays like late arrivals to parliamentary sessions, Hezbollah agreed to Joseph Aoun’s presidential appointment and Salam’s, with the support of its allies. Media close to Hezbollah report that the duo has committed to rebuilding Shia homes in southern Lebanon, ensuring Israel refrains from future attacks, and maintaining Lebanon’s religious and sectarian balance. Those critical of Hezbollah argue the movement agreed to these terms after suffering significant losses in the war against Israel and the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria. According to them, Hezbollah supported Aoun and, by extension, Salam, to preserve its current positions, regroup, and seek new corridors to Iran. Truce Expiration and Lebanon’s Reconstruction The destruction of Hezbollah remains a goal for Israel and the U.S., with various scenarios attempted to weaken the group, including specialized warfare by Israel. One of the main questions now is how Salam will address Hezbollah, considering the party’s armed wing is significantly stronger than Lebanon’s U.S.-backed army. Washington, Tel Aviv, Paris, and Riyadh want the group disarmed, which Hezbollah refuses. Officials and supporters of Hezbollah argue that southern Lebanon would be occupied by Israel, as recently seen in Syria, the moment they lay down their arms. At the same time, Salam is expected to implement reforms and strengthen Lebanon’s economy. With backing from multiple countries and an impressive career in various fields, Salam, who comes from a family with a history of Lebanese prime ministers, is seen as capable of fulfilling these tasks. Reforms aimed at strengthening Lebanon’s economy will likely garner support from all factions, but progress may stall on other contentious issues, such as the influence of foreign powers in Beirut, relations with Israel, Iran, or the new Syrian authorities. Announcing a “new Lebanon,” Salam declared yesterday that he would “save, reform, and rebuild” the country, pledging unity—a message directed at Hezbollah supporters. The Shia movement agreed to Aoun’s appointment, and its allies supported Salam, ensuring him a parliamentary majority. Significantly, Salam has stated his commitment to fully implementing UN Security Council Resolution 1701, which calls for the withdrawal of all forces from southern Lebanon except for the Lebanese army. This would require Hezbollah to withdraw, as well as Israel, which Salam labeled an “enemy,” demanding its complete withdrawal from “every inch of our occupied land.” However, Hezbollah and Israel have unfinished business. The truce they signed expires in less than two weeks, and without a new agreement, conflict looms. Israel will likely seize any opportunity to strike its adversary, with Western backing. The West also supports Salam. On Friday, French President Emmanuel Macron will visit Beirut. Following Aoun’s election, Saudi Arabia announced plans to restore a hotel damaged in the 2020 Beirut port explosion and invited Lebanon’s new president to visit Riyadh. According to the truce between Hezbollah and Israel, U.S. forces have been tasked with monitoring some aspects of its implementation and will undoubtedly remain close to Salam. Praised by Lebanese media as a “pro-Palestinian” politician with strong Western ties and a distinguished reputation, Salam is poised to confront the delicate challenge of maintaining the neutrality that made him a consensus choice for the premiership. His initial significant decisions could inevitably align him with a particular political, sectarian, or religious faction. When this happens, the underlying agreements among Lebanon’s key players may surface, revealing whether Salam has the capacity and strategy to address the nation’s multifaceted challenges effectively. This article was previously published on the news portal nap.ba .

More than a month has passed since Bashar al-Assad stopped ruling Syria. Power has been taken over by Ahmed al-Sharaa, a former member of ISIS and Al-Qaeda. Despite this, the major powers have not turned their backs on him. Particularly interesting is how some European powers are approaching a man who was until recently on the U.S. most-wanted list, with a $10 million bounty on his head. Foto: Baerbock, Barrot and Al-Sharaa Ahmed al-Sharaa, also known as Abu Mohammed al-Golani, likely never imagined that his path through Al-Qaeda, ISIS, an American prison in Iraq, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the war against the Kurds, (pro-)Iranian Shiite militias, the Iraqi army, Russia, Iran, and Syria would lead him to power in Damascus. The leader of HTS is now the ruler of Syria, excluding parts where Kurdish and foreign (American, Turkish, Russian, Israeli) troops are present. This seems to be enough for him to assume the functions of the internationally recognized government in Damascus. The West is not looking into its past but rather seeks to pursue its interests. The Pragmatic al-Sharaa The ice-breaking visit to the HTS leader was initiated by the Americans. Barbara Leaf, the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State, described her meeting with him in Damascus about twenty days ago as “very productive,” adding that al-Sharaa is “pragmatic.” Shortly thereafter, Washington removed him from its most-wanted list. A meeting with a man whose organization is designated as a terrorist by Washington is not surprising—great powers often prioritize their interests over the principles they publicly advocate. Turkish, Qatari, and other Arab officials, who previously supported the overthrow of Assad, have also visited Damascus. All of them expect concessions from the new Syrian leader and offer assistance, investments, and reconstruction in return. The new Syrian Foreign Minister has even embarked on a mini tour, holding talks with officials from Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. The time has now come for leading European Union powers, although, except for France, their influence in the Middle East is minimal. Last week, German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock and her French counterpart Jean-Noël Barrot visited Damascus. While Baerbock was not greeted with handshakes, she was received warmly. According to announcements, Italy’s Foreign Minister is also set to visit Damascus, likely signaling the recognition of the new Syrian government by European powers. A few days before these visits, the European Union’s Foreign Affairs Chief Kaja Kallas stated that Brussels should ease sanctions on Syria, as HTS had been “saying the right things.” She added that actions are now expected, including the closure of Russian military bases in Syria to diminish Russian influence. