Trump and Erdoğan Test Ties as They Reshape the Middle East via Syria

The fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime marked the end of an era for Syria. Just a few months later, Syria once again stands at a crossroads. The leading roles are played by the United States and Turkey.

Photo: Illustration

Less than six months ago, al-Assad was toppled and the Middle East was reshaped. Russia faces the loss of its only naval base on the Mediterranean, Iran has been pushed out of Syria, Lebanese Hezbollah has lost its land corridor to Tehran through Iraq, and a major victory has been secured by all those who sought Assad’s downfall. This primarily includes most Western states, Israel, and ultimately Turkey, which now stands to gain more than others in the new reordering of the Middle East.

The final days of Joseph Biden’s presidency, as he awaited the handover of power to his successor, were marked by Assad’s fall. Biden will be remembered as the president during whose term a major Washington adversary was defeated—something that many previous occupants of the White House, including Trump in his first term, had failed to achieve.

Trump and Syria

In his first term, Trump ordered strikes against Syria, with U.S. forces initially entering the country under the pretext of fighting ISIS. In reality, Washington used the opportunity to strengthen the Kurds militarily and established the Al-Tanf military base at the tri-border area of Syria, Iraq, and Jordan, preventing Damascus from reaching its state borders. Along Syria’s northern frontier, American bases protected the Kurds from Turkish attacks.

Now, in his new term, Trump is once again turning his attention to Syria. Biden has left him with a clean slate. For months before the presidential election, U.S. media reported that Trump, upon returning to the White House, intended to withdraw troops from Syria. Now, he has the opportunity to do so even more easily—and possibly to secure concessions in return.

In the complex geopolitical game involving Israel, Iran, Russia, Lebanon, Jordan, and Iraq, Trump is expected to focus special attention on ally Turkey, a NATO member. An agreement with Ankara could bolster some of America’s positions in the Middle East and bring Turkey even closer. Trump is particularly counting on his strong personal ties with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.

Last week, Washington announced the withdrawal of part of its forces from Syria, after the government in Damascus—now more closely aligned with Turkey—reached an agreement with the Kurds to hand over control of oil fields and the Tishrin Dam on the Euphrates River. The United States will leave about one thousand troops in Syria, withdrawing roughly the same number.

The Kurds’ willingness to cede vital facilities to Damascus could not have occurred without American approval. The Kurds know that only the United States can protect them from Turkey, which accuses some Kurdish groups of terrorism. This particularly concerns the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which Washington also designates as a terrorist organization, though elements of it fought as part of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) against ISIS.

Turkey’s Presence in Syria and Israel’s Concerns

Trump’s decision to gradually integrate the Syrian Kurds into the new Syrian government, and to allow Damascus greater influence over territories it had not controlled for years, signals his trust in relations with Erdoğan—despite Israel’s objections to Turkey’s growing presence in Syria.

Last week, Trump told Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu that he "must be reasonable" regarding any disagreements with Turkey over Syria, praising his personal ties with Erdoğan.

"Any problem you have with Turkey, I think I can fix it. I mean, as long as you’re reasonable, you have to be reasonable. We all have to be reasonable," Trump said in the Oval Office while hosting Netanyahu. "Bibi, if you have a problem with Turkey, I really believe you’ll be able to solve it. You know, I have very good relations with Turkey and with their leader, and I think we’ll manage to sort it out. So I hope it won’t be a problem. I don’t think it will be a problem," he added, using Netanyahu’s nickname.

Netanyahu’s resistance to Turkey’s presence is no coincidence. Turkey is reportedly considering establishing its own air bases near Hama and Palmyra, in central Syria. A few days before Turkish experts were allegedly due to visit these bases, Israel bombed them. Israel is concerned about Turkey’s growing footprint, particularly since greater Turkish control over Syrian airspace could, at some point, hinder Israeli military operations.

Nevertheless, Tel Aviv’s official line is that Turkish military presence could lead to incidents between the two armies. Washington has tried to calm its closest ally, suggesting that there must be permanent communication channels with Turkey to avoid such incidents. Middle East Eye reported that Turkey told Washington it already maintains such communication channels in Syria with the United States, Russia, and Iran—and would have no problem establishing another with Israel.

The fate of the Syrian Kurds remains unclear. Turkey does not want armed Kurdish groups on its borders, and the new government in Damascus aims to restore control over all Syrian territory. During the Syrian war, the Kurds were a means for the U.S. to enter Syrian territory without Damascus’ official invitation and to protect Kurdish forces from attacks by Turkey, Syria, Russia, or Iran. Tel Aviv opposes any reduction of American military presence in Syria, and some in Israel have long proposed closer ties with the Kurds as potential strategic partners in the Middle East.

A New Syria

Ahmed al-Sharaa, a former member of al-Qaeda and ISIS, has come to power in Damascus—and is considered more acceptable to the West and almost all Syria’s neighbors than the secular Assad. In recent months, al-Sharaa has both visited and welcomed visits from Western delegations, despite having been long labeled a terrorist.

Today, al-Sharaa is a dialogue partner for the West. American, German, French, and numerous other delegations now regularly visit Damascus. The European Union is announcing aid packages for Syria, while the United States and the United Kingdom have begun removing the new Syrian rulers and government from sanctions lists.

Al-Sharaa has declared that he wants Syria to be rebuilt and that he seeks no wars with neighbors. He has refrained from commenting on Israel’s occupation of parts of Syrian territory. In his view, the only major regional issue for Syria is Iran’s influence.

It appears that al-Sharaa may not stop there. According to U.S. Republican Representative Cory Mills—who recently returned from a meeting with the new Syrian president in Damascus—al-Sharaa expressed a willingness to consider joining the Abraham Accords and recognizing Israel under certain conditions. Mills, along with colleague Marlin Stutzman, reportedly carried a letter from al-Sharaa to Trump outlining this position.

The new Syrian leadership’s readiness to engage with all sides, and the openness of others to listen, signals a new dynamic in Middle Eastern relations. This political stance is driven by Syria’s devastation, the need for foreign assistance, and the desire to see sanctions lifted. With Iran and Russia pushed out of Syria, Washington remains the only viable address for engagement.

The future of Syria will be determined by the broader relationships across the Middle East. With the defeat of Iran and Russia in Syria, Turkey and Israel now have an opportunity to expand their influence. This is happening at a time when Washington is pressuring Tehran to sign a new nuclear agreement.

Washington seeks partners to take over some of its positions in the Middle East, as the world’s largest power refocuses its attention on confronting China. Trump appears to count heavily on Erdoğan. Thus, Syria becomes part of an evolving Middle Eastern mosaic—and at the same time, a testing ground for the personal relationship between two presidents, strengthening the strategic ties between two allied nations.

The article was previously published on nap.ba.

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