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What’s the True Price of Western Backing for Vučić?

Writer's picture: Armin SijamićArmin Sijamić

Last week, the Petroleum Industry of Serbia (NIS) faced the imminent risk of U.S. sanctions. Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić had been cautioning about this potential development for months, with the government proactively preparing for a situation that might require cutting energy connections with Moscow—a strategic decision intended to ensure unwavering support from the West.

People hold a banner with a drawing of a tiger, surrounded by trees. Several protest signs are visible, with text written in Cyrillic.
Photo: Student protests. Source: @EKOF Blokade, X

Given that Aleksandar Vučić is arguably the most prominent figure in Serbian public life and speaks almost daily through media and social networks, his announcements that the United States would impose sanctions on NIS (Naftna Industrija Srbije) initially seemed implausible to many.


Christopher Hill, the U.S. ambassador to Belgrade and a strong supporter of Vučić since taking office, stated repeatedly that neither Serbia nor its companies would face any sanctions.


The closeness between Hill and Vučić only added to public confusion, as the two offered completely contradictory statements on the matter. In recent days, as Serbia grapples with protests over the collapse of a canopy at the Novi Sad train station and a series of related scandals, Hill has been attending basketball games, enduring insults from fans who hurl abuse at both him and Vučić.


Russian NIS and American Vučić


Sanctions were conditionally imposed on January 10. The U.S. Department of Treasury sanctioned Russian Gazprom and its subsidiaries, claiming that NIS is one of them. Washington aims to penalize Russian companies supporting the aggression against Ukraine. Belgrade is now tasked with removing Russian ownership of NIS within two months or face American sanctions, which could significantly disrupt Serbia's economy.


Once again, Serbia finds itself a battleground between Washington and Moscow. It’s worth recalling that under Vojislav Koštunica's government, NIS was sold cheaply to the Russians in exchange for Moscow's diplomatic support for Serbia on the international stage. For €400 million in 2008, Gazprom Neft, a subsidiary of Gazprom, acquired a 51% stake in NIS.


Since Russia invaded Ukraine, Serbia has faced mounting pressure to align its foreign policy with the European Union's, as part of its long-term aspiration to join the bloc. This expectation has been in place since February 2022.


Vučić anticipated sanctions and prepared for a planned takeover of the Russian capital in NIS. In mid-September, Serbia's Foreign Minister Marko Đurić, a close ally of Vučić, signed a Strategic Cooperation Agreement on Energy with Washington. Among other provisions, the agreement allows U.S. companies to invest in Serbia's energy sector.


Before becoming foreign minister, Đurić served as Serbia’s ambassador to Washington. His close ties to the U.S. have drawn criticism from Serbia’s pro-Russian opposition, particularly after it emerged that he once returned to Belgrade aboard a U.S. military plane. Serbia’s new ambassador to Washington, Dragan Šutanovac—a pro-Western politician and former leader of the Democratic Party—has also sparked controversy, with local tabloids branding his party as “yellow thieves.”


Western Alignment


The agreement signed by Đurić essentially paved the way for sanctions. To implement it, Belgrade must remove Russian companies from Serbia and make room for Western firms. This mirrors previous moves by Vučić, such as pledging to purchase French fighter jets, collaborate with Paris on nuclear energy, and distance Serbia from Moscow.


At the same time, Vučić accuses his critics of working for the West, alleging a foreign conspiracy to overthrow his government. Serbian tabloids, aligned with Vučić, frequently invoke “Ustaše” (a reference to Croatian fascists during World War II) during major political crises.


Despite such rhetoric, it’s clear that Vučić enjoys Western support—support he will need more than ever in the coming period. The West expects him to resolve the Kosovo issue in a way that aligns with its interests, a move opposed by most Serbians. Should this opposition merge with growing student protests, Vučić’s political position could become even more precarious.


Vučić will need external support to survive politically, particularly if Russia refuses to relinquish its stake in NIS. Serbian media reports suggest that options include selling the Russian share to a Western-approved company, such as one from Azerbaijan, or having the Serbian government assume control. If Russia rejects these proposals, Vučić may be forced to choose between expropriating the company and handing it over to American firms.


Vučić also appears to be banking on understanding from Donald Trump and his allies, with whom Serbia has sought to establish political and business ties.


Some analysts in Serbia fear that Vučić could become a “velvet dictator,” maintaining power indefinitely with Western backing while fulfilling their demands. These include concessions on lithium mining, compromises on Kosovo, the aforementioned Western arms deals, and opening up Serbia’s energy sector to Western companies. Analysts also point to Chinese investments and U.S.-led highway construction projects as part of this broader trend.


Regardless of these fears, Western favoritism toward Vučić is evident. Examples include Serbia’s meddling in Montenegro’s political and religious affairs, support for separatism in Bosnia and Herzegovina through the so-called “Serbian World,” electoral irregularities noted by EU observers, and the deadly attack in Banjska, which remains unresolved in court. This long-standing Western tolerance for Vučić has come at a high cost for neighboring countries, and without clear red lines, new incidents are only a matter of time.


In the face of growing opposition, particularly from students, Vučić finds himself with fewer tools to suppress dissent. Many in Serbia are weary of his 13-year rule. In contrast, others in the region have grown tired of his dual-faced rhetoric, alternating between ally and adversary to the West, Russia, China, and the Balkans. He perpetually warns of impending disasters while promising economic prosperity.


When the television is turned off, the division of spheres of influence and policymaking remains far from the public eye.



This article was originally published on the news portal nap.ba.

 

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