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen was more explicit. “Now we must intensify our direct engagement with HTS and other factions,” she said after a meeting in Ankara with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in mid-December. The visits by German and French diplomats have drawn significant attention across the Middle East. The government in Damascus seeks the lifting of Western sanctions and assistance in rebuilding the country. In return, it is expected to formally respect human and minority rights and curb terrorist threats. Europe’s Concerns and Plans However, European powers are focused on other matters, with democracy being the least of their concerns. In short, the image of the Damascus government matters, but the primary focus is on energy, the security of Israel, Iran’s and Russia’s positions, and the return of Syrian refugees. European countries are increasingly concerned about Turkey's growing influence in the Middle East. Turkey is becoming an energy hub for resources from Russia, Azerbaijan, Iraq, and potentially Syria, Qatar, and Libya in the future. Ankara’s independent policies worry Brussels, as Erdogan is acting in Turkey’s interests. Any further strengthening of Ankara’s position in the Middle East gives Erdogan additional leverage. If the new Syrian government were to adopt a more independent stance from Ankara, Brussels might hope to reduce its energy dependency on Turkey. Many European countries currently rely on the TurkStream pipeline, which has become especially important for Europe and Russia after Ukraine halted transit through its territory. Additionally, European powers expect the new government in Damascus to leave Israel alone and push Russia and Iran out of Syria. This, in turn, would weaken Hezbollah in Lebanon, a country where France has significant influence and long-term interests. Barbara Leaf also demanded the removal of Iran from Syria during her meeting in Damascus, stating afterward, “If I’m judging by today, Iran will play no role and shouldn’t.” Finally, there is the issue of Syrian refugees and migrants. The issue of illegal migration is becoming increasingly significant in Western politics, with anti-migration parties gaining momentum in elections. This shift in migration policies began even before Assad's fall. (In)stability of Syria and European Governments To realize these plans, stability in Syria needs to be ensured, at least temporarily, while its economy is improved. Al-Sharaa stated in late December that the new government would work on stabilizing Syria and that citizens would begin to feel changes in about a year. Still, elections might not be held for another four years. This stability has already been acknowledged by the German government, which announced this week a plan to return Syrian refugees, as they now consider the country safer following Assad's fall. A few weeks ago, Germany halted the processing of asylum applications from Syrians. Reports indicate that there are approximately 975,000 Syrian refugees in Germany, about 300,000 of whom are there due to the war. Their residence permits will be revoked once the government determines peace has been established in Syria. However, those with jobs, who speak German or are in education will be allowed to stay. Those willing to return to Syria will be subsidized by the German government. With elections scheduled in Germany for late February, it is believed the plan will yield results by then. Otherwise, anti-migration parties could gain additional support. This approach might be replicated in other European countries. Turkish authorities are already working on repatriating millions of Syrians they have hosted for years. The swift actions of Brussels, Paris, and Berlin are a novelty. These power centers often waited to follow Washington’s lead, expecting the world’s largest superpower to direct its allies. In recent months, likely out of uncertainty surrounding newly elected U.S. President Donald Trump, Europeans have acted more decisively. The change in power in Damascus and the redrawing of influence zones in the Middle East have shaken old European powers, although this comes at the end of the current French and German governments’ terms. Unlike them, the new composition of the European Union’s institutions has just begun its mandate and appears to have a clear plan. This article was originally published on the news portal nap.ba .

At the beginning of this year, Young Chilean President Gabriel Boric shook the world public—the official Santiago wants to gain control over Antarctica, or at least one of its parts, marking the start of the race for every inch of the Planet. Photo: Gabriel Boric The public worldwide was shocked last week when Donald Trump announced that he does not rule out taking military and economic measures for the United States to gain control over Greenland (part of Denmark), the Panama Canal in Panama, and at the same time advocated for turning neighboring Canada into a new U.S. state. Military and economic interests drive Trump. In the case of Greenland , Washington would acquire natural gas, oil, and other resources while opening a new shipping route due to melting ice in the Arctic – the North Pole. Moreover, the island of Greenland is strategically vital in the event of a military conflict between the United States and Russia. If these two nuclear powers were to engage in war, most missiles would be launched over Greenland, as it is the shortest route to the opponent. Thus, control over Greenland is essential for American military plans. Adding Canada, which has "angered" Trump by creating a massive trade deficit with its southern neighbor, further clarifies the objectives of the new U.S. administration. In the case of Panama, it involves pushing China out of Central and Latin America and regaining control over a crucial waterway connecting the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans and the two American coasts. By controlling the Panama Canal, Trump could reduce costs for American ships and goods, dominate shipping routes, and curb China's influence. The Young President's Ambitions All the above – and more – is at play in the race for Antarctica. Chile's young president Gabriel Boric, who has Croatian roots, is attempting to take a bigger bite than Trump because this involves a fight for an entire continent. This disparity grows when comparing the military and other strengths of Chile and the United States and considering that temperatures in some parts of Antarctica can drop to -70 degrees Celsius. However, this remained largely overshadowed in the media by Trump's aforementioned announcements. Still, those aware of Antarctica's significance closely followed every move of a president who has repeatedly proven to be an autonomous political figure concerning Washington, Beijing, Moscow, and his Latin American neighbors. Boric has shown time and again that he is willing to take significant risks and possesses the perseverance often lacking in his counterparts and young politicians in general. Proof of his determination lies in the fact that he is the first Latin American president to visit the South Pole. On January 2, Boric appeared in Antarctica as part of a trip called "Operation Polar Star III," which included visits to the Amundsen-Scott Station at the South Pole and Chilean research facilities. According to media reports, Boric was accompanied by a military and scientific delegation, as well as the ministers of defense and environmental protection, underscoring the significance and character of this visit. To reach Antarctica, Boric reportedly flew in an American-made Hercules-130 aircraft to a Chilean military base on the continent. From there, the delegation traveled to an American base using two U.S. MH-60 Black Hawk helicopters and two Canadian-made DHC-6 Twin Otter planes belonging to the Chilean military. “This is a milestone for us. This is the first time a Chilean president has come to the South Pole and spoken about Chile’s mission in Antarctica,” Boric said in an address broadcast by Chilean television. “This is very relevant for Chile in terms of asserting sovereignty in Antarctica,” noting that Chile is “one of seven countries claiming sovereignty” in that region. “Chile’s Antarctic policy is a long-term state policy, and in the turbulent times of international geopolitics, where the Antarctic Treaty will be revisited in the not-so-distant future, this is a milestone in maintaining Chile’s presence on Antarctica under the most extreme conditions, setting a critical and relevant precedent when discussing the future of the White Continent,” Boric added. “There are those who suggest exploiting mineral resources in Antarctica, for example, or deregulating other industries. We in Chile, an Antarctic nation by vocation and excellence, say no. Antarctica is and will continue to be a continent of science and peace, and Chile has reaffirmed its sovereign right over its Antarctic territory,” the Chilean president emphasized. Others Are Asking Questions Too While Boric’s speech may seem like another textbook example of crisis management and an attempt to say little about what truly matters, the situation is different, and official Santiago is preparing for future developments on the fifth-largest continent. The race began long ago, and only the existing Antarctic Treaty of 1961, which declared the region a scientific reserve and banned military activities, prevents escalation. Chile, Argentina, the United Kingdom, Norway, Australia, New Zealand, and France claim sovereignty over parts of this continent, with some territorial claims overlapping. For instance, Chile, the UK, and Argentina claim the same portions of territory due to their proximity to sovereign territories near Antarctica. For the UK, this involves the Falkland Islands, which Argentina calls the Malvinas. Meanwhile, France cites 19th-century research by its scientists, while Australia, New Zealand, and Norway rely on 20th-century exploration. All these territorial claims have limited recognition under international law, and the 1961 treaty, achieved during the Cold War, was signed by twelve countries. In addition to the mentioned nations, other signatories include Japan, Russia (then the USSR), South Africa, Belgium, and the United States. The treaty aimed to prevent the militarization of Antarctica and the use of its territory for military purposes. It also banned the exploitation of its resources, making the continent a site for scientific research crucial to understanding climate change, astronomy, physics, and more. A glance at a map of territorial claims on Antarctica shows straight triangular lines with their apex at the South Pole and their base along the coastline. The U.S., a signatory of the treaty, does not claim sovereignty. However, Washington has three bases in Antarctica and effectively controls much of the continent. Washington asserts its commitment to the 1961 treaty, emphasizing that the continent must remain a place of cooperation and scientific research as outlined by the agreement. Every Agreement Has an End – And Then… The 1961 treaty is up for review in 2048, as is the 1991 Protocol on Environmental Protection, which bans mining in Antarctica. Boric had this in mind when he stated that Chile would assert its sovereign rights over its claimed territories while simultaneously working to preserve existing agreements and treaties. It is clear to Boric – as Trump confirmed in his statements days later – that global powers will seize any opportunity, especially when resources and military matters are at stake. Controlling the South Pole, or at least establishing a presence there, is an enticing idea. Considering the ongoing struggle for dominance around the North Pole, involving the United States, Russia, Norway, and other European nations, as well as China, it is evident that any lack of agreement on Antarctica will spark a new race among major powers. Coupled with advancing technology and presumed ice melting in the coming decades, Boric’s trip was far from a tourist visit. Moreover, Boric is not the first world leader to visit the South Pole. In 2007, New Zealand's Prime Minister Helen Clark made such a trip, followed four years later by Norwegian Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg. Stoltenberg visited during the centennial of the mission led by Roald Amundsen, who, along with five Norwegian explorers, reached the South Pole on December 14, 1911. Boric is concerned about what will happen to Antarctica not only after the agreement expires but even today. Of all the countries claiming this continent, Chile is geographically the closest. Significant climate changes are already affecting Chile, particularly its fishing industry. Boric is especially troubled by China’s behavior, as the country is not a signatory to the treaty. For decades, Chinese fishing fleets have operated near Antarctica, effectively undermining the agreement. China’s modern fishing fleet, the largest in the region, processes fish onboard, making the distance from the Chinese coast irrelevant. The catch can be transported to consumers by other vessels while the fleet continues fishing. In recent years, China has expanded its fleet and shows no signs of stopping. Krill, a small crustacean essential for whales, penguins, seals, and other marine life, is a primary target of Chinese fishing. Chilean authorities are aware that continued krill fishing could disrupt the Antarctic and Chilean coastal ecosystems. Chinese ships operate in the region year-round, essentially making Beijing’s presence felt on Antarctica. This positions China as a significant player when the 1961 treaty expires – but also today. Reports indicate that Russia is also increasing its presence in this part of the world, raising concerns among its rivals. Russia is widely recognized as the best-prepared country for operating in freezing temperatures and icy seas. Western officials acknowledge that Russia has surpassed all others in its presence at the North Pole, building nuclear-powered icebreakers and adapting its troops and equipment to Arctic conditions. Should Russia decide to move toward the South Pole, it would become a formidable competitor. In this context, it is worth noting that zones in Antarctica remain unclaimed. According to Boric, Chile is prepared to establish a presence in those areas as well. Until now, Chile has operated in the continent's northern part as part of its southernmost province, Magallanes, but now aims to expand its presence “to the Bellingshausen and Weddell seas,” according to a Chilean government statement following Boric’s visit. Boric stated he sees no reason why “Chile couldn’t, in the medium term, reach the South Pole and establish a permanent base there.” However, Boric added that this requires a state policy and “long-term investments” to face off against major powers. Additionally, Chile and Argentina are rivals in Antarctica, which should especially concern Santiago now that the unpredictable Javier Milei governs Buenos Aires. Milei is willing to make concessions to those he considers Argentina’s friends and adversaries of the left and communism. Boric has no choice. If Chile cannot establish itself as a decision-maker, it can at least attempt to curb the influence of major powers by invoking international regulations and advocating for their enforcement while they remain in effect. Otherwise, alongside all the ecological and climate consequences, Chile could face a conflict of major powers off its coasts, ultimately being drawn into the competition. Boric understands that such an outcome is unnecessary for a country that has managed to avoid major international conflicts for decades while maintaining its regional relevance. The battle for Antarctica surpasses all his previous challenges and plans and will continue long after his tenure. Chile will therefore need a long-term strategy and broader societal consensus. This article was originally published on the news portal PISJournal.net .

Newly elected U.S. President Donald Trump continues to shock the world as he awaits his formal inauguration. Yesterday, he declared his desire for control over Panama, part of Denmark (Greenland), and Canada. He has not ruled out the use of military force to achieve some of his goals. Photo: Donald Trump Before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Vladimir Putin spent considerable time preparing domestic and international audiences for the idea that Russia had territorial claims over neighboring states. He twisted history to suit his narrative, arguing that Moscow had historical and other rights to these territories. According to him, it was his duty to correct historical injustices and restore security to Russia. Reactions to Putin’s rhetoric were swift and harsh, coming from all corners of the globe. When the invasion of Ukraine began on February 24, 2022, much of the world condemned the act on various international platforms. The war continues to this day, with the Kremlin adamant in its argument that it has the right to carve up neighboring states. Trump's Confidence Yesterday, Trump picked up where Putin left off before deploying troops to Ukraine. Trump believes that the United States should claim Greenland—an autonomous territory under Denmark, a NATO ally. He also argues that the Panama Canal should return to U.S. military control and that Canada should consider becoming a new U.S. state. Unlike Putin, who delivered long-winded historical justifications for altering internationally recognized borders, Trump is more pragmatic, offering no deeper rationale. Speaking from his Mar-a-Lago residence in Florida and addressing journalists’ questions about his intentions for Greenland and the Panama Canal, Trump once again shocked the public. “Can you guarantee the world that you won’t use economic or military force to take control of these areas?” a journalist asked. “No,” Trump replied bluntly before continuing the conversation. “Could you elaborate on your plan? Will you negotiate new agreements? Will you ask Canadians to hold a vote? What’s your strategy?” the journalist pressed. “I can’t guarantee anything,” Trump said. “You’re talking about Panama and Greenland. I can’t guarantee for them. But I can say we need them for economic security. The Panama Canal was built for the military,” he added. When asked whether he ruled out the use of military force, Trump said, “I won’t commit to that. Maybe we’ll have to take action. The Panama Canal is vital to our country. It’s currently managed by China. We gave the Panama Canal back to Panama; we didn’t give it to China,” Trump emphasized. Trump's Logic Why does Trump believe he should focus on Greenland, Panama, and neighboring Canada? What is their “offense” against the new U.S. administration? The simplest answer is that these three territories are doing things Trump doesn’t like. In the case of Greenland, it’s about access to natural gas, oil, and other resources. Additionally, Greenland’s strategic location is crucial in the fight for the Arctic and the sea routes opening up due to melting ice. Militarily, control of Greenland offers a significant advantage in a nuclear standoff, as most missiles between the U.S. and Russia would be launched over Greenland—the shortest route between the two nations. Regarding Panama, Trump is displeased that the Panama Canal, vital for global and American trade, is no longer under Washington’s control. Panama became independent in 1903 when Washington carved it out of Colombia, and the canal connecting the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans was constructed between 1904 and 1914. In 1999, the U.S. handed control of the canal back to Panama. Recently, China’s growing influence in Panama and other Central American countries has evidently alarmed Trump. Canada, the United States’ largest trading partner, has drawn Trump’s ire due to its substantial trade surplus. Over the past two years, Canada’s trade surplus with the U.S. has reached approximately $120 billion. Furthermore, Canada’s strategic importance is amplified by its proximity to Greenland in military matters. Trump recently suggested Canada should join the United States, referring to Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau as the “Governor of the Great State of Canada.” The World of Realpolitik In a short time, Trump has undermined many principles championed by the current president, Joseph Biden. While Biden has emphasized sovereignty and international law in cases like Ukraine, Trump’s logic dismisses these principles when it comes to Panama and Denmark. Denmark and Greenland’s government have outright rejected any discussions about transferring Greenland to the United States, as they did when Trump previously proposed purchasing the territory. Similarly, the Panamanian government has dismissed any possibility of relinquishing control of the canal. However, Trump remains indifferent to the interests of others, confident in the power of his country. During his Mar-a-Lago address, he even suggested renaming the Gulf of Mexico to the American Gulf, effectively erasing historical context. It’s worth recalling that in 2019, Trump canceled a visit to Denmark because the Danes refused to discuss selling Greenland. The U.S. had previously offered to buy Greenland in 1946. During the Cold War, the U.S. military established a presence on Greenland, but the island remained part of Denmark. In other words, the U.S. plans to claim Greenland predates Trump, as it is a strategically vital island for America’s defense strategy. In the most recent election, certain factions close to the military and arms manufacturers supported Trump, aiding his victory. This challenges the narrative that Trump is a “rogue” figure battling the establishment. Instead, he appears to be an integral part of it. This conclusion is critical for those who argue that Trump is a “man of peace” and “didn’t start any wars,” despite having attacked Syria, assassinated Iranian General Qassem Soleimani in Iraq, and exposed U.S. bases in Iraq to Iranian missile strikes. Less than two weeks before taking office, Trump has already signaled his intention to sideline international law and disregard the interests of other nations. During his first term, many looked to the House of Representatives, the Senate, and Vice President Mike Pence to act as checks on his presidential power. In his upcoming term, however, these restraints may prove weaker, with an increasing number of Trump loyalists now holding key positions of influence. This article was originally published on the news portal nap.ba .

Another year has passed in the Balkans—specifically across the region of the former Yugoslavia (excluding Slovenia, but including Albania)—marked by aimless wandering and stagnation. For 2024, like many years before, was yet another year lost to empty promises and missed opportunities, where the grand ambitions of local political elites amounted to little more than hollow rhetoric. Will 2025 break this cycle, or will it simply bring more of the same? Photo: Aleksandar Vučić Government Faces Protests Politicians around the globe are closely anticipating Donald Trump’s imminent return to the White House. In just ten days, his formal inauguration will signal not so much a new beginning, but the revival of familiar American policies centered on domestic priorities: revitalizing domestic manufacturing, reinforcing military strength, and prioritizing national security. In all these areas, Balkan leaders have consistently fallen short. Meanwhile, plans are underway for the wholesale sell-off of natural resources through massive concessions on mining projects—on a scale previously unimaginable for the region. Small Balkan states are being positioned as new alternatives to resource powerhouses like Russia, China, and Bolivia, paving the way for intensified exploitation. Yet Balkan politicians, too, are awaiting Trump’s return. This isn’t about shared values with American Republicans but rather a calculation that the new administration might, either through action or inaction, facilitate certain political processes in the region. Vučić’s Fight for Power Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić has worked the hardest to prepare for Trump’s return. In various ways, he has cozied up to the American establishment from both parties. Eventually, he began awarding lucrative contracts to members of Trump’s family. These deals are presented to the public as market-driven, though many claim they are attempts to buy influence. A similar pattern can be observed in Albania, where Prime Minister Edi Rama, an ally of Vučić, has awarded even larger contracts to Trump’s family. During Trump’s previous term, Vučić and Rama worked on plans to partition Kosovo. Meanwhile, a portion of Albanian voters and political factions turned against Milo Đukanović in Montenegro. For years, Rama and Vučić have sought to undermine Kosovo’s Prime Minister Albin Kurti, who opposes Kosovo’s partition and refuses to turn Pristina and Podgorica into Sarajevo-like entities with ethnically divided governance. The current U.S. administration has also joined the campaign against Kurti, imposing sanctions on Pristina. The plan to partition Kosovo failed, according to statements from Serbia and implicit admissions by Vučić, largely due to opposition from German Chancellor Angela Merkel. Other European countries joined Germany in rejecting the plan. However, the current German government under Olaf Scholz seems more accommodating toward Vučić, focusing on access to lithium reserves in the Podrinje region and beyond. Vučić’s broader political strategy has come under scrutiny, particularly after the collapse of a shelter at the Novi Sad train station. Serbian citizens have since demanded answers about who is building and operating in Serbia, what Vučić has promised to whom, and what future awaits the country’s people amidst the division of interests among global powers. Meanwhile, the judiciary remains silent. Pushing Red Lines Despite these challenges, Vučić continues to anticipate Trump’s return and has a plan. Previous attempts to destabilize neighboring states have largely failed, though official Belgrade achieved some successes. This is especially evident in Montenegro, where a Chetnik commander leads the parliament, and the Serbian Orthodox Church wields significant influence over the government. Vučić likely hopes to achieve some of his goals by the end of Trump’s term, using 2025 as a preparatory period for larger moves. Western powers have allowed him considerable leeway in their attempts to distance Vučić from Russia. Consider just a few examples of what the West has forgiven him: the Banjska attack, irregular elections (according to EU institutions), interference in Montenegro, support for separatism in Bosnia and Herzegovina via the so-called "Serb World," refusal to impose sanctions on Russia, and failure to align Serbia’s foreign policy with Brussels. In the coming period, Vučić may once again test the limits of Western tolerance, counting on Trump’s support—not necessarily for Serbia but for himself. The European Union’s disorientation regarding Trump further supports his calculations, as Brussels debates how to replace aid to Ukraine should Washington withdraw its support. Russia remains a significant challenge for Vučić. Increased Western pressure on Moscow could inevitably translate into pressure on Belgrade. Recently, Vučić has been discussing plans to acquire majority ownership of Serbia’s oil industry (NIS) from Russian hands, fearing potential U.S. sanctions. To amplify the fear of external threats while suppressing domestic unrest, state-controlled media have emphasized supposed “Ustaše” conspiracies aimed at toppling Vučić, Vojvodina autonomy activists disguised as striking students and professors, and a Western plot to stifle Serbia’s growth. Provocations and incidents in Kosovo, Sandžak, Montenegro, Bosnia, and Herzegovina may also be on the horizon. New Realities The world has changed since Trump’s first term in the White House. Among Balkan politicians, only Vučić and then-Kosovo Prime Minister Avdullah Hoti faced significant pressure under Trump, particularly after committing to combat the “terrorist organization Hezbollah” and advocating for LGBTQ rights worldwide. That agreement, which also included Israel recognizing Kosovo’s independence, was publicly mocked by Maria Zakharova, the spokesperson for Russia’s Foreign Ministry—a rare breach of Moscow’s diplomatic norms. At the same time, Trump’s administration positioned Croatia as a potential energy hub for Europe. American strategists worked diligently to reduce Europe’s dependence on Russian energy, laying the foundation for a new “Iron Curtain” against Moscow—a policy further strengthened under Joseph Biden after the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Under Biden, Western policies toward Russia have become even more stringent, with initiatives like strengthening Poland and Romania further isolating Moscow. It is unlikely that Trump would significantly alter this trajectory. Even an agreement to end the war in Ukraine would not immediately lead to the lifting of sanctions or a restoration of Russia’s influence in Europe. Trump’s primary foreign policy focus remains to contain China—a strategy he initiated during his first term and Biden continued. This could place Vučić and other Balkan governments with significant Chinese investments under greater scrutiny from Washington. Ultimately, 2025 in the Balkans is likely to mirror previous years unless the West takes a firm and unambiguous stance, supporting only those partners who genuinely uphold democratic values. Without such a commitment, the region seems destined to remain trapped in its cycle of crises, where political "firefighters" extinguish the very flames they ignite—only to tighten their hold on power in the process. Tekst je ranije objavljen na portalu geopol.ba .

The Greek community of Istanbul, once a vibrant and vital part of the city's multicultural fabric, has dwindled to fewer than 500 individuals today. This decline is a poignant reminder of historical upheavals that reshaped the city and its demographics over centuries. The Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople, now located in the Fanari district, stands as a powerful symbol of the community's resilience. After the fall of Constantinople in 1453, the Patriarchate moved from Hagia Sophia—which had been converted into a mosque—to its current location. Hagia Sophia's transformation marked the beginning of a new architectural legacy, as its iconic dome and minarets inspired the design of Ottoman mosques that followed. At its height, the Greek population in Istanbul was a significant presence in the cultural, economic, and religious life of the City. Historical data shows that in 1919, Greeks constituted approximately 31% of Istanbul's population, numbering over 350,000 individuals. However, a series of devastating events—including the anti-Greek riots of 1955, oppressive policies, and mass emigration—has drastically reduced the community. By 1935, the Greek population had decreased to just 11% of the city's total, and today, the number has dwindled to a mere 500 individuals. Most Greeks in Istanbul are elderly, and only a handful of young families remain, raising concerns about the long-term survival of this once-thriving community. The 1922–1923 population exchange between Greece and Turkey was a watershed moment for Greek communities in Asia Minor and Istanbul. Under the terms of the Treaty of Lausanne, hundreds of thousands of Orthodox Christians from Anatolia were resettled in Greece, while Muslim populations from Greece were relocated to Turkey. The Greek population of Istanbul was initially exempt from this exchange, but subsequent political and social pressures, including the 1942 Wealth Tax, the 1955 anti-Greek pogrom, and restrictions on minority rights, led to waves of emigration. By the 1970s, the Greek population had dwindled to just a few thousand, and today it has almost disappeared. Despite these challenges, the remaining Greek community continues to maintain its cultural and religious traditions. Centered around the Patriarchate, a handful of churches, schools like the historic Great School of the Nation, and cultural organizations, they preserve the heritage of one of the city’s oldest communities. In Greece, the refugees from Anatolia and Istanbul integrated into society, bringing with them their traditions, cuisine, and unique cultural heritage. Meanwhile, the shrinking Greek population in Istanbul faces an uncertain future, holding on to its identity in a rapidly changing city. The story of the Greek community in Istanbul is one of resilience amidst adversity, a legacy that continues to echo in the narrow streets of Fanari and beyond.

When Hamas launched an attack on Israel on October 7, 2023, killing numerous civilians and taking some as hostages, the Middle East momentarily froze before dividing along the lines of the conflict. While most countries in the region remained neutral or effectively supported Israel, Yemen’s Houthi movement initiated a military operation with an uncertain outcome. Photo: Ilustration In the immediate aftermath of Hamas’s attack on Israel on October 7, 2023, it quickly became evident what fate awaited the Gaza Strip. Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant vowed to deal with the “human animals” in Gaza, a promise that was grimly fulfilled. The Gaza Strip was reduced to rubble, with tens of thousands of children among the dead. The International Criminal Court issued warrants for both Gallant and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, holding them accountable for alleged war crimes. Amid the escalating conflict, Yemen’s Houthi movement entered the fray, launching missiles and drones at Israel to halt attacks on the Palestinian enclave. The Houthis escalated further, targeting ships in the Red Sea and disrupting global trade. This prompted the United States and the United Kingdom, with UN authorization, to launch operations against the Houthis in support of Israel. The Houthis: A Movement Without a Clear Plan Many observers attributed the Houthis’ actions to Iranian influence. Western sources claimed the Houthis were acting under Tehran’s directives, as Iran is alleged to control the Ansar Allah movement, as the Houthis call themselves. While Iranian influence on the Houthis is undeniable—evident in the rapid advancements in their missile and drone technology—it would be incorrect to suggest Tehran fully controls them. Of all the groups within the so-called "Shia Crescent"—spanning Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen—the Houthis are the least loyal to Tehran. Their alignment with Iran stems more from shared adversaries—Saudi Arabia, the U.S., and now Israel—than from ideological allegiance. The Houthis are a coalition of tribes operating differently from Iran, Gaza, or Egypt. While they have adopted some of Hezbollah's guerrilla tactics, their behavior is predominantly shaped by tribal dynamics. Additionally, remnants of Yemen’s fragmented army, which collapsed after the Houthi uprising, have joined their ranks, making their actions unpredictable to many. Their decision to support the Palestinians by entering into conflict with Israel has elevated the Houthis into a significant regional actor. Both sides have inflicted heavy damage on each other without backing down. The Houthis claim to have deployed hypersonic ballistic missiles capable of traveling 2,000 kilometers in just 11 minutes. In response, Israel has bombed Yemeni ports, airfields, and energy infrastructure. The Houthis may lack a coherent strategy in this war, but they have a clear objective: they demand an end to Israel’s attacks on Gaza as a condition for ceasing their strikes on ships and Israeli targets. However, Israel, the U.S., and the UK have shown no willingness to make concessions. Even so, all parties understand that resolving the Houthi problem is no simple task, and any misstep could exacerbate the situation. How to Stop the Houthis? The Houthis’ attacks do not pose a critical threat to the Israeli military, but their defiance represents a broader challenge to Israel and the U.S. The actions of the world’s poorest Arab nation could inspire others in the region to resist, a prospect that remains unthinkable in much of the Arab world today. Thus, addressing the Houthi issue is a priority for Tel Aviv and Washington, where patience is wearing thin. But what more can be done in Yemen that hasn’t already been tried in the past decade? Yemen has endured civil war, foreign military intervention, infrastructure destruction, airstrikes, naval blockades, mercenaries, sanctions, and a crippling humanitarian crisis. Israel is not relenting. Recently, Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz openly acknowledged Israel’s role in the assassination of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in Iran and issued threats against the Houthis. “Today, as the terrorist organization Houthis fire rockets at Israel, I have a clear message for them: We defeated Hamas, we defeated Hezbollah, we blinded Iran’s defense systems, and we struck hard at the axis of evil. We will deliver a crushing blow to the Houthi terrorist organization in Yemen as well,” Katz declared. “We will destroy their strategic infrastructure and eliminate their leaders, just as we did to Haniyeh, Sinwar, and Nasrallah in Tehran, Gaza, and Lebanon. We will do the same in Hodeidah and Sana’a.” Similar warnings have been issued by Danny Danon, Israel’s UN ambassador, who, at the end of December, delivered a “final warning” to the Houthis, urging them to cease their attacks on Israel. Morality and Politics While the Houthis present challenges to the military forces of Israel, the U.S., and the UK, the balance of power is unmistakably tilted. Nevertheless, a full-scale deployment of ground troops seems unlikely. Instead, external forces may back factions in Yemen’s fractured landscape, particularly in Aden, home to the internationally recognized government. Clashes between Houthi forces and those aligned with the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council have already reignited, with the latter even proposing a re-division of Yemen into two states. The Houthis’ support for Hamas has placed them in a precarious position. However, unless ground forces enter the fray, the movement is likely to persist despite Israeli threats to target their leaders. Ironically, such threats might strengthen the Houthis, as they frame their actions as a moral obligation to support their Sunni Arab brethren in Palestine. In this context, it is striking that the world’s poorest Arab state speaks of morality. In contrast, religious leaders and political figures across the Arab world remain silent, and much of the West turns a blind eye to the suffering in Gaza. The Houthis’ defiance raises uncomfortable questions about those who react with outrage to caricatures or book burnings but remain passive in the face of child deaths. Ultimately, it also forces reflection on what kind of world Arabs envision and what values they uphold. These questions have lingered long before the rise of the Houthis and their objectives. Devastated Yemen remains the loudest Arab voice, and that reality speaks volumes. The article was previously published on the news portal nap.ba .

The past year was defined by notable events, including Donald Trump's return to the White House—a development likely to play a key role in shaping trends that began in 2023 and are expected to continue through 2025. Photo: Illustration A year ago, we discussed on this platform the political and economic dynamics expected to shape 2024. Even then, it was clear that the year would be marked by turbulence, culminating in the U.S. presidential election, where Donald Trump triumphed over Kamala Harris following Joseph Biden's withdrawal from the race. Many are eagerly anticipating Trump’s return to the White House in just over two weeks, holding onto the belief that the 79-year-old president will address their concerns—often overlooking the broader priorities and interests of his own nation. When Trump takes office, he will be confronted with a packed agenda. His top three priorities are expected to include resolving the war in Ukraine, addressing conflicts in the Middle East while bolstering Israel's position, and navigating the ongoing confrontation with China—a challenge that gained momentum during his first term and was hinted at even during Barack Obama’s presidency. Priorities and Allies These issues are a continuation of Biden's agenda, as all three touch the core of U.S. strategic interests. The war in Eastern Europe, on NATO’s borders, serves as a test of Western alliance reliability and is considered one of Trump’s key priorities. Trump himself reinforced this narrative by promising to quickly end the war. There is no doubt Trump could end or accelerate the war’s conclusion by halting U.S. aid to Kyiv. Conversely, he could prolong the conflict by partially withdrawing U.S. involvement and shifting some responsibilities to European allies. In negotiations with Russia, Trump is unlikely to have a single plan. This is clear to Russia, which seeks the lifting of sanctions and is grappling with economic challenges. Current battlefield dynamics give Moscow hope that Ukraine’s military might collapse before Russia’s economy does. However, the war in Ukraine is not Trump’s primary concern. Far more significant to him is ensuring that the U.S.’s key ally, Israel, achieves its goals in the Middle East. Trump’s administration is expected to be filled with pro-Israel personnel, likely the most in Washington’s history. These individuals will undoubtedly support Israel in every way possible. Such support could prove crucial, especially as the Assad family dynasty has been overthrown in neighboring Syria, fundamentally altering the Middle East. Damascus is now controlled by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the former Syrian Al-Qaeda, and Washington has recently shown a willingness to collaborate with them. Specifically, HTS is expected to leave Israel in peace, attack Iran and pro-Iranian forces in the region, and, in return, gain sanctions relief and acceptance from the West. Biden initiated this approach, and Trump demonstrated during his first term that he knows how to play by these rules—remember his meetings with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un. Stabilizing the Middle East and redistributing zones of influence will be a significant part of Trump’s policy. His approach to Iran and Tehran’s behavior will dictate the region’s dynamics in the coming year, with Turkey playing a pivotal role. Meanwhile, a group of Arab states will closely monitor the actions of the new administration in Damascus. While it may seem the cards are aligned for the West to dominate the Middle East completely, the reality is more complicated. Major conflicts in the region would divert the U.S. focus from China, giving Beijing more time to prepare for its confrontation with Washington. This makes peace in the Middle East essential for Trump, alongside guarantees for Israel to maintain its dominant position. Europe and the Rest of the World In 2025, Europe will continue grappling with the same issues it has faced for years while adhering to previous policies. The exception may be migration policy, which could see significant changes. If not, right-wing and anti-establishment parties could gain further strength. Nevertheless, Europe will primarily focus on Trump’s policies and how to safeguard its interests under an unpredictable White House occupant. This could create two blocs: those who unconditionally support Trump and his policies and those advocating for Europe’s voice to be heard. Beyond Europe, this divide already exists, and four years of Trump’s presidency will not be enough to dismantle all of America’s adversaries or secure agreements with all of them. Confrontations with China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, Venezuela, and others remain central to Washington’s focus. Domestically, Trump will face challenges related to illegal immigration, combating drug addiction, building an economy less reliant on foreign partners, and creating a new economic and political model influenced by billionaire Elon Musk. These issues will also impact India, a rising power. How Trump engages with the world's most populous country, courted by both Russia and China, will determine the role of BRICS, whose growth is eagerly anticipated by numerous nations, including Brazil, South Africa, Iran, Ethiopia, and Egypt. The group’s attempt to “de-dollarize” the global economy may also provoke a strong response from Trump. Musk’s influence will also be interesting to watch within the context of Argentina’s political and economic experiment led by Javier Milei, who has backing from parts of the American political and business community. Milei’s success or failure will significantly affect relations in Latin America. The Year of Trump In summary, 2025 could very well be Trump’s year—a year in which the world’s leading superpower sets the course while others adapt and develop their policies in response. Trump’s first term demonstrated that almost anything is possible with him, but the world has changed, and Trump knows this, meaning success is far from guaranteed. Technology continues to infiltrate every aspect of our lives. The use of artificial intelligence will reach unprecedented levels this year, influencing everything from the simplest tasks to the battlefield, communications, and political struggles. Advanced technology could also aid in combating climate change. For decades, Western nations have led in this area, but Trump’s return to the White House jeopardizes those plans. Simply put, Trump doesn’t care about climate change. Distrust isn’t confined to Western allies. Recent reports indicate that 2025 will set records in defense spending, with global expenditures expected to reach $2.5 trillion. The largest contributors will be the U.S., China, and Russia. In recent weeks, these three powers have showcased advanced missile systems (with Russia claiming they are undefeatable), sixth-generation fighter jets (which China claims surpass anything else), and Trump’s earlier announcement of plans to conquer space, potentially revitalizing the U.S. military. In a year when the world looks to Trump, global powers are looking to weaponry as a guarantee for securing their interests. Only then, perhaps, will the interests of ordinary people around the world come into play. This article was originally published on the news portal nap.ba .

Greece has been facing one of its worst droughts in decades in 2024. With rainfall levels plummeting to historic lows, the repercussions are being felt across the country—from parched agricultural lands to reduced water supplies in urban areas. Marathon lake, nearby Agios Stefanos. Copyright by Sanin Mirvic&Corella Climate Trends and Contributing Factors The ongoing drought is not an isolated event but part of a broader pattern of shifting climatic conditions in the Mediterranean. Scientists point to rising global temperatures, altered weather patterns, and reduced snowfall in mountainous regions as key contributors. According to the Hellenic National Meteorological Service (HNMS) , rainfall during the critical autumn and winter months of 2023–24 was 40% below the seasonal average. In addition to natural climatic variations, human activities such as deforestation, over-irrigation, and inefficient water management have exacerbated the crisis. Urban areas, particularly Athens and Thessaloniki, are struggling to meet water demands, while rural regions grapple with depleted groundwater reserves. Impact on Agriculture The agricultural sector, a cornerstone of the Greek economy, has been hit particularly hard. Crops such as olives, grapes, and wheat, which are vital both domestically and for export, are suffering from water scarcity. Farmers report that yields have dropped by up to 50% in some regions , leading to financial distress and concerns about long-term sustainability. Forest fire aftermath, near Varympompi. Copyright Sanin Mirvic & Corella Animal husbandry is also under strain, as livestock struggle to find adequate water and grazing lands. This has driven up prices for essential products like milk, cheese, and meat, further burdening Greek households already contending with inflation. Tourism and Water Management Tourism, another pillar of the economy, is facing its own set of challenges. Many popular islands, including Mykonos and Santorini, rely on limited freshwater resources that are being stretched to their limits. Hotel owners and local authorities are scrambling to adopt water-saving measures, but the long-term viability of tourism in such regions remains uncertain. Authorities have also implemented water restrictions in many areas, limiting usage for non-essential activities such as gardening and car washing. Desalination plants and water imports have been proposed as emergency solutions, but these are costly and environmentally controversial. Government and Community Responses The Greek government has acknowledged the severity of the crisis and pledged to invest in sustainable water management practices. Proposed measures include modernizing irrigation systems, promoting drought-resistant crops, and enhancing the country’s capacity for rainwater harvesting. However, experts caution that these initiatives will take time to implement and may not fully address the immediate challenges. Communities across Greece are also stepping up. Grassroots organizations are raising awareness about water conservation, while local farmers are experimenting with innovative techniques such as drip irrigation and soil moisture retention methods. A Wake-Up Call The 2024 drought serves as a stark reminder of the vulnerability of Greece and other Mediterranean countries to the impacts of climate change. While the immediate focus is on mitigating the crisis, the long-term solution lies in a combination of global climate action and local adaptation strategies. For Greece, preserving its natural resources is not just an environmental imperative but a cultural and economic necessity. As the country navigates this challenging period, its resilience and capacity for innovation will be critical in ensuring a sustainable future for its people and ecosystems.

The World Health Organization (WHO) officially declared the end of the COVID-19 pandemic on May 5, 2023, marking a pivotal moment for countries worldwide, including Greece. While the initial relief was palpable, the pandemic left behind a trail of economic, social, and public health challenges that Greece continues to address in 2024. This period has been one of reflection, recovery, and resilience for the nation and its people. Athens, Syntagma Square during the COVID-19 pandemic. Copyright: S.Mirvić&Corella Economic Recovery Greece's economy, like much of the world, faced significant setbacks during the pandemic, with tourism—a cornerstone of its GDP—taking a particularly heavy hit. However, 2024 has witnessed encouraging signs of recovery. Domestic consumption has rebounded , and tourism has resurged, reaching near pre-pandemic levels, thanks to lifted restrictions and renewed traveler confidence. Reports suggest a marked improvement in employment rates, bolstered by government stimulus packages aimed at reviving small businesses and promoting investment in sustainable tourism. However, challenges remain. Many small enterprises that shuttered during the pandemic have struggled to reopen, and inflationary pressures have affected household budgets. Greece’s commitment to leveraging EU recovery funds and implementing structural reforms will be critical for sustaining this economic rebound in the years ahead. Mental Health: Breaking the Silence One of the less visible but deeply felt impacts of the pandemic has been on mental health. The isolation, uncertainty, and loss experienced during COVID-19 have left a lasting imprint on many individuals. Greece has taken significant steps to address this issue, particularly in the workplace. In 2023, the Ministry of Health, in collaboration with the non-governmental organization Thalpos Mental Health, established the nation’s first Workers’ Day Center. This center focuses on promoting mental well-being, preventing mental health disorders, and fostering resilience among employees, aligning with WHO recommendations . The initiative marks a progressive step in recognizing the importance of mental health as integral to overall recovery. Despite these advancements, there is still much work to be done in breaking the stigma surrounding mental health and ensuring accessible services for all. Public Health: Lingering Challenges and Lessons Learned While the pandemic's acute phase has passed, the virus continues to pose risks. In mid-2024, Greece faced a surge in cases linked to a new variant, known as FLiRT , which temporarily strained the healthcare system (The Independent, 2024). The resurgence underscored the importance of maintaining public health vigilance and preparedness, even as the immediate crisis has waned. For individuals suffering from Long COVID, the challenges have been particularly profound. Many patients have reported difficulties in receiving appropriate care, with symptoms often misunderstood or dismissed. A striking example is the case of a 26-year-old Greek woman who was involuntarily committed to a psychiatric ward due to a lack of awareness and resources for Long COVID. Her story highlights the urgent need for increased understanding and dedicated support for those living with the condition. The Human Experience: Stories of Resilience Beyond the statistics, the pandemic’s aftermath is best understood through the experiences of individuals. Greeks have shown remarkable resilience and adaptability, finding new ways to connect, work, and thrive. Community support systems have strengthened, and there is a renewed appreciation for simple joys, such as gathering with loved ones, strolling through vibrant city squares, or enjoying a seaside meal. At the same time, the pandemic has prompted a national conversation about the fragility of life and the importance of preparedness. For many, it has been a time to re-evaluate priorities, focusing on health, family, and community. A Look Ahead As Greece continues to navigate the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic, the journey is one of hope tempered by caution. The lessons learned from this global crisis are shaping the nation’s policies, attitudes, and aspirations. By addressing the lingering challenges with the same resilience that has defined its response thus far, Greece stands poised to emerge stronger and more united in the face of future uncertainties